State ex rel. Kushlak v. Cleveland Animal Protective League
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Opinion
[Cite as State ex rel. Kushlak v. Cleveland Animal Protective League, 2024-Ohio-580.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE EX REL., ANTHONY : KUSHLAK, : Relator, : No. 112753 v. : THE CLEVELAND ANIMAL PROTECTIVE LEAGUE, :
Respondent. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT DISMISSED DATED: February 9, 2024
Writ of Mandamus Motion No. 565565 Order No. 571904
Appearances:
Michaela Huth, for relator.
Holland & Muirden and DanaMarie Pannella, for respondent.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.:
Anthony Kushlak (“Kushlak”), the relator, has filed a complaint for a
writ of mandamus. Kushlak essentially seeks a declaratory judgment and a
prohibitory injunction that prevents the enforcement of an agreed sentencing judgment that provides for random, unannounced inspection of Kushlak’s residence
by the Cleveland Animal Protective League (“APL”), the respondent. The APL has
filed a motion to dismiss that is granted for the following reasons.
I. The Facts
In Cleveland v. Kushlak, Cleveland M.C. No. 2021-CRB-13267,
Kushlak was charged with violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinances 603.091(b)
(no person shall keep any animal in a place that is unsanitary, including any place
where there is an accumulation of feces or other waste, or foul odor, or insect or
rodent infestation) and violation of R.C. 959.131(D)(1) (prohibitions concerning
companion animals). On June 1, 2022, Kushlak entered a plea of no contest and
was found guilty of R.C. 959.13(D)(1), the offense of prohibitions concerning
companion animals. The offense of keeping an animal in an unsanitary place, a
violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinances 603.091(b), was nolled. As part of the
agreed sentence imposed by the trial court, the following condition was imposed as
part of community control:
The Defendant voluntarily consents to random, unannounced inspections of his home and other areas of his property where animals may be kept or cared for by the Cleveland APL or other county humane society where he resides. Such random inspections shall take place during daylight hours at a reasonable time and frequency.
No appeal was taken by Kushlak from the sentence and conditions of
community control journalized on June 1, 2022. On May 23, 2023, Kushlak filed a
complaint for a writ of mandamus. Kushlak seeks to: Enjoin Respondent Cleveland APL from entering Relator Anthony Kushlak’s property pursuant to the random and unannounced community control condition set forth in paragraph four of the Agreed Supplemental Sentencing Entry.
Enjoin Respondent Cleveland APL from entering upon Relator Anthony Kushlak’s property, including his home, unless the Cleveland APL employee or agent conducting the entry, complies [with] Ohio Revised Code Section 2951.02.
On June 27, 2023, the APL filed a motion to dismiss. On July 17, 2023, Kushlak
filed a brief in opposition the APL’s motion to dismiss.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of the Law
The Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(1)(b) provides this
court with original jurisdiction over a complaint that seeks a writ of mandamus. A
writ of mandamus, however, is an extraordinary remedy that can only be granted in
a limited set of circumstances. State ex rel. Parisi v. Heck, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
25709, 2013-Ohio-4948. Mandamus can only be employed to compel the
performance of a present existing duty to which there is a default. State ex rel.
Willis v. Sheboy, 6 Ohio St.3d 167, 451 N.E.2d 1200 (1983); State ex rel. Fed. Homes
Properties, Inc. v. Singer, 9 Ohio St.2d 95, 223 N.E.2d 824 (1967).
To be granted mandamus, Kushlak must establish (1) a clear legal
right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the APL, and (3) the
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel.
Richardson v. Gowdy, 172 Ohio St.3d 281, 2023-Ohio-976, 223 N.E.3d 424; State
ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452. The Ohio Supreme Court has held “[t]he availability of an appeal is an adequate remedy
sufficient to preclude a writ.” State ex rel. Luoma v. Russo, 141 Ohio St.3d 53, 2014-
Ohio-4532, 21 N.E.3d 305, ¶ 8; State ex rel. Peoples v. Johnson, 152 Ohio St.3d 418,
2017-Ohio-9140, 97 N.E.3d 426. The availability of an appeal is an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law even if the relator fails to pursue an appeal.
Jackson v. Johnson, 135 Ohio St.3d 364, 2013-Ohio-999, 986 N.E.2d 989; State ex
rel. Gaydosh v. Twinsburg, 93 Ohio St.3d 576, 757 N.E.2d 357 (2001).
Herein, Kushlak cannot demonstrate that he lacks or lacked an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The sentencing order
journalized June 1, 2022, that contained the supplemental agreed provision to be
subjected to random and unannounced inspections by the APL, constituted a final
appealable order subject to an immediate appeal. In addition, Kushlak can
potentially avail himself of an appeal through a delayed appeal pursuant to App.R.
5. Shoop v. State, 144 Ohio St.3d 374, 2015-Ohio-2068, 43 N.E.3d 432; State ex rel.
Williams v. Corrigan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87150, 2005-Ohio-6092.
B. Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief
This court lacks any jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment on
behalf of Kushlak. Wright v. Ghee, 74 Ohio St.3d 465, 659 N.E.2d 1261 (1996); State
ex rel. Coyne v. Todia, 45 Ohio St.3d 232, 543 N.E.2d 1271 (1989). The Supreme
Court of Ohio has held that if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus
indicate the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment, the complaint does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 716 N.E.2d 704 (1999).
In addition, this court lacks jurisdiction to issue a prohibitory
injunction to prohibit or enjoin the APL from doing something that Kushlak expects
to occur in the future. Any attempt to prevent an anticipated injury is the function
of a prohibitory injunction, which is not within the original jurisdiction of this court.
State ex rel. Gadell-Newton v. Husted, 153 Ohio St.3d 255, 2018-Ohio-1854, 103
N.E.3d 809.
Kushlak seeks a declaratory judgment, through his prayer in the
complaint for mandamus, that the APL is required to comply with R.C. 2951.02 and
must have statutory reasonable grounds for any unannounced inspection and a
search of his home pursuant to the agreed community control condition set forth in
paragraph four of the agreed supplemental sentencing journal entry. We can only
consider the merits of a declaratory judgment claim in a direct appeal from a
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