State ex rel. Long v. Brinkman

3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 710, 7 Ohio C.C. 165
CourtPutnam Circuit Court
DecidedFebruary 15, 1893
StatusPublished

This text of 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 710 (State ex rel. Long v. Brinkman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Putnam Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Long v. Brinkman, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 710, 7 Ohio C.C. 165 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1893).

Opinion

SENEY, J.

The relator. David C. Long, is Captain of Company “I,” 2nd Regiment of Infantry, Ohio National Guard, and as such Captain has given bond, and is responsible for the care and preservation of a large amount of arms, equipments, uniforms and other military property furnished by the state to said Company “I.”

[711]*711That Company “I” is a regularly, legally organized company of infantry under the laws of Ohio, and a part of the active militia of the state, and has been furnished by the -state with arms, equipments, uniforms, blankets and other military property necessary for rts use as such active militia.

That at the commencement of this action the total number of members of said company was fifty-three, consisting of three commissioned officers and fifty enlisted men. That thirty-seven of said members were at said time residents of said Putnam county, Ohio, and that the headquarters of said company are situated in Ottawa, in said county, and a majority .of said members are now residents of said Putnam county.

That the armory, rented for said company by the board of' county commissioners, was inspected by an officer appointed for that purpose by the commander in chief of said militia, .and was by such officer disapproved and rejected, for the reason that it was totally unfit ■for an armory for said Company “I.”

That the respondents, the board of county commissioners of Putnam county, Ohio, -were duly notified of such inspection by such officer, and of his disapproval and rejection of ithe same as unfit for the purposes of an armory, and requested and demand was made of said board to furnish a suitable armory, but that the said respondents then and there neglected and refused, and do still neglect and refuse to furnish any suitable armory, or ■any room other than the one so condemned by the inspecting officer.

That a suitable room could, at the time of filing the application, and still can be procured for said purpose, of which fact the respondents, the board of county commissioners, had full knowledge.

Upon this state of affairs, can the board of county commissioners of Putnam county, Ohio, be compelled by a peremptory writ of mandamus, to furnish Company “I” a suitable room or armory, is the question presented to the court by an appeal from the court of common pleas of this county.

It is urged and claimed by the relator that this quéstion must be answered in the affirmative, by virtue of sec. 3085 of the Rev. Stat. of the state, as amended and found in vol. 89 O. L.,413, which section reads:

“Section 3085. The Board of County Commissioners of the county in. which all or a majority of the officers and enlisted men of any regiment, battalion, company, troop or battery reside, shall provide for each organization a suitable armory for the purposes of ■drill and for the safe keeping of the arms, equipments, uniforms and other military property -furnished by the state, subject to the inspection and approval of an officer detailed for that purpose by the commander-in-chief, and the expense of armories, including the necessary care of said armories, fuel and light, shall be paid either by the county wherein all the ■members of any such organization reside, or by counties in proportion as they have resident -members of any such organization.”

As the facts presented in the case at bar show that a majority of the officers •and enlisted men of Company “I” reside in Putnam county; then under said sec. •3085, Putnam county is the county that is required to furnish an armory to Company “I.” The furnishing of this armory involves necessarily an expense — an •expenditure of public money — be the same a large or a small amount. As to how much of this amount Putnam county is to pay, or from what source it is to •derive the money to pay with, me section is silent. True the section provides that (as in the case at bar), where the members of the company reside in different counties, said counties should pay the expenses in proportion to the resident members. But what tribunal, board or officer shall determine the resident members of the respective counties so as to be able to determine the proportionate amount of the expense each county must pay, the section does not say.

Company “I” has fifty-three members, thirty-seven of whom reside in Put-mam county. So that of the expenses of an armory and its maintenance, Putnam county must pay 37-53 of the expense. Nothwithstanding Putnam county is only required to pay 37-53 of the expense, yet it is also required to furnish an armory and maintain it, which carries with it the payment of the entire expense. After Putnam county has obligated itself for an armory and its maintenance, which under all rules of law governing contracts makes it liable for -the entire amount, how and in what manner is Putnam county to receive the other 16-53 ■of the expense? The section is silent.

[712]*712Again:

Putnam county must pay only 37-53 of the expense. From what source will it receive the money, or from what fund will it be paid? The section is silent.

If the views thus expressed are correct, it is evident that the object and purpose of section 3085 it is impossible to execute, on account of these imperfections, and it is therefore void.

As held by the supreme court in the case of State v. Com’rs, 35 O. S., 458, 466, wherein Judge' Oke-y says:

“Because the act is vague and indefinite in its terms, cases may be found in which statutes have been held void on such grounds, but as decided in Cochran v. Loring, 17 O., 409, though the law is imperfect in its details, it is not void unless it is so imperfect as tc> render it impossible to execute.”

It is further urged and claimed 'by relator that although sec. 3085 does not provide from what source or fund the expense shall be paid, it does authorize the commissioners to create the liability, and by so doing they are governed by section 2822 and 2823 of the Rev. Stat.

Section 2822 provides that:

“The county commissioners shall at their March or June session, annually, determine on the amount to be raised for ordinary county purposes, for public buildings, for the support of the poor, and for the interest and principal of the public debt, and for road and. bridge purposes, and they shall set forth in the record of their proceedings, specifically, the amount to be raised for each of said purposes.”
Section 2823 provides the limit of the levy for county purposes other than for roads,' bridges, county buildings, sites therefor, and the purchase of lands for infirmary purposes, and further limits the levy for the purpose of building county buildings, purchasing sites-therefor, etc., etc.

The general assembly derive the power to enact secs. 2822 and 2823 from t|ie constitution of the state, as expressed in Art. X, sec. 7, which reads: i “The commissioners of counties, the trustees of townships and similar boards, shall have such powers of local taxation for police purposes as may be prescribed by law.”

• From this article and section of the constitution it will be noticed that the commissioners of a county are limited in their powers of taxation to “local taxation for police purposes.”

■ Acting under this limitation, the general assembly enacted secs.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 710, 7 Ohio C.C. 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-long-v-brinkman-ohcirctputnam-1893.