State ex rel. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Public Service Commission

201 S.W. 1143, 273 Mo. 632, 1918 Mo. LEXIS 181
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedMarch 5, 1918
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 201 S.W. 1143 (State ex rel. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Public Service Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Public Service Commission, 201 S.W. 1143, 273 Mo. 632, 1918 Mo. LEXIS 181 (Mo. 1918).

Opinion

FARIS, J.

This is an appeal by the Public Service Commission from a judgment rendered in the circuit court of Cole County, whereby an order made by the Public Service Commission was modified.

Upon a hearing by the Public Service Commission of a complaint filed by A. B. Cole, as mayor of the city of California, against the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, and Benjamin F. Bush, the receiver’ thereof, wherein a better and more adequate interstate-train service was prayed for, the Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) made therein, so far as is pertinent to the points involved, the below order, to-wit:

“Now after due deliberation it is ordered: That the defendants, the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, and B. F. Bush, Receiver of the Missouri Pacific Railway [635]*635Company, be required from and after the effective date of this order and until the further order of this Commission to regularly stop their eastbound Passenger Train No. 2 at California, Missouri, and to stop their westbound Passenger Train No. 5 at California, Missouri, on flag; that is, to take on passengers for points beyond California, Missouri, where stops are made by said.trains, or to let off passengers boarding said trains at other points at which such trains stop.”

Upon the hearing before the Commission, the defendants therein, who are the relators here (and are hereinafter for brevity so styled), in effect conceded in their testimony the justness of the order of the Commission, as to the stop thereby required to be made at California by relators’ eastbound Passenger Train No. 2, and in the exceptions which relators filed to the finding and order of the Commission no complaint is made of such part of said order as refers to Train No. 2.

Upon the entering by the Commission of the order above recited, and following the conventional procedure in that behalf, defendants sued out a writ of certiorari in the circuit court of Cole County; wherein, the regular judge of said court having disqualified himself, Judge A. W. Walker, of the Ninth Circuit, was called in and sat upon the trial as special judge, and on a hearing therein de novo rendered the below judgment, to-wit:

“Now at this day this cause comes on for final determination and the court finds that the order of the Public Service Commission is lawful and reasonable in all respects except that portion requiring Train No. 5 to stop on flag to take on passengers for points beyond California, Missouri, where stops are made by said trains at other points at which such trains stop as set forth in the latter part of paragraph 1, and that said portion of said order is unreasonable in requiring said train to stop except on flag or request for passengers from St. Louis to California, Missouri, as set forth in plaintiff’s motion to modify.
[636]*636“It is therefore ordered and adjudged that this cause be reversed and remanded to the Public Service Commission for further consideration.”

From this judgment the Commission, after the usual motions and procedure, has appealed. The evidentiary facts, since they are in our view decisive of all of the questions involved herein, will be found in the discussion of the law, which we think ought to apply to the case.

Trainfate This case turns wholly upon the facts. For the law, so far at least as concerns its general terms, is well-settled. The rule in such cases has been repeatedly stated; never more- clearly qnd carefully per^aps, certainly never more authoritatively, than by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Mississippi Railroad Comm. v. Illinois Central Railroad, 203 U. S. l. c. 344, where it was said:

“Upon the principles decided in these cases, a state railroad commission has the right, under a-state statute, so far as railroads are concerned, to compel a company to stop its trains under the circumstances already referred to, and it may order the stoppage of such trains if the company does not otherwise furnish proper and adequate accommodation to a particular locality, and in such cases the order may embrace a through interstate train actually running and compel it to stop at a locality named. In such case, in the absence of Congressional legislation covering the subject, there is no illegal or improper interference with the interstate commerce right; but if the company has furnished all such proper and reasonable accommodation to the locality as fairly may be demanded, taking.into consideration the fact, if it be one, that the locality is a county seat, and the amount and character of the business done, then any interference with the company (either directly by statute, or by a railroad commission acting under authority of a statute) by causing its interstate trains to stop at a particular locality in the State, is an improper and illegal interference with the rights of the railroad [637]*637company, and a violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. ’ ’

The identical general rule is stated in the later case of Herndon v. Railroad, 218 U. S. l. c. 156, as also in divers other cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, which is empowered to speak upon this subject the decisive and authoritative and last word. [Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142; Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427; Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514; Atlantic Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Wisconsin, 237 U. S. 220; Atlantic Coast Line v. North Carolina Corp. Comm., 206 U. S. 1; Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510; Railroad v. Public Service Comm., 216 Fed. 252; Ohage v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 200 Fed. 128.]

In the case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Wisconsin, supra, at page 226, is was said:

“In reviewing the decision we may start with certain principles as established: (1) It is competent for a State to require adequate local facilities, even to the stoppage of interstate trains or the re-arrangement of their schedules. (2) Such facilities existing — that is, the local conditions being adequately met — -the obligation of the railroad is performed, and the stoppage of interstate trains becomes an improper and illegal interference with interstate commerce. (3) And this, whether the interference be directly by the Legislature or by its command through the orders of an administrative body. (4).

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Lusk v. Public Service Commission
210 S.W. 72 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1919)

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Bluebook (online)
201 S.W. 1143, 273 Mo. 632, 1918 Mo. LEXIS 181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-missouri-pacific-railway-co-v-public-service-commission-mo-1918.