State ex rel. Motor Vehicles Division v. Conforth
This text of 628 P.2d 781 (State ex rel. Motor Vehicles Division v. Conforth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Defendant appeals from an order declaring him to be a habitual traffic offender within the meaning of ORS 484.700 to 484.750, contending that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding because the state did not allege in its complaint that it had given the notice provided by ORS 484.715.1 We affirm.
At the hearing on the order to show cause issued on the basis of the complaint, the state introduced certified copies of convictions of three traffic citations and the warning letter required by ORS 484.715. Defendant objected to the admission of the warning letter on the grounds that it was not relevant to any issue raised by the pleadings and did not come within the scope of the pleadings. The objection was overruled, and at the conclusion of the state’s case defendant’s motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction was denied.
In State v. Wells, 27 Or App 537, 556 P2d 727 (1976), we held that the giving of the notice provided for in ORS 484.715 is essential to the court’s power to declare a defendant a habitual traffic offender; because the state did not prove the giving of such notice, we reversed the trial court’s order determining defendant to be a habitual traffic offender. In Wells, we expressly did not decide who has the burden of pleading and proving the notice or lack of notice under ORS 484.715. In State v. Carlile, 31 Or App 1065, 572 P2d 629 (1977), we affirmed the dismissal of the state’s complaint under the Habitual Traffic Offender’s Act on the ground that the Motor Vehicles Division had failed to "notify the licensee” as required by ORS 484.715. Although we did not expressly address the question of who had the burden of proof, it appears from the opinion that the burden was placed on the state to prove that it had given [620]*620the requisite notice. Our concern was with the meaning of the word "notify” as used in the statute; in other words, what kind of notice was required. A majority of the court concluded that it meant sending the requisite notice by registered mail, addressee only, return receipt requested. ’
Defendant here relies on the concluding sentence of our opinion in State v. Wells, supra, in which we said that Division compliance with ORS 484.715 "is a condition precedent to circuit court jurisdiction under the Act.” 27 Or App at 537. We used the word "jurisdiction” loosely to mean that the court did not have authority to enter an order declaring defendant to be a habitual traffic offender unless it was shown that the requisite notice was given. Clearly, the court had jurisdiction over both the defendant and the subject matter,2 but the defendant contended he did not receive the required notice and the state did not prove that it had given the notice.
We now hold that it is not necessary for the state to allege the giving of the notice; it is sufficient if the state proves at the trial that it gave the notice required by the statute as construed in State v. Carlile, supra.
Affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
628 P.2d 781, 52 Or. App. 617, 1981 Ore. App. LEXIS 2573, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-motor-vehicles-division-v-conforth-orctapp-1981.