State Ex Rel. Laron Toney, Jr. Versus State of Louisiana
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Opinion
STATE EX REL. LARON TONEY, JR. NO. 25-KH-380
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
September 05, 2025
Linda Tran First Deputy Clerk
IN RE LARON TONEY, JR.
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ST CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE CONNIE M. AUCOIN, DIVISION "C", NUMBER 23,193
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, John J. Molaison, Jr., and Scott U. Schlegel
WRIT DENIED
The relator, Laron Toney, Jr., seeks this court’s review of the July 15, 2025
denial of his Application for Post-Conviction Relief (APCR). We deny this writ
application for the following reasons.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2023, the relator pled guilty to one count of manslaughter and
one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On May 16, 2023, in
accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences
of thirty years imprisonment at hard labor on the manslaughter count and fifteen
years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence on the firearm count. The relator did not file a motion for
an appeal.
On June 15, 2025, the relator, through counsel, filed an APCR claiming he
had ineffective assistance of counsel and entered an involuntary guilty plea. The
25-KH-380 State filed an answer to the APCR, arguing the relator’s claims were without merit,
noting that the relator’s counsel obtained a favorable plea agreement; the district
attorney amended the second-degree murder charge to the reduced charge of
manslaughter for which he agreed to a thirty-year sentence, he was not multiple
billed, and the State dismissed four other criminal cases pending against him.
In denying the relator’s application, the trial court found the relator had not
proved he was entitled to relief. This timely writ application followed.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
§ 13 of the Louisiana Constitution, a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of
counsel. State v. Casimer, 12-678 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/13), 113 So.3d 1129,
1141. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-
prong test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Casimer, 113 So.3d at 1141. Under the Strickland test, the
defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, that the
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Id. When a defendant claims that counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered a guilty
plea invalid, the Strickland analysis under the first deficiency prong remains the
same. In contrast, under the second prejudice prong, “the defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
The relator contends that his counsel’s pretrial investigation was inadequate
because she failed to interview a key witness who would have explained why the
relator had the victim’s wallet. To support this claim, the relator relies on a non-
notarized “affidavit” by Clifford Washington, dated June 18, 2025, in which Mr.
2 Washington stated that he drove the relator and the victim to a check-cashing store
a few days before the killing. Mr. Washington later discovered the victim’s wallet
in his car and allegedly gave the wallet to the relator to return to the victim. Mr.
Washington stated that neither law enforcement nor the relator’s attorney contacted
him. He further claimed that he could have assisted in the relator’s defense by
confirming that the victim’s wallet was not stolen. Thus, the relator argues,
because he was already in possession of the victim’s wallet, he would have no
motive to rob and shoot the victim.
This argument has no merit. The relator obviously knew how he came to
have the victim’s wallet and would have informed his defense counsel of Mr.
Washington’s knowledge and willingness to testify. Given the very favorable plea
agreement negotiated by the relator’s trial counsel, the self-serving, post-trial
“affidavit” submitted to support the relator’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel fails to show a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s deficient
performance, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.
The relator claims that his trial counsel misinformed him that he would be
eligible for good-time release after serving sixty-five percent of his thirty-year
sentence. To support this claim, the relator relies on an undated, non-notarized
“affidavit,” signed by his father, stating that counsel advised the relator that he
would be eligible for good time release after serving sixty-five percent of his
sentence, “a full three years before his actual eligibility date.” The relator claims
that his Master Prison Record, which he does not include in the writ application,
shows that he will only be eligible for release on good time after serving seventy-
five percent of his sentence.
The relator has not included a transcript of his plea or his waiver of rights
form with this writ application. However, in denying the relator’s APCR, the trial
3 court stated: (1) the relator was advised on the record of the rights he was waiving
and informed him of what his agreed-upon sentence would be, (2) neither the court
nor the State advised the defendant that he would only have to serve a certain
percentage of his sentence, and (3) neither the trial court nor the State made any
representations regarding the amount of time he would have to serve once he was
remanded to the Department of Corrections. The trial court further noted that the
relator recited on the record that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact
guilty of killing the victim. The relator stated that he was satisfied with the
performance of his trial counsel.
“General statements and conclusory allegations will not suffice to prove a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Fisher, 19-488 (La. App. 5
Cir. 6/24/20), 299 So.3d 1238, 1247; State v. Rivas, 17-615 (La. App. 5 Cir.
7/31/18), 251 So.3d 1228, 1234. Although the relator complains that counsel
misled him resulting in three additional years he did not believe he would have to
serve, the relator initially faced a life sentence before counsel negotiated a plea
agreement resulting in the reduction of the charge of second degree murder to
manslaughter, four other offenses were nolle prossed, and the State agreed not to
file a multiple offender bill of information. Again, the relator has not shown “that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s statement, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370.
CONCLUSION
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