State ex rel. Nasal v. BJS No. 2, Inc.

2003 Ohio 7323, 806 N.E.2d 208, 127 Ohio Misc. 2d 101
CourtMiami County Court of Common Pleas
DecidedOctober 16, 2003
DocketNo. 03-CV-287
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2003 Ohio 7323 (State ex rel. Nasal v. BJS No. 2, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Miami County Court of Common Pleas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Nasal v. BJS No. 2, Inc., 2003 Ohio 7323, 806 N.E.2d 208, 127 Ohio Misc. 2d 101 (Ohio Super. Ct. 2003).

Opinion

ORDER DECLARING THE CABARET PORTION OF TOTAL XPOSURE A NUISANCE, GRANTING A PERMANENT INJUNCTION, ABATEMENT, CLOSURE FOR ONE YEAR, FORFEITURE AND SALE OF CONTENTS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, IN PART R.C. 3767.01(C)(2) and (3), 3767.05, and 3767.06

Jeffrey M. Welbaum, Judge.

{¶ 1} On August 12, 2003, a trial to the court was heard on plaintiffs’ complaint for a permanent injunction, seeking a declaration and abatement of a nuisance, an order closing the business for one year, and forfeiture and sale of the personal property used to conduct the nuisance.

2} The defendants/respondents and their counsel, H. Louis Sirkin, Robert J. Huffman Jr., Jennifer M. Kinsley, and Michael R. Botros, attorneys at law, were present. The plaintiffs/relators were represented by Gary A. Nasal, Miami County Prosecuting Attorney, Mark W. Altier, Chief Civil Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, and W. McGregor Dixon Jr., Law Director of the city of Troy. Due to the lack of time prior to trial to allow a response to the plaintiffs’ motions to dismiss the defendants’ counterclaim, disposition of the motion to dismiss the counterclaim was postponed. The parties proceeded to litigate the plaintiffs’ [105]*105complaint for a permanent injunction. The motions to dismiss were subsequently granted by separate orders.

{¶ 3} On September 11, the court admitted STATE’S EXHIBITS 1 through 8. On September 22, defendants Scott Conrad and Luke Liakos, and BJS No. 2, Inc. and Haworth, Inc. filed their post-hearing briefs. On that date, the plaintiff filed its post-hearing merit memorandum. On September 29, the parties filed their reply memoranda and briefs.

{¶ 4} There is nude dancing performed at the cabaret portion of Total Xposure. First, it must be said that some people find nude dancing objectionable under any circumstances. Others not only approve of nude dancing, they obviously pay to watch. It is not the court’s function to decide whether the dancing at Total Xposure is morally acceptable or whether it is equivalent to a visit to the ballet or the human hog trough.

{¶ 5} It has been held by the United States Supreme Court that entertainment programs may not be prohibited solely because they display a nude human figure, and nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protection from official regulation. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim (1981), 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671. The court is confined to determinations based solely on the law and the facts proved at trial.

{¶ 6} Plaintiffs claim that Total Xposure is a nuisance for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs say that Total Xposure is a public nuisance under R.C. 3767.01(C)(2) due to the sexual activity that takes place on the premises. Second, the plaintiffs allege that it is a nuisance under R.C. 3767.01(C)(3) because the defendants permit, encourage, and promote the distribution of alcoholic beverages on its premises in violation of law.

{¶ 7} R.C. 3767.01(C) defines “nuisance” as:

“(1) That which is defined and declared by statute to be a nuisance;
“(2) Any place in or upon which lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted, permitted, continued or exists.* * *
“(3) Any room, house, building, boat, vehicle, structure, or place where beer or intoxicating liquor is manufactured, sold, bartered, possessed, or kept in violation of law * * * or the operation of such a room, house, building, boat, structure, or place as described in division (C)(3) of this section where the operation of that place substantially interferes with public decency, sobriety, peace, and good order. * * *”

{¶ 8} The Total Xposure defendants contend that any sexual contact with the patrons was incidental to the expressions exhibited by the performers during their dancing. They say that it is therefore protected under the First Amendment. As to the second claim, the defendants say that Total Xposure is a private [106]*106club and the liquor laws do not apply. Finally, the Total Xposure defendants say that they were not aware of any nuisance at the business. It is easy to envision cases with facts where these defenses will ring true. However, the defenses proposed are clearly inapplicable to the facts of this case.

{¶ 9} As a preliminary finding, the court must first determine whether Total Xposure is a private club. Lewd behavior does not constitute a nuisance unless Total Xposure is a public place. Also, the liquor laws were not violated if Total Xposure is a private club. In resolving this issue, the seven-factor test set forth in Tippecanoe Country Club, Inc. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (Mar. 30, 2000), Mahoning App. No 99 CA 330, 2000 WL 341128, requires the court to consider:

(1) the genuine selectivity of the group;
(2) the membership’s control over the operation of the establishment;
(3) the history of the organization;
(4) the use of the facilities by nonmembers;
(5) the club’s purpose;
(6) whether the club advertises for members; and
(7) whether the club is nonprofit or for profit.

{¶ 10} From the foregoing factors, the court finds that Total Xposure is a public place and not a private club. The evidence shows that there is no genuine selectivity in admission to Total Xposure. People become “members” upon signing the agreement, giving identification, and paying a cover charge. The membership has no control over the operation of the establishment. Total Xposure is for profit. There is no history or purpose of the organization that would support a conclusion that it is legitimately a private club.

{¶ 11} The partitioned couch-dance area is also public. It is open to view at different angles from the main cabaret area. All persons paying for a couch dance have access to this area upon paying for a couch dance. For example, it has been held that an enclosed video booth of an adult bookstore is a public area. State ex rel. Bowers v. Elida Rd. Video (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 78, 84, 696 N.E.2d 668.

{¶ 12} “For the purposes of defining lewdness under R.C. Chapter 3767, sexual activity that occurs in areas where there is no legitimate expectation of privacy is public sexual activity.” State ex rel. Roszmann v. Lions Den (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 775, 627 N.E.2d 629; State ex rel. Montgomery v. Pakrats Motorcycle Club, Inc. (1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 458, 693 N.E.2d 310. The announcers during EXHIBITS 1 through 8 informed the dancers and audience that the shows were being broadcasted live to thousands over the World Wide Web. The membership agreements that the customers signed included a consent that gave Total [107]*107Xposure permission to record and broadcast the patrons’ images for commercial purposes.

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Bluebook (online)
2003 Ohio 7323, 806 N.E.2d 208, 127 Ohio Misc. 2d 101, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-nasal-v-bjs-no-2-inc-ohctcomplmiami-2003.