PER CURIAM:
The petitionex’, Dai’rell V. McGraw, Attorney Genei’al for the State of West Virginia, seeks a writ of prohibition directed to the respondent, Charles E. King, Jr., Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, to enjoin enforcement of the August 15, 2011, order herein dismissing the petitioner’s action seeking enforcement of cei’tain investigative subpoenas issued against the respondents, Fast Auto Loans, Inc., a Virginia corporation; Community Loans of America, Inc., a Georgia corporation; and Robert I. Reich, the president and chief executive office of both corporations. After careful review of the record presented, the briefs and arguments of the parties as well as the brief of the amici curiae1 we deny the re[368]*368quested writ of prohibition for the reasons contained herein.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The petitioner, Darrell V. McGraw, is the Attorney General for the State of West Virginia. Respondent Charles E. King, Jr., is a judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. Respondent Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (hereinafter “FAL”), is a Virginia corporation. Respondent Community Loans of America, Inc. (hereinafter CLA) is a Georgia corporation. Respondent Robert I. Reich (hereinafter “Reich”), is the chief executive officer of both FAL and CLA and is a resident of the state of Georgia.
FAL and CLA are non-resident corporations that do not have offices or places of business in West Virginia. Their business consists of loaning money to people who own motor vehicles. The loan is secured by a lien on the borrower’s motor vehicle. These types of loans are often referred to as “title loans.” It is the position of the Attorney General that these loans are not authorized by West Virginia law, that West Virginia residents obtain these loans in Virginia, and that FAL and CLA attempt to collect on some of the delinquent title loans in West Virginia.
The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division received three complaints by West Virginia residents regarding the collection of these title loans provided by respondents, FAL and CLA The complaints were not about the loans themselves; rather the complaints were about telephone calls seeking information from and about the debtors. The first complaint was received on February 16, 2007. The second complaint was received on March 16, 2009, by a father whose daughter, a resident of Virginia, was the recipient of the respondent FAL’s loan. The final complaint was received on September 9, 2010. The manner of the calls, according to the Attorney General, violated the West Virginia Consumer Protection Act (W. Va.Code § 46A-1-101, et seq.)
These complaints triggered an investigation by the Attorney General into the legality of these collection calls. As part of his investigation, the Attorney General on March 2, 2011, issued an administrative subpoena duces tecum to the respondents, seeking disclosure of documents regarding loans made to West Virginia residents.2 The authority of the Attorney General to issue this type of investigative subpoena may be found in W. Va.Code § 46A-7-104G) (1974).3 The sub[369]*369poena requested compliance with the disclosure of documents by March 21, 2011. This investigative subpoena duces tecum was served upon the respondents by certified mail, return receipt requested. FAL’s subpoena was mailed to an address in Georgia. Neither FAL nor CLA responded to the subpoenas with documents. Instead, each had asked for more time, to April 4, 2011, to respond to the State’s requests.
On April 5, 2011, the respondents filed the affidavit of Terry E. Fields, the chief financial officer of FAL. This affidavit stated that FAL was not registered to transact business within West Virginia. Further, Mr. Fields testified that FAL did not have any offices or employees within this state. The respondents indicated that it was their position that they were under no obligation to produce the documents requested by the Attorney General in the investigative subpoena.
On April 28, 2011, the Attorney General filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County an action seeking enforcement of the previously issued subpoena duces tecum. On April 28, 2011, the respondent, Judge Charles E. King, Jr., issued a Rule to Show Cause directed to FAL, CLA and the respondent, Robert I. Reich, setting a hearing for June 8, 2011, on the issue of whether the respondents needed to comply with petitioner’s request for documents. The respondents filed a response indicating that the subpoena duces tecum was invalid and moved that it should be quashed because the Attorney General ignored procedural requirements for the issuance of an out-of-state subpoena. The respondents contended that the Attorney General should have attempted to domesticate the subpoena in the state of incorporation or residence for each respondent instead of merely mailing the self-issued subpoena to the respondents. The respondents also raised the issue of whether the Attorney General was properly before the West Virginia courts for enforcement.
A hearing was held before the respondent Judge King on June 8, 2011. At the conclusion of the hearing the circuit court requested that each party submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a proposed order for the court’s review and entry. On August 15, 2011, the circuit court ruled that the investigative subpoena was proeedurally defective and therefore invalid, and denied the petitioner’s request for enforcement of the subpoena.
In denying the petitioner’s request for judicial enforcement of the subpoena, the circuit court held that the petitioner had failed to abide by the requirements for issuance of and service of subpoenas on out-of-state entities. Citing Syl. pt. 1, State ex. rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996), the circuit court found that in order to obtain judicial enforcement of the investigative subpoena, the petitioner had to prove five “tightly drawn” requirements, including (1) that the subpoena was issued for a legislatively authorized purpose; (2) that the information sought is relevant to the authorized purpose; (3) that the information sought is not already in the petitioner’s possession; (4) that the information described is adequately described and (5) that proper procedures were employed in issuing the subpoena.
The circuit court reasoned that it was only after these factors were satisfied that the subpoena could be determined to be presumptively valid, shifting the burden to the respondent to show why the subpoena is not enforceable. Quoting again from Hoover, the circuit court found that “West Virginia courts are ‘particularly sensitive to claims of administrative subpoena ‘abuse,’ ” and when such a claim is raised, the circuit court must perform its “gatekeeper function” and provide “meaningful judicial oversight” and “careful [370]*370scrutiny” to determine if the subpoena is entitled to judicial backing. Hoover at 18-19,483 S.E.2d at 18-19.
The circuit court found that the sole issue before it was whether the petitioner had employed proper procedures in issuing the administrative investigative subpoena to the respondents. The order noted, inter alia, that if the Attorney General could not demonstrate that the subpoena was procedurally sound, the subpoena would be invalid and could not be enforced by the circuit court.
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PER CURIAM:
The petitionex’, Dai’rell V. McGraw, Attorney Genei’al for the State of West Virginia, seeks a writ of prohibition directed to the respondent, Charles E. King, Jr., Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, to enjoin enforcement of the August 15, 2011, order herein dismissing the petitioner’s action seeking enforcement of cei’tain investigative subpoenas issued against the respondents, Fast Auto Loans, Inc., a Virginia corporation; Community Loans of America, Inc., a Georgia corporation; and Robert I. Reich, the president and chief executive office of both corporations. After careful review of the record presented, the briefs and arguments of the parties as well as the brief of the amici curiae1 we deny the re[368]*368quested writ of prohibition for the reasons contained herein.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The petitioner, Darrell V. McGraw, is the Attorney General for the State of West Virginia. Respondent Charles E. King, Jr., is a judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. Respondent Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (hereinafter “FAL”), is a Virginia corporation. Respondent Community Loans of America, Inc. (hereinafter CLA) is a Georgia corporation. Respondent Robert I. Reich (hereinafter “Reich”), is the chief executive officer of both FAL and CLA and is a resident of the state of Georgia.
FAL and CLA are non-resident corporations that do not have offices or places of business in West Virginia. Their business consists of loaning money to people who own motor vehicles. The loan is secured by a lien on the borrower’s motor vehicle. These types of loans are often referred to as “title loans.” It is the position of the Attorney General that these loans are not authorized by West Virginia law, that West Virginia residents obtain these loans in Virginia, and that FAL and CLA attempt to collect on some of the delinquent title loans in West Virginia.
The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division received three complaints by West Virginia residents regarding the collection of these title loans provided by respondents, FAL and CLA The complaints were not about the loans themselves; rather the complaints were about telephone calls seeking information from and about the debtors. The first complaint was received on February 16, 2007. The second complaint was received on March 16, 2009, by a father whose daughter, a resident of Virginia, was the recipient of the respondent FAL’s loan. The final complaint was received on September 9, 2010. The manner of the calls, according to the Attorney General, violated the West Virginia Consumer Protection Act (W. Va.Code § 46A-1-101, et seq.)
These complaints triggered an investigation by the Attorney General into the legality of these collection calls. As part of his investigation, the Attorney General on March 2, 2011, issued an administrative subpoena duces tecum to the respondents, seeking disclosure of documents regarding loans made to West Virginia residents.2 The authority of the Attorney General to issue this type of investigative subpoena may be found in W. Va.Code § 46A-7-104G) (1974).3 The sub[369]*369poena requested compliance with the disclosure of documents by March 21, 2011. This investigative subpoena duces tecum was served upon the respondents by certified mail, return receipt requested. FAL’s subpoena was mailed to an address in Georgia. Neither FAL nor CLA responded to the subpoenas with documents. Instead, each had asked for more time, to April 4, 2011, to respond to the State’s requests.
On April 5, 2011, the respondents filed the affidavit of Terry E. Fields, the chief financial officer of FAL. This affidavit stated that FAL was not registered to transact business within West Virginia. Further, Mr. Fields testified that FAL did not have any offices or employees within this state. The respondents indicated that it was their position that they were under no obligation to produce the documents requested by the Attorney General in the investigative subpoena.
On April 28, 2011, the Attorney General filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County an action seeking enforcement of the previously issued subpoena duces tecum. On April 28, 2011, the respondent, Judge Charles E. King, Jr., issued a Rule to Show Cause directed to FAL, CLA and the respondent, Robert I. Reich, setting a hearing for June 8, 2011, on the issue of whether the respondents needed to comply with petitioner’s request for documents. The respondents filed a response indicating that the subpoena duces tecum was invalid and moved that it should be quashed because the Attorney General ignored procedural requirements for the issuance of an out-of-state subpoena. The respondents contended that the Attorney General should have attempted to domesticate the subpoena in the state of incorporation or residence for each respondent instead of merely mailing the self-issued subpoena to the respondents. The respondents also raised the issue of whether the Attorney General was properly before the West Virginia courts for enforcement.
A hearing was held before the respondent Judge King on June 8, 2011. At the conclusion of the hearing the circuit court requested that each party submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a proposed order for the court’s review and entry. On August 15, 2011, the circuit court ruled that the investigative subpoena was proeedurally defective and therefore invalid, and denied the petitioner’s request for enforcement of the subpoena.
In denying the petitioner’s request for judicial enforcement of the subpoena, the circuit court held that the petitioner had failed to abide by the requirements for issuance of and service of subpoenas on out-of-state entities. Citing Syl. pt. 1, State ex. rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996), the circuit court found that in order to obtain judicial enforcement of the investigative subpoena, the petitioner had to prove five “tightly drawn” requirements, including (1) that the subpoena was issued for a legislatively authorized purpose; (2) that the information sought is relevant to the authorized purpose; (3) that the information sought is not already in the petitioner’s possession; (4) that the information described is adequately described and (5) that proper procedures were employed in issuing the subpoena.
The circuit court reasoned that it was only after these factors were satisfied that the subpoena could be determined to be presumptively valid, shifting the burden to the respondent to show why the subpoena is not enforceable. Quoting again from Hoover, the circuit court found that “West Virginia courts are ‘particularly sensitive to claims of administrative subpoena ‘abuse,’ ” and when such a claim is raised, the circuit court must perform its “gatekeeper function” and provide “meaningful judicial oversight” and “careful [370]*370scrutiny” to determine if the subpoena is entitled to judicial backing. Hoover at 18-19,483 S.E.2d at 18-19.
The circuit court found that the sole issue before it was whether the petitioner had employed proper procedures in issuing the administrative investigative subpoena to the respondents. The order noted, inter alia, that if the Attorney General could not demonstrate that the subpoena was procedurally sound, the subpoena would be invalid and could not be enforced by the circuit court. The circuit court ruled that the subpoena could not withstand scrutiny because the procedural requirements for issuing a valid out-of-state subpoena duces tecum were not met.
The Attorney General did not file a direct appeal to this Court from the order of August 15, 2011. On December 5, 2011, the petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition, seeking the stop the enforcement of the circuit court’s order.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Syllabus Point 4 of Hoover, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12, we explained that
In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal’s order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.
Using this standard of review, we examine the Attorney General’s request for a writ of prohibition.
III.
DISCUSSION
In his petition to this Court the Attorney General raised five distinct questions of law, all going to the merits of whether the circuit court should have enforced the investigative subpoena issued by the Attorney General.4 [371]*371The respondents argue that these questions are improperly before this Court, and that the sole issue for review is whether the circuit court was correct when it ruled that the Attorney General had failed to utilize the proper procedure when it issued and served the administrative investigative subpoenas upon the out-of-state respondents.
We agree with the respondent that the five questions posed by the Attorney General exceed the scope of our review in an original jurisdiction extraordinary remedy proceeding. The underlying order issued by Judge King clearly framed the issue facing him as whether the Attorney General issued a procedurally sound subpoena to the respondents. Relying upon the Hoover analysis the circuit court found that the petitioner made procedural missteps in executing and serving the subpoenas upon the out-of-state respondents. An appeal of that decision to this Court would have allowed this Court to rule on the propriety of that ruling. However, the proceeding before us is not an appeal on the merits, but rather a petition for writ of prohibition.
This Court looks with disfavor upon the use of the extraordinary writ process to address problems which should have been handled by an appeal. The writ of prohibition is truly an extraordinary remedy, one which should be reserved for extraordinary eases. We have held that
“Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts from proceedings in causes over which they have no jurisdiction, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are exceeding their legitimate powers, and may not be used as a substitute for [a petition for appeal] or certiorari.”
Syl. pt. 1, Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W.Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953).
Whether there was another adequate remedy available to the Attorney General is a factor in determining whether to issue a discretionary writ of prohibition. We held in Hoover:
In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal’s order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear eiTor as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.
Syl. pt. 4, Hoover v. Berger, ibid.
In the instant case, there was another adequate remedy clearly available to the Attorney General; i.e., the filing of a direct appeal to this Court. A direct appeal is a more appropriate remedy available to address the perceived error in the lower court’s order. The petition for writ of prohibition is not a substitute for an appeal. We therefore deny the requested writ of prohibition.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Because the petitioners had another adequate remedy, that being an appeal of the order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, we deny the issuance of the writ of prohibition.
Writ denied.
Justice WORKMAN dissents, and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.