State ex rel. Miller v. Mead Corp.

Ohio Supreme Court

State ex rel. Miller v. Mead Corp.

390 N.E.2d 1192, 58 Ohio St. 2d 405, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 348, 1979 Ohio LEXIS 449

CourtOhio Supreme Court

DecidedJune 20, 1979

DocketNo. 78-388

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 390 N.E.2d 1192 (State ex rel. Miller v. Mead Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State ex rel. Miller v. Mead Corp., 390 N.E.2d 1192, 58 Ohio St. 2d 405, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 348, 1979 Ohio LEXIS 449 (Ohio 1979).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

Appellee’s disability is not the result of an injury, within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act, since an injury “comprehends a physical or traumatic damage or harm,” which must be “accidental in its character in the sense of being the result of a sudden mishap occurring by chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual course of events, at a particular time and place.” Malone v. Indus. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N. E. 2d 266, paragraph one of the svllabus; Bowman v. National Graphics Corp. (1978), 55 Ohio St. 2d 222, 224, 378 N. E. 2d 1056.

The issue, therefore, is whether a pre-existing disease, aggravated while a claimant is in the employ of an employer subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act, may be the subject of compensation from the fund.

R. C. 4123.54 states that “ [ejvery employee, who * * * contracts an occupational disease * * * is entitled to receive *' * * compensation * * *.” And, in State, ex red. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., v. Krise (1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 247, 327 N. E. 2d 756, this court stated! in the syllabus: “An occupational disease is compensable under R. C. 4123.68(BB) where the following criteria exist: (1) The disease is contracted in the course of employment * * *.”

We do not fault the Court of Appeals’ majority for its effort to award compensation in this case. However, current statutory law does not permit such an outcome. The record, speaks clearly that appellee did not “contract” his disease, within the meaning of R. C. 4123.54 or 4123.68, while he was an R C. 4123.01 (A) “employee” of an R. C. 4123.01(B) “employer.”

[407]*407Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Celebrezze, C. J., HeebeRt, W. Brown, P. Brown, Sweeney, Locher and! Palmer, JJ., concur. Palmer, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for Holmes, J., who did not participate because he was a Judge of the Court of Appeals which heard the case.

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Per Curiam.

Appellee’s disability is not the result of an injury, within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act, since an injury “comprehends a physical or traumatic damage or harm,” which must be “accidental in its character in the sense of being the result of a sudden mishap occurring by chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual course of events, at a particular time and place.” Malone v. Indus. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N. E. 2d 266, paragraph one of the svllabus; Bowman v. National Graphics Corp. (1978), 55 Ohio St. 2d 222, 224, 378 N. E. 2d 1056.

The issue, therefore, is whether a pre-existing disease, aggravated while a claimant is in the employ of an employer subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act, may be the subject of compensation from the fund.

R. C. 4123.54 states that “ [ejvery employee, who * * * contracts an occupational disease * * * is entitled to receive *' * * compensation * * *.” And, in State, ex red. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., v. Krise (1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 247, 327 N. E. 2d 756, this court stated! in the syllabus: “An occupational disease is compensable under R. C. 4123.68(BB) where the following criteria exist: (1) The disease is contracted in the course of employment * * *.”

We do not fault the Court of Appeals’ majority for its effort to award compensation in this case. However, current statutory law does not permit such an outcome. The record, speaks clearly that appellee did not “contract” his disease, within the meaning of R. C. 4123.54 or 4123.68, while he was an R C. 4123.01 (A) “employee” of an R. C. 4123.01(B) “employer.”

[407]*407Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Celebrezze, C. J., HeebeRt, W. Brown, P. Brown, Sweeney, Locher and! Palmer, JJ., concur. Palmer, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for Holmes, J., who did not participate because he was a Judge of the Court of Appeals which heard the case.

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Bluebook (online)

390 N.E.2d 1192, 58 Ohio St. 2d 405, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 348, 1979 Ohio LEXIS 449, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-miller-v-mead-corp-ohio-1979.

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