State Ex Rel. Lemieux v. Dist. Cour

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: February 3, 1975
• Docket: 12934
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 12934

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A F OTN

THE STATE O M N A A e x re1 F OTN ALLEN LEMIEUX, County A t t o r n e y i n and f o r t h e County o f J e f f e r s o n ,

Rela t o r ,

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O THE STATE F O MONTANA, i n and f o r t h e County F o f J e f f e r s o n , and t h e HON. FRANK E. BLAIR, Judge t h e r e o f ,

Respondents.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:

Counsel o f Record:

F o r Rela t o r :

A l l e n LeMieux, County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , Boulder, Montana Richard J. L l e w e l l y n , Boulder, Montana

F o r Respondents:

James H. Goetz a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana

Submitted: J a n u a r y 7, 1975

Decided : FEB - 3 1975 Filed : FEB -3 197'5 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Original Proceeding. This is an application for a writ of supervisory control by the Jefferson County Attorney to set aside a ruling of the district court of the Fifth Judicial District holding that section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, is unconstitutional. The pertinent facts are not in dispute, they are: On August 8, 1974, leave to file an Information was granted by the district court of the Fifth Judicial District charging defendants, Penny Mitchell and Richard Mitchell with the criminal sale of dangerous drugs as specified in section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947. On December 16, 1974, a jury trial was commenced and the state presented evidence that defendants had cultivated approximately 30 marijuana plants in their vegetable garden and that a quantity of marijuana seeds and processed marijuana had been seized from defendants' resident pursuant to a search warrant. No evidence was offered that defendants had ever sold in the ordinary sense of the word, any of the marijuana in question. At the close of the state's case, defendants entered a motion to dismiss the charge of criminal sale of dangerous drugs for the reason that section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, was unconstitutional. On December 18, 1974, the district court ruled the statute was unconsi- tutional because it created an irrebuttable presumption that a defend- ant who manufactured, prepared, cultivated,compounded or processed any dangerous drug was guilty of selling the same. Thereupon the criminal proceeding against defendants was con- tinued and the county attorney petitioned this Court for a writ of supervisory control to set aside the action of the district court in declaring the statute unconstitutional. Section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, provides in pertinent part: "Criminal s a l e of dangerous drugs. ( a ) A person commits t h e o f f e n s e of a c r i m i n a l s a l e of dan- gerous drugs i f he s e l l s , b a r t e r s , exchanges, g i v e s away, o r o f f e r s t o s e l l , b a r t e r , exchange o r g i v e away, manufactures, p r e p a r e s , c u l t i v a t e s , compounds o r processes any dangerous drug a s d e f i n e d i n t h i s a c t . II Defendants argue t h a t s e c t i o n 54-132 o f f e n d s due process requirements because by i t s terms, an i r r e b u t t a b l e presumption

i s c r e a t e d t h a t one who c u l t i v a t e s a dangerous drug a s d e f i n e d i n t h e Act i s g u i l t y of s e l l i n g t h e same. I n support of t h i s c o n t e n t i o n defendants r e l y p r i n c i p a l l y upon Tot v. United S t a t e s , 319 U.S.' 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L ed 1519, 1524. I n - t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e F e d e r a l Firearms Act, Tot 52 S t a t . 1250, Ch. 850, 15 U.S.C. !j 9 0 2 ( f ) , was s u c c e s s f u l l y a t t a c k e d by t h e defendant. This Act provided t h a t i t was a crime

f o r any person who had p r e v i o u s l y been convicted of a crime of v i o l e n c e t o r e c e i v e any f i r e a r m o r ammunition t h a t had been shipped through i n t e r s t a t e commerce. S e c t i o n 2 ( f ) of t h a t s t a t u t e c o n t a i n s t h i s e x p l i c i t presumption: If* ** and t h e possession of a f i r e a r m o r ammunition by any such person s h a l l be presumptive evidence t h a t such f i r e a r m o r ammunition was shipped o r t r a n s p o r t e d o r r e c e i v e d , a s t h e c a s e may b e , by such person i n v i o l a t i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r . 11 The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n - d e c l a r e d t h e s t a t u t e Tot u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s e t f o r t h t h i s t e s t : "Under our d e c i s i o n s , a s t a t u t o r y presumption cannot be s u s t a i n e d i f t h e r e be no r a t i o n a l connec- t i o n between t h e f a c t proved and t h e u l t i m a t e f a c t presumed, i f t h e i n f e r e n c e of t h e one from proof of t h e o t h e r i s a r b i t r a r y because of l a c k of connec- t i o n between t h e two i n common experience. ; I Under t h i s t e s t , defendants a r g u e , t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l connection between t h e f a c t of c u l t i v a t i o n of marijuana and t h e s a l e of marijuana. W d e c l i n e t o s p e c u l a t e whether such a r a t i o n a l e connection e x i s t s because we do n o t a g r e e t h a t s e c t i o n 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, c r e a t e s a presumption. According t o t h e terms of s e c t i o n 54-132, one i s g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e of s a l e of dangerous drugs i f any of t h e following p r o h i b i t e d c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s a r e committed: 1) S e l l i n g , b a r t e r i n g , exchanging, o r g i v i n g away any dangerous drug a s d e f i n e d i n t h e a c t . 2) O f f e r i n g t o s e l l , b a r t e r , exchange o r g i v e away any dangerous drug a s d e f i n e d i n t h e a c t . 3) P r e p a r i n g , c u l t i v a t i n g , compounding, o r processing any dangerous drug a s d e f i n e d i n t h e a c t . A r e a d i n g of t h i s s t a t u t e compels t h e conclusion t h a t t h e

l e g i s l a t u r e b r o a d l y d e f i n e d t h e term "sale" t o i n c l u d e t h e enum- e r a t e d a c t i v i t i e s s e t out by t h e terms of t h e s t a t u t e . Stated i n another fashion, the l e g i s l a t u r e s e t f o r t h certain activities which a r e adverse t o t h e p u b l i c w e l f a r e and has b r o a d l y l a b e l e d t h e s e p r o h i b i t e d a c t i v i t i e s a s t h e " s a l e " of dangerous drugs. Defendants a r g u e t h a t t h e r e a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e power of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o " s t r e t c h " o r d i n a r y meanings i n d e f i n i n g words f o r s t a t u t o r y purposes. T o support t h i s c o n t e n t i o n they r e l y on C a l v e r t v. Zanes-Ewalt Warehouse, I n c . , Tex.Civ.App., 1973, 492 S.W.2d 638. The Texas l e g i s l a t u r e enacted a t a x a t i o n s t a t u t e t h a t d e f i n e d t h e term "sale" t o i n c l u d e a t h e f t . In C a l v e r t t h e Texas Court of Appeals d e c l a r e d t h e s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l and s t a t e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of t h e term was s t r a i n e d , c o n t r a r y t o i t s o r d i n a r y meaning, and so a r b i t r a r y t h a t due process had been denied. However, t h e Texas Supreme Court l a t e r r e v e r s e d t h i s d e c i s i o n i n Calvert v. Zanes-Ewalt Warehouse, I n c . , (Texas 1973), 502 S.P.2d 689, and upheld t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s t a t u t e d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e term "sale" was d e f i n e d i n a way t h a t was a t odds w i t h i t s o r d i n a r y meaning. The reviewing c o u r t found no abuse of due process. Research on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s t h a t d e f i n e terms c o n t r a r y t o t h e i r o r d i n a r y , accepted meanings l e d t o People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 217 P.2d 1, 4 , c e r t . d e n . 340 U.S. 879, 71 S.Ct. 117, 95 L ed 639. I n Knowles, t h e C a l i f o r n i a Penal Code 5 209, was d i s c u s s e d . I t d e f i n e d t h e crime of kidnapping i n t h e s e terms:: 11Every person who s e i z e s , c o n f i n e s , i n v e i g l e s , e n t i c e s , decoys, a b d u c t s , c o n c e a l s , kidnaps o r c a r r i e s away any i n d i v i d u a l by any means whatsoever w i t h i n t e n t t o hold o r d e t a i n , o r who holds o r d e t a i n s , such i n d i v i d u a l f o r ransom, reward o r t o commit e x t o r t i o n o r robbery % Jc *'I*

I t i s c l e a r from t h e terms of t h i s s t a t u t e t h a t t h e C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e had r e d e f i n e d t h e crime of kidnapping t o i n c l u d e s i t u a - t i o n s where an a s p o r t a t i o n of t h e v i c t i m was l a c k i n g . I n so doing, t h e crime of kidnapping had been d e f i n e d c o n t r a r y t o i t s commonly accepted meaning. Consequently, a defendant could be convicted of kidnapping even though t h e same o f f e n s e would have only c o n s t i t u t e d an armed robbery i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . I n Knowles, t h e defendant and an accomplice had e n t e r e d a c l o t h i n g s t o r e and compelled t h e p r o p r i e t o r and a c l e r k t o e n t e r a stockroom i n t h e r e a r of t h e s t o r e . While momentarily confined i n t h e stockroom, t h e c l e r k and t h e p r o p r i e t o r were robbed. One of defendants was convicted of kidnapping d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e had been no a s p o r t a t i o n of t h e v i c t i m ; a c r u c i a l element under t h e common law d e f i n i t i o n of t h e crime. J u s t i c e Traynor, w r i t i n g f o r t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t , upheld t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s t a t u t e and s t a t e d : here i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e has t h e power t o d e f i n e kidnapping broadly enough t o i n c l u d e t h e o f f e n s e h e r e committed and t o p r e s c r i b e t h e punish- ment s p e c i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 209. Subject t o t h e c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n of c r u e l and unusual punishment, t h e L e g i s l a t u r e may d e f i n e and punish o f f e n s e s a s i t s e e s f i t . [ C i t i n g c a s e s ] It may d e f i n e and punish a s kidnapping an o f f e n s e t h a t o t h e r s t a t e s r e g a r d only a s armed robbery. S e c t i o n 209 e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t d e f i n i t i o n a s t h e law of California. [Case c i t e d ] The s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of t h e p r o s c r i b e d o f f e n s e s i s n o t rendered u n c e r t a i n o r ambiguous because some of t h e p r o h i b i t e d a c t s a r e n o t o r d i n a r i l y r e - garded a s kidnapping. I I W a g r e e w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l e of Knowles. e The Montana l e g i s l a t u r e could have s e t f o r t h a s e p a r a t e s t a t u t e p r o h i b i t i n g t h e c u l t i v a t i o n of marijuana and could have l a b e l e d i t a c c o r d i n g l y . W s e e no e reason f o r d e c l a r i n g t h e s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because t h e l e g i s - l a t u r e d e f i n e d a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e i n terms of s e v e r a l t y p e s of conduct which may c o n s t i t u t e t h a t s i n g l e o f f e n s e . W recognize t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e defined t h e s a l e of e dangerous d r u g s t o i n c l u d e o f f e n s e s t h a t o t h e r s t a t e s have labeled llpossessionl' o r llcultivation". The w r i t o f s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l s h a l l i s s u e and t h i s c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o proceed t o a f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion.

W Concur: e

Chief J u s t i c e

.................................... Justices. Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k I . Haswell d i s s e n t i n g :

I dissent.

S e c t i o n 54-132, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , d e c l a r e s t h a t a p e r s o n who

c u l t i v a t e s m a r i h u a n a commits t h e o f f e n s e o f a c r i m i n a l s a l e

thereof. The v i c e o f t h i s s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n l i e s i n p r e -

c l u d i n g proof t h a t t h e accused d i d n o t s e l l o r t r a n s f e r marihuana

t o o t h e r s , b u t o n l y grew i t f o r h i s own u s e . Proof o f c u l t i v a -

t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n v i c t without r e g a r d t o proof of a s a l e

or t r a n s f e r t o a n o t h e r . C l a s s i f y i n g c u l t i v a t i o n as a s a l e and p r o h i b i t i n g p r o o f

t o t h e c o n t r a r y c r e a t e s a c o n c l u s i v e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t o n e who

grows m a r i h u a n a s e l l s i t c r i m i n a l l y . A presumption i s "a deduc-

t i o n which t h e l a w e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s t o b e made f r o m p a r t i c u l a r

f a c t s " , h e r e a c r i m i n a l s a l e from p r o o f o f c u l t i v a t i o n . Section

93-1301-3, R.C.M. 1947. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e presumption i s

made c o n c l u s i v e by d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e crime:

"A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f a c r i m i n a l s a l e o f d a n g e r o u s d r u g s if he * * * c u l t i v a t e s * * * a n y d a n g e r o u s d r u g * * *."

The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s e x p r e s s e d t h e t e s t

of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f s u c h s t a t u t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n s i n T o t v .

U n i t e d S t a t e s , 319 U.S. 403, 6 3 S . C t . 1 2 4 1 , 8 7 L.ed 1 5 1 9 , 1524:

"Under o u r d e c i s i o n s , a s t a t u t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n c a n n o t b e s u s t a i n e d i f t h e r e b e no r a t i o n a l con- n e c t i o n between t h e f a c t p r o v e d a n d t h e u l t i m a t e f a c t presumed, i f t h e i n f e r e n c e o f t h e o n e from proof of t h e o t h e r i s a r b i t r a r y because of l a c k o f c o n n e c t i o n between t h e two i n common e x p e r i e n c e . "

This t e s t of u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y f i t s l i k e a glove i n t h i s

case. ' t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e f a c t p r o v e d

{ c u l t i v a t i o n of m a r i h u a n a ) and t h e u l t i m a t e f a c t presumed ( t h e

c r i m i n a l s a l e of m a r i h u a n a ) . The i n f e r e n c e o f s a l e f r o m p r o o f

of c u l t i v a t i o n i s a r b i t r a r y b e c a u s e o f l a c k o f c o n n e c t i o n between

t h e two.

A c c o r d i n g l y , I would a f f i r m t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n d e c l a r i n g the statute unconstitutional. i n my view, it d e n i e s t h e d e f e n d a n t

" d u e p r o c e s s o f l a w " by i t s a r b i t r a r y a n d i r r a t i o n a l c l a s s i f i -

c a t i o n of a "grower" as a " p u sh e r " w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o the f a c t s

of t h e i n d i v i d u a l case.

Justice

Mr. J u s t i c e Gene 9. Daly d i s s e n t i n g :

I concur with t h e d i s s e n t r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell.