State ex rel. Muhammad v. Holbrook
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State ex rel. Haneef Muhammad, :
Relator, :
No. 26AP-81
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
[Honorable] Michael Holbrook, :
Respondent. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on September 8, 2026
On brief: Haneef Muhammad, pro se.
On brief: Shayla D. Favor, Prosecuting Attorney, Gareth A. Whaley, and Devin E. Bartlett, for respondent.
IN PROCEDENDO
ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS DINGUS, J.
{¶ 1} Relator, Haneef Muhammad, filed a complaint in procedendo on February 4, 2026 asking that this court order respondent, Judge Michael Holbrook, to rule on numerous motions that Muhammad filed in October and November 2025. Judge Holbrook filed a motion to dismiss Muhammad’s complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, we referred this matter to a magistrate who issued the appended decision.
{¶ 2} On review, the magistrate recommends that we grant the motion to dismiss, noting that the Ohio Rules of Superintendence provide that courts should rule on motions within 120 days. See Sup.R. 40(A)(3), now codified at Sup.R. 5.23(A)(3). Because none of the motions identified in Muhammad’s complaint had been pending for 120 days or more at the time he filed his complaint, the magistrate concluded that the complaint failed to
No. 26AP-81 2
state a claim that Judge Holbrook had unduly delayed or refused to enter judgment on the motions.
{¶ 3} Muhammad filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, and Judge Holbrook responded with a memorandum in opposition to Muhammad’s objections. In his objections, Muhammad argues that the “120-day guideline does not resolve whether the delay has become unreasonable,” and that the magistrate erred in failing to consider the additional days that had passed by the time of the magistrate’s decision. (June 22, 2026 Relator’s Objs. at 1-2.) Muhammad additionally argues that he is seeking rulings, rather than particular outcomes, on his many pending motions. The latter of these objections is a general statement that is not relevant to the magistrate’s decision, and we therefore disregard it as non-compliant with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii).
{¶ 4} Apart from a reference to the 120-day rule now found in Sup.R. 5.23(A)(3), Muhammad has not provided any legal support for his arguments. We likewise find no legal support for the proposition that it is possible to state a claim in procedendo for delays under 120 days or that a prematurely filed procedendo action can be cured by the additional passage of time alone.
{¶ 5} A writ of procedendo provides a remedy where a court has either refused to enter judgment or has caused unnecessary delay in rendering judgment. State ex rel. Brown v. Logan, 2014-Ohio-769, ¶ 13; State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 1995-Ohio-26, ¶ 6. A successful procedendo action requires relators to show that they have a clear right for a court to proceed, the court has a clear legal duty to do so, and the relators lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Logan at ¶ 13; Sherrills at ¶ 4; State ex rel. Ward v. Reed, 2014-Ohio-4512, ¶ 9. The extraordinary remedy of procedendo exists to combat undue delay, not just any delay and; procedendo cannot be used to compel prompt decisions. Sherrills at ¶ 6; State ex rel. Luna v. Huffman, 74 Ohio St.3d 486, 488 (1996). And procedendo will not lie to interfere with ordinary court procedure. Sherrills at ¶ 4; State ex rel. Cochran v. Quillin, 20 Ohio St.2d 6, 6 (1969).
{¶ 6} If the facts alleged in a complaint in procedendo do not show that the court has refused or delayed its consideration of a petitioner’s motion, the complaint should be dismissed under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Sherrills at ¶ 6-7. Ohio’s Courts of Appeals, including the Tenth District, have consistently held that “complaints in procedendo are
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premature when the time period to rule on motions has not exceeded 120 days.” State ex rel. Goodwin v. Gaul, 2007-Ohio-4294, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.) (petitioner’s filings had been pending for approximately 2 months when the procedendo action was filed). See also Villavicencio v. Mingo, 2026-Ohio-1665, ¶ 3 (10th Dist.) (petitioner’s filings had been pending for 108 days); State ex rel. Cromwell v. Dellick, 2017-Ohio-8032, ¶ 7 (7th Dist.) (petitioner’s filings had been pending for 96 days); State ex rel. Ross v. McGookey, 2019- Ohio-1710, ¶ 6 (6th Dist.) (petitioner’s filings had been pending for 54 days); State ex rel. Stacey v. Owens, 2026-Ohio-905, ¶ 28-29 (5th Dist.) (petitioner’s filings had been pending for 78 days). We see no reason to depart from our own precedent or to diverge from the views consistently expressed in our sister districts.
{¶ 7} Although Muhammad would like the court to consider the additional passage of time since the filing of his complaint in procedendo, such consideration would be inappropriate when determining whether his complaint states a valid cause of action to withstand a motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) “is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 1992-Ohio-73, ¶ 9. An action generally “must be determined upon the rights of parties as they existed at the commencement of [the] action.” Clark v. Clark, 20 Ohio St. 128, 136 (1870). To state a valid cause of action in mandamus or procedendo regarding the judicial disposition of pending motions, the complaint must show that the court had a pre-existing or presently existing legal duty to rule on the petitioner’s motions at the time the complaint is filed. State ex rel. Martinelli v. Corrigan, 1994-Ohio-179, ¶ 5. If the allegations in a complaint demonstrate that a cause of action has not yet arisen, the matter is not ripe and is therefore not justiciable. See Keller v. Columbus, 2003-Ohio- 5599, ¶ 26 (“In order to be justiciable, a controversy must be ripe for review.”); Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 2010-Ohio-6036, ¶ 17 (“To be justiciable, a controversy must be grounded on a present dispute, not on a possible future dispute.”).
{¶ 8} If a litigant does not yet have a justiciable issue to bring before the court, the litigant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court and set the process in motion. See Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 20-27; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 22. See also Tobin v. McCann, 17 Mo. App. 481, 483 (1885) (“One cannot bring another into court and tax him with cost in defending against a non-
No. 26AP-81 4
existent right, upon the ground that a right may be created pending the procedure.”). Accordingly, if a cause of action has not yet arisen when the complaint is filed, then the complaint purporting to state such a cause of action should be dismissed. Schwartzwald at ¶ 28; Kincaid at ¶ 20; State ex rel. Jones v. Husted, 2016-Ohio-5752, ¶ 21.
{¶ 9} Muhammad’s complaint failed to indicate that Judge Holbrook had a pre-
existing or presently existing legal duty to rule on Muhammad’s motions at the time Muhammad filed his complaint. He therefore failed to present a justiciable controversy and invoke this court’s jurisdiction. We note that such a defect generally cannot be cured through amended or supplemental pleadings. See Schwartzwald at ¶ 25-26, 37; Clark at 136 (a motion to amend pleadings is not proper when it is, “in fact, a motion for leave to make a new case”). Moreover, even if supplemental pleadings would have been appropriate here, Muhammad did not seek to file a supplemental complaint. We need not consider new claims found only in Muhammad’s briefing. See RR. Co. v. Hutchins, 37 Ohio St. 282 (1881), paragraph three of the syllabus (if a subsequent “change takes place in the rights of the parties, it must be shown by supplemental pleading, otherwise it should be disregarded”).
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