STATE EX REL. NEB. STATE BAR v. Rhodes

453 N.W.2d 73, 234 Neb. 799
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 23, 1990
Docket89-142
StatusPublished

This text of 453 N.W.2d 73 (STATE EX REL. NEB. STATE BAR v. Rhodes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
STATE EX REL. NEB. STATE BAR v. Rhodes, 453 N.W.2d 73, 234 Neb. 799 (Neb. 1990).

Opinion

453 N.W.2d 73 (1990)
234 Neb. 799

STATE of Nebraska ex rel. NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, Relator,
v.
George G. RHODES, Respondent.

No. 89-142.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

March 23, 1990.

*75 Dennis G. Carlson, Counsel for Discipline, for relator.

William M. Connolly, of Conway, Connolly and Pauley, P.C., Hastings, for respondent.

HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is a disciplinary proceeding against the respondent, George G. Rhodes, who was admitted to the practice of law in Nebraska on April 8, 1977.

Formal charges against the respondent were filed in this court on February 24, 1989. The respondent's answer was filed on March 13, 1989. The allegations in the formal charges center around the propriety of the respondent's conduct in prosecuting Daniel T. Speer and the respondent's behavior toward Bradley Roth, an attorney who was appointed special prosecutor for some of the Speer prosecutions.

The respondent was charged with having violated his oath of office as an attorney at law, as provided by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 7-104 (Reissue 1987), and the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

DR 1-102 Misconduct.
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
....
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
....
DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment.
....
(B) Mandatory withdrawal.
A lawyer representing a client ... shall withdraw from employment ... if:
....
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
(3) His mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively.
....
DR 5-101 Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May Impair His Independent Professional Judgment.
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests.
....
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interest of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of his client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
....
DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.

In his answer, the respondent generally denied the substantive allegations contained in the formal charges. The respondent further alleged that this court does *76 not have jurisdiction over this matter because the hearing panel of the Committee on Inquiry did not transmit formal charges to the Disciplinary Review Board within 45 days, as required by Neb.Ct.R. of Discipline 9(H)(3)(h) (rev. 1989). In this case, the respondent alleges the formal charges were transmitted 53 days after the committee hearing.

We held in State ex rel. NSBA v. Kirshen, 232 Neb. 445, 441 N.W.2d 161 (1989), that a lawyer is entitled to due process of law in a disciplinary proceeding. However, technicalities cannot be invoked to defeat charges where there is evidence showing that the conduct alleged against the attorney is ethically wrong. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Jensen, 171 Neb. 1, 105 N.W.2d 459 (1960), cert. denied 365 U.S. 870, 81 S.Ct. 905, 5 L.Ed.2d 860 (1961); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Leonard, 212 Neb. 379, 322 N.W.2d 794 (1982).

Pursuant to Neb.Ct.R. of Discipline 10(B) (rev. 1989), this court may institute disciplinary proceedings on its own and has the inherent authority to direct the filing of disciplinary charges notwithstanding the action or inaction of the Committee on Inquiry. Even if formal charges are filed with the Disciplinary Review Board after the time provided in rule 9(H)(3)(h), the delay is not jurisdictional, and the rule does not require dismissal of the formal charges. We further note that the respondent has made no showing that he was prejudiced in any way by the alleged delay in the filing of the formal charges. The respondent's contention is without merit.

A referee was appointed on March 24, 1989, and the matter was heard on July 12 and 13, 1989. The report of the referee was filed in this court on August 15, 1989. The referee found that the respondent had violated the provisions of DR 1-102, DR 2-110, DR 5-101, and DR 7-102 and recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 5 years. Exceptions to the referee's report were filed by the respondent on August 25, 1989.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A proceeding to discipline an attorney is a trial de novo on the record, in which the Supreme Court reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the referee, provided, where credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the Supreme Court considers and may give weight to the fact that the referee heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. State ex rel. NSBA v. Douglas, 227 Neb. 1, 416 N.W.2d 515 (1987), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 31, 102 L.Ed.2d 10 (1988); State ex rel. NSBA v. Kirshen, supra. See also, State ex rel. NSBA v. Cohen, 231 Neb. 405, 436 N.W.2d 202 (1989); State ex rel. NSBA v. Neumeister, 234 Neb. 47, 449 N.W.2d 17 (1989). In its de novo review of the record in a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney, and to sustain a particular complaint against an attorney, the Supreme Court must find that the complaint has been established by clear and convincing evidence. State ex rel. NSBA v. Douglas, supra; State ex rel. NSBA v. Kirshen, supra.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Conner
666 P.2d 5 (California Supreme Court, 1983)
State v. Bell
370 P.2d 508 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1962)
People v. Superior Court (Greer)
561 P.2d 1164 (California Supreme Court, 1977)
STATE EX REL. NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASS'N v. Cohen
436 N.W.2d 202 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1989)
State Ex Rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Jensen
105 N.W.2d 459 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1960)
Kennedy v. L.D.
430 N.W.2d 833 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1988)
People v. Doyle
406 N.W.2d 893 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1987)
State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Douglas
416 N.W.2d 515 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1987)
State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Rhodes
453 N.W.2d 73 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
453 N.W.2d 73, 234 Neb. 799, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-neb-state-bar-v-rhodes-neb-1990.