State Ex Rel. Letcher v. Keco Industries, Incorp., 07ap-151 (4-22-2008)

2008 Ohio 1907
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 22, 2008
DocketNo. 07AP-151.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2008 Ohio 1907 (State Ex Rel. Letcher v. Keco Industries, Incorp., 07ap-151 (4-22-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Letcher v. Keco Industries, Incorp., 07ap-151 (4-22-2008), 2008 Ohio 1907 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Ora L. Letcher, as the surviving spouse of John Letcher, filed this original action, which requests a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order denying Mr. Letcher's *Page 2 application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation and to enter an order awarding relator the compensation Mr. Letcher would have received, but for his death.

{¶ 2} This court referred this matter to a magistrate pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that this court grant a writ ordering the commission to vacate the April 20, 2004 order and, in a manner consistent with the magistrate's decision, enter a new order either granting or denying the application. (Attached as Appendix A.) No party has filed objections to the magistrate's findings of fact, and we adopt them as our own.

{¶ 3} As detailed in the magistrate's decision, the commission relied upon the medical report of Dr. Ron M. Koppenhoefer and the employability assessment and deposition testimony of Ms. Christine Vogelsang. Although not entirely clear, Dr. Koppenhoefer's report indicated that Mr. Letcher was capable of sedentary work, but the allowed conditions precluded him from performing "material handling tasks" and he "should be able to change his position at will."

{¶ 4} Based on Dr. Koppenhoefer's findings and considering other relevant non-medical factors, Ms. Vogelsang concluded that Mr. Letcher was capable of performing identified jobs, which, in her view, were sedentary in nature and required below average academic aptitude: monitor, operator, charter, preparer, engraver, and stuffer. The magistrate concluded that the commission could not rely on Ms. Vogelsang's list of employment options for two reasons: (1) Ms. Vogelsang stated in her deposition that all but the monitor job would require some degree of material handling; and (2) as to the monitor job, Ms. Vogelsang stated that sedentary jobs usually do not permit the worker *Page 3 to change positions at will. While the magistrate did not eliminate Ms. Vogelsang's report entirely, the magistrate recommended a writ ordering the commission to enter a new order either granting or denying the application.

{¶ 5} The commission has filed objections to the magistrate's conclusions of law, essentially arguing that the magistrate substituted his judgment for that of the commission. We agree.

{¶ 6} The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly held that this court may not substitute its judgment for the commission's judgment in evaluating evidence. See, e.g., State ex rel. Athey v. Indus. Comm.,89 Ohio St.3d 473, 476, 2000-Ohio-489; State ex rel. Jackson v. Indus. Comm.,79 Ohio St.3d 266, 268, 1997-Ohio-152. Instead, the commission is the exclusive evaluator of factual evidence in determining whether an individual is entitled to compensation. State ex rel. Cherryhill Mgmt., Inc. v. Indus.Comm., 116 Ohio St.3d 27, 2007-Ohio-5508, ¶ 13; State ex rel. Teece v.Indus. Comm. (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 165. More to the point at issue here, this court has previously held that the commission need not explain why it concluded a claimant could perform each of the jobs listed in an order or expert report. State ex rel. Collins v. Almar RealtyCorp., Franklin App. No. 05AP-862, 2006-Ohio-3554, ¶ 17.

{¶ 7} As to whether the jobs listed in her report require material handling, Ms. Vogelsang stated that, with the exception of monitor, the jobs would require material handling to "some degree." (Depo., 24.) Despite this testimony, the commission was free to determine for itself what tasks each job required and whether those tasks conflicted with the medical evidence. For example, the job of telephone operator, as defined by the commission, requires the worker to operate a switchboard to relay calls. *Page 4 While the description states that the job may require a worker to type or sort mail, the basic requirements of the position only require a worker to push switch keys and plug telephone jacks into a switchboard. Likewise, the job description of a charter, who observes horseraces and records and communicates relevant data, does not indicate that it requires material handling. Instead, the job requires the individual to record information, compute race completion times, and mail records. Thus, at the very least, the commission reasonably could conclude that these jobs require no material handling, despite Ms. Vogelsang's testimony.

{¶ 8} As to whether Mr. Letcher was capable of performing the position of monitor, we note the magistrate's reliance on the exchange between relator's counsel and Ms. Vogelsang at her deposition. In our view, that testimony does not establish with certainty that Mr. Letcher could not perform any of the jobs identified by Ms. Vogelsang. Ms. Vogelsang agreed that, "[f]or the most part," sedentary jobs require the ability to sit for six out of eight hours, not that they always require sitting for six hours straight without any movement. (Depo., 23.) When asked whether sedentary jobs "traditionally" permit an individual to get up and move at all, she responded: "Not usually. That's changing, though, a lot, based on the current labor market. Employers are being much more flexible." (Depo., 23-24.) In other words, Ms. Vogelsang's testimony did not establish that Mr. Letcher could not perform the job of monitor.

{¶ 9} In any event, as with the other positions, the commission was free to determine whether Mr. Letcher could work as a monitor within his restrictions. As the position description indicates, the job of surveillance system monitor requires an individual to monitor the premises of public transportation terminals by watching closed *Page 5 circuit television screens and to notify authorities, as needed. There is nothing within the job description indicating that the monitor must perform these duties only while seated or without changing his or her position at will. Thus, there is some evidence on which the commission could conclude that Mr. Letcher could perform the job of monitor.

{¶ 10} In short, the staff hearing officer's ("SHO's") order following the April 30, 2004 hearing indicates a careful review of Dr. Koppenhoefer's medical report and Ms. Vogelsang's assessment, addendum, and testimony. The SHO clearly understood Mr. Letcher's physical and intellectual limitations. While relator and the magistrate, or even we, may have determined that Ms. Vogelsang's report was not persuasive or that Mr. Letcher could not perform any sedentary work, we must decline to reweigh the evidence or to second guess the SHO's evaluation of it. Therefore, we sustain the commission's objections.

{¶ 11}

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Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 1907, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-letcher-v-keco-industries-incorp-07ap-151-4-22-2008-ohioctapp-2008.