[Cite as State ex rel. Knox v. Gallagher, 2026-Ohio-2345.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WILLIAMS COUNTY
STATE EX REL. LEO PATRICK COURT OF APPEALS NO. {86}WM-26-002 KNOX AND SHANNON MARIE KNOX
RELATORS
V.
THE HONORABLE KAREN K. GALLAGHER
RESPONDENT
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: June 16, 2026
***** Anaya N. Khan, for relators.
Mark R. Weaver, Ryan C. Spitzer, and Andrew Fraser, for respondent. *****
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} This case is before the court on the March 12, 2026 motion to dismiss filed
by respondent, Judge Karen Gallagher of the Williams County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division. Because Judge Gallagher included information from outside of the
pleadings with her motion, on March 25, 2026, we converted the motion to a motion for
summary judgment and gave her and relators, Leo Knox and Shannon Knox, time to file evidence that complies with Civ.R. 56.1 Both parties filed memoranda in response to our
order. The motion for summary judgment is now decisional. Because the Knoxes cannot
show that they are entitled to the requested writs, we grant Judge Gallagher’s motion.
{¶ 2} Also before the court is the March 27, 2026 motion for leave to intervene
filed by Ina O’Briant, guardian for L.K., mother of the child involved in the underlying
dependency case. On March 30, 2026, the Knoxes filed a memorandum in support of
O’Briant’s motion for leave to intervene. Because we are granting Judge Gallagher’s
motion for summary judgment and dismissing this case, we deny O’Briant’s motion for
leave to intervene.
{¶ 3} The final motion pending before the court is the Knoxes’ May 27, 2026
“EMERGENCY MOTION TO EXCLUDE RESPONDENT’S UNSERVED MAY 13,
2026 SUPPLEMENTAL SUMMARY-JUDGMENT SUBMISSION, TO REQUIRE
PROOF OF SERVICE, AND FOR CONDITIONAL SHOW-CAUSE AND
SANCTIONS RELIEF.” On May 29, 2026, Judge Gallagher filed a response to the
Knoxes’ motion, and on June 1, 2026, the Knoxes filed a reply in support of their motion.
Because the Knoxes are not entitled to file a response to Judge Gallagher’s supplemental
summary judgment memorandum and cannot show that they were prejudiced by Judge
Gallagher’s inadvertent failure to serve her supplemental memorandum, we deny their
motion to exclude.
1 The clerk of court did not serve the parties our order converting the motion to dismiss, so we reissued the order on April 29, 2026. 2. {¶ 4} In Judge Gallagher’s motion, she raises three arguments in support of her
motion to dismiss the Knoxes’ complaint for writs of mandamus and procedendo. First,
she argues that the Knoxes lack standing to bring their complaint because they are not
parties to the underlying juvenile court case. Next, she argues that the Knoxes’ motions
are not ripe for review until the foreign child-custody determination is registered and
confirmed under R.C. 3127.35, which has not yet happened. Finally, even if the Knoxes
correctly filed to register the foreign child-custody determination, there is a 30-day
window for contesting the registration that has not yet passed, so the child-custody
determination cannot yet be registered and confirmed. For all of these reasons, Judge
Gallagher argues that the Knoxes have no legal right to the relief they are seeking, and
she has no legal duty to grant it.
1. Summary judgment standard
{¶ 5} We can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the moving party
demonstrates:
(1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.
Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1978); Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶ 6} The party seeking summary judgment must specifically delineate the basis
upon which the motion is brought and identify those portions of the record that
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio
3. St.3d 280, 293 (1996); Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112 (1988), syllabus. When a
properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, an adverse party may not rest
on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must respond with specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Civ.R. 56(E); Riley v.
Montgomery, 11 Ohio St.3d 75, 79 (1984). The opposing party must do so using
“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,
transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact . . . .” Civ.R. 56(C). A “material”
fact is one that would affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.
Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 135 Ohio App.3d 301, 304 (6th Dist. 1999); Needham
v. Provident Bank, 110 Ohio App.3d 817, 827 (8th Dist. 1996), citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
2. Standing
{¶ 7} Judge Gallagher first argues that the Knoxes lack standing to bring their
mandamus and procedendo complaint. She contends that they do not have a beneficial
interest in the underlying dependency proceedings because they are not parties to the
dependency case.
{¶ 8} The Knoxes respond that the correct beneficial-interest inquiry is whether
they would be directly benefited or injured by a judgment in the underlying case. They
claim that they would. They alleged in their complaint that Michigan made them the
child’s guardians, they filed the guardianship papers in the juvenile court case and sought
enforcement of the foreign child-custody determination, and “unresolved motions
prevented any judicial determination on participation and enforcement before the court
4. proceeded toward immediate placement decisions.” They contend that these allegations
show the direct legal stake necessary to give them standing to pursue these mandamus
and procedendo claims. The Knoxes also point out that Judge Gallagher should not be
able to ignore her duty to rule on pending motions and then point to their nonparty status
(which they imply only exists because Judge Gallagher has not yet ruled on their motion
to intervene) to claim they lack standing. Finally, the Knoxes argue that “Ohio law does
not permit a court to defer the threshold ruling, allow the resulting exclusion to persist,
and then invoke that exclusion as the reason no one may obtain review of the failure to
rule.”
{¶ 9} In her reply, Judge Gallagher argues that the Knoxes lack standing to bring
their mandamus claim because R.C. 2731.02, the mandamus statute, says that mandamus
“may issue on the information of the party beneficially interested” and the Knoxes are
not parties to the underlying juvenile court case. (Emphasis added.) She also claims that
the cases the Knoxes cite in support of their position do not establish that they have
standing.
{¶ 10} A person lacks standing unless he or she has, in an individual or
representative capacity, “some real interest in the subject matter of the action.” State ex
rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176 (1973),
syllabus. “Traditional standing principles require litigants to show, at a minimum, that
they have suffered ‘(1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly
unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’”
ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 2014-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7, quoting Moore v. Middletown,
5. 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 22. To have standing in a mandamus case, a relator must be
“beneficially interested” in the case. State ex rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning
Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 297, 299 (1997); R.C. 2731.02. “[T]he applicable test is whether
relators would be directly benefited or injured by a judgment in the case.” State ex rel.
Sinay v. Sodders, 80 Ohio St.3d 224, 226 (1997). A mandamus or procedendo action
brought by a person who lacks standing will be dismissed. State ex rel. Ames v. Portage
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2021-Ohio-4486, ¶ 10; see also State ex rel. Barnes v. Fuerst, 1999
WL 462335, *1 (8th Dist. July 1, 1999).
{¶ 11} Applying traditional standing principles to the Knoxes’ procedendo claims,
we find that they have presented sufficient evidence to show that they have standing.
They have shown an injury because they are unable to participate in custody proceedings
involving their grandchild (who they ostensibly have custody of through the Michigan
guardianship proceedings), the injury is fairly traceable to Judge Gallagher’s alleged
conduct of declining to rule on the Knoxes’ motions, and the injury is likely to be
addressed by a writ of procedendo compelling Judge Gallagher to rule on the pending
motions. Because they can meet the traditional standing test, the Knoxes have standing
to pursue their procedendo claim.
{¶ 12} Additionally, the Knoxes will directly benefit from or be injured by a
judgment on their mandamus complaint. They have presented some evidence in the form
of guardianship papers from Michigan showing that they have a legal right to or a legally
protectable interest in custody of the child. See In re Goff, 2003-Ohio-6768, ¶ 15 (11th
Dist.). They are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Gallagher to comply with
6. R.C. 3127.38(C), the statute that requires a hearing on a petition to enforce a foreign
child-custody determination. Our decision on their mandamus complaint will directly
affect whether and when they get such a hearing. This is sufficient to show that the
Knoxes are beneficially interested in the mandamus case. Thus, they have standing to
pursue their mandamus claim.
3. Procedendo
{¶ 13} Turning to the Knoxes’ claim for a writ of procedendo, Judge Gallagher
argues that they are not entitled to the writ because they lack a clear legal right to compel
her to rule on their motions, and she lacks a clear legal duty to do so. She contends that
the Knoxes should have filed their foreign child-custody determination in its own action,
rather than in the dependency case, and paid the required fee before the foreign custody
determination could be registered, which they did not do.2 She also argues that R.C.
3127.35(C)(2) requires a 30-day waiting period, during which someone could request a
hearing to contest the validity of the custody determination, before the custody
determination can be registered, and the Knoxes filed their procedendo complaint before
that 30-day period expired. Despite that, Judge Gallagher set the matter for a hearing on
March 23, 2026, and the existence of a hearing is an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Finally, Judge Gallagher argues that the Knoxes’ motion requesting
issuance or denial of an order under R.C. 3127.38(C) is improper because a petition for
2 There is no appropriate Civ.R. 56 evidence before us indicating that the Knoxes did not pay any filings fees associated with the underlying pleadings. 7. enforcement must be verified and their motion was not verified and cannot be verified
until the 30-day window in R.C. 3127.35(C)(2) passes.
{¶ 14} The Knoxes respond that their complaint pleads a viable procedendo claim,
a future hearing date does not discharge a court’s duty to rule on pending matters and
does not moot a procedendo claim, and Judge Gallagher’s arguments are essentially her
decisions on the merits of the motions pending in the underlying case without the benefit
of producing reviewable judgments. They also argue that the hearing date Judge
Gallagher set is not an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law because it simply
postponed Judge Gallagher’s decisions and, “[u]nder the facts pleaded here,
postponement is the injury, because delay itself carried legal consequences before the
newly assigned hearing date arrived.”
{¶ 15} “A writ of procedendo is an extraordinary remedy in the form of an order
from a higher tribunal directing a lower tribunal to proceed to judgment.” State ex rel.
Mignella v. Indus. Comm., 2019-Ohio-463, ¶ 7. It is appropriate when a court has either
refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment. State
ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 72 Ohio St.3d 461, 462
(1995). “A writ of procedendo may be used to compel an inferior, dilatory court to
proceed to a final judgment . . . .” State ex rel. O’Malley v. Russo, 2019-Ohio-1698, ¶ 32.
The writ does not instruct the lower court as to what the judgment should be; it merely
instructs the lower court to issue a judgment. Sherrills at 462. “A writ of procedendo is
appropriate upon a showing of ‘a clear legal right to require the trial court to proceed, a
clear legal duty on the part of the trial court to proceed, and the lack of an adequate
8. remedy in the ordinary course of the law.’” State ex rel. White v. Woods, 2019-Ohio-
1893, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Ward v. Reed, 2014-Ohio-4512, ¶ 9.
{¶ 16} An “inferior court’s refusal or failure to timely dispose of a pending action
is the ill a writ of procedendo is designed to remedy.” (Internal quotations omitted.)
State ex rel. Rodak v. Betleski, 2004-Ohio-6567, ¶ 16. However, “[n]either procedendo
nor mandamus will generally issue to compel a court to release its decisions promptly.”
State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo, 2002-Ohio-4907, ¶ 31. Nor does procedendo “lie to control
or interfere with ordinary court procedure or process.” State ex rel. St. Sava Servian
Orthodox Church of Cleveland v. Riley, 36 Ohio St.2d 171, 174 (1973). Consequently,
courts have denied writs of procedendo when the delay is relatively minimal. Rodak at ¶
14. The same is true when a requested hearing has been scheduled. Page v. Geauga Cty.
Probate & Juvenile Court, 2023-Ohio-2491, ¶ 3.
{¶ 17} In this case, the evidence before us does not demonstrate that Judge
Gallagher has refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to
judgment, so the Knoxes are not entitled to a writ of procedendo. The exhibits that the
Knoxes included with their complaint show that Judge Gallagher filed a notice of hearing
for their (properly filed) motion to intervene the same day the motion was filed. That is,
Judge Gallagher immediately scheduled the Knoxes’ February 23, 2026 motion to
intervene for a hearing on March 23, 2026. This shows that the motion to intervene was
proceeding through ordinary court procedures or processes, not that Judge Gallagher was
delaying or denying a decision on the motion to intervene.
9. {¶ 18} Regarding the rest of the Knoxes’ pending motions, “[a] person seeking to
intervene in a court case is a party to the case for the limited purpose of determining
whether they have a right to intervene.” RELD & G Ents., Inc. v. Eldanaf, 2024-Ohio-
245, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); see also Southside Community Dev. Corp. v. Levin, 2007-Ohio-
6665, ¶ 11 (“[A] person’s assertion that it has a legal right to be a party . . . makes it a
‘party’ . . . for one limited purpose: to seek the court’s determination of whether the
asserted right exists.”). Beyond that, “it is normally error for a trial court to entertain a
motion filed by a non-party to the action.” In re Estate of Markovich, 2006-Ohio-6064, ¶
11 (9th Dist.); State ex rel. Haley v. Davis, 2016-Ohio-534, ¶ 11 (“it might be considered
error for the court to rule on motions filed by a nonparty . . .”). The Knoxes filed at least
eight motions in Judge Gallagher’s court between February 26 and March 5, 2026, which
Judge Gallagher could not properly address unless and until the Knoxes were granted
leave to join the underlying dependency case as parties. Assuming that any delay was
unnecessary, the Knoxes were not entitled to have Judge Gallagher address these motions
before they were made parties to the underlying case, so we cannot find that they are
entitled to a writ of procedendo based on Judge Gallagher’s failure to rule on them.
{¶ 19} Finally, the Knoxes make much of the fact that the shelter care hearing was
set for March 5, 2026—before the hearing on their motion to intervene—and claim that
they will lose the opportunity to participate in that hearing if Judge Gallagher is not
forced to decide their motions before holding a shelter care hearing. But a shelter care
hearing, by its very nature, generates impermanent results. As the Supreme Court has
said, “[a] shelter care decree is in no sense dispositive; it is interlocutory in nature,
10. limited in scope and purpose, and temporary in duration. It responds to an emergency—
the immediate physical needs of the child—until the court can fully inquire into the facts
and decide what is best for the child. A shelter care order is no more than this.” In re
Moloney, 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 25 (1986). A shelter care order is also potentially modifiable
at the request of any party to the case. R.C. 2151.415(F). Thus, if the Knoxes are made
parties to the case after a shelter care hearing is held, they are still able to request a new
shelter care hearing under R.C. 2151.415(F). If they are not made parties to the case,
their position is no different whether that decision is made before or after a shelter care
hearing. Consequently, their potential ability to participate in the shelter care hearing
does not affect their entitlement to a writ of procedendo.
{¶ 20} In sum, after construing the evidence most strongly in the Knoxes’ favor,
there is no genuine issue of material fact, Judge Gallagher is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, and reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion that is adverse to the
Knoxes. We grant summary judgment in Judge Gallagher’s favor on count one of the
Knoxes’ complaint.
4. Mandamus
{¶ 21} Regarding the Knoxes’ claim for a writ of mandamus, Judge Gallagher
argues that their request fails because they do not have a clear legal right to have her
issue an order under R.C. 3127.38(C) until the 30-day window for contesting registration
of the foreign child-custody determination has passed, and she is under no clear legal
duty to issue such an order.
11. {¶ 22} The Knoxes first respond that the statutes do not require a “waiting period”
before the court is required to set an enforcement petition for a hearing. They also
contend that Judge Gallagher’s arguments essentially rewrite the statutes she is relying
on. They go on to argue that their complaint alleges that they filed their R.C. 3127.38
petition on February 26, 2026, but, as of March 4, 2026, Judge Gallagher had not set the
petition for a hearing on the “next judicial day after service” or on the “first judicial day
possible,” as the statute requires. This shows that Judge Gallagher did not perform her
statutory duty, they claim.
{¶ 23} Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy “to be issued with great caution and
discretion and only when the way is clear.” State ex rel. Taylor v. Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d
165, 166 (1977), citing State ex rel. Kriss v. Richards, 102 Ohio St. 455 (1921), and State
ex rel. Skinner Engine Co. v. Kouri, 136 Ohio St. 343 (1940). A relator seeking a writ of
mandamus must establish (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal
duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 2012-Ohio-69, ¶ 6. The
relator must prove entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing evidence. State ex rel.
Cleveland Right to Life v. State Controlling Bd., 2013-Ohio-5632, ¶ 2.
{¶ 24} Here, the Knoxes are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Judge
Gallagher to comply with R.C. 3127.38(C). The statute requires that, upon the filing of a
verified petition for enforcement of a child-custody determination, “the court shall issue
an order directing the respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a
hearing . . . . If possible, the hearing must be held on the next judicial day after service of
12. the order. If holding the hearing on that date is impossible, the court shall hold the
hearing on the first judicial day possible.” Although the Knoxes focus on the lack of an
immediate hearing on their petition, any issues with timing are immaterial because the
Knoxes did not comply with the verification requirement of R.C. 3127.38(A), so any duty
Judge Gallagher might have had under R.C. 3127.38 did not arise.
{¶ 25} R.C. 3127.38(A) requires that a petition for enforcement of a foreign child-
custody decree “must be verified.” “‘Verification’ means a ‘formal declaration made in
the presence of an authorized officer, such as a notary public, by which one swears to the
truth of the statements in the document.’” Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 327 (2001),
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999). The Knoxes included a notarized
“SWORN STATEMENT UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY” from Shannon with their
petition for enforcement, but that statement does not “‘swear[] to the truth of the
statements in’” the petition. Id. Instead, Shannon swears that she is the person seeking
registration of the Michigan guardianship order and that the guardianship order has not
been vacated, stayed, or modified. Thus, we conclude that the Knoxes’ petition for
enforcement was not verified, as required by R.C. 3127.38(A).
{¶ 26} In sum, because the Knoxes did not comply with the statutory
requirements, Judge Gallagher did not have a duty to set the petition for a hearing on the
schedule outlined by R.C. 3127.38(C). And because Judge Gallagher did not have a clear
legal duty, the Knoxes are not entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Judge
Gallagher to set their petition for an immediate hearing. Thus, after construing the
evidence most strongly in the Knoxes’ favor, there is no genuine issue of material fact,
13. Judge Gallagher is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can
come to but one conclusion that is adverse to the Knoxes. We grant summary judgment
in Judge Gallagher’s favor on count two of the Knoxes’ complaint.
5. Motion to intervene
{¶ 27} Next, we turn to O’Briant’s motion to intervene. Because we are granting
Judge Gallagher’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing this case, we find that
O’Briant’s motion is not well-taken and it is denied.
6. Motion to exclude
{¶ 28} Finally, we address the Knoxes’ motion to exclude Judge Gallagher’s
supplemental summary judgment memorandum. Although Judge Gallagher concedes
that she inadvertently failed to serve the Knoxes’ counsel, we find that her oversight was
not prejudicial to the Knoxes. The Knoxes were not entitled to file a response to Judge
Gallagher’s supplemental memorandum, and the four exhibits attached to Judge
Gallagher’s supplemental memorandum provided background but did not affect the
outcome of the case. Because the lack of service did not ultimately affect the Knoxes, we
find that their motion to exclude is not well-taken and it is denied.
7. Conclusion
{¶ 29} Because Judge Gallagher has shown that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we grant her motion
for summary judgment on both counts of the Knoxes’ complaint. The Knoxes’ complaint
is hereby dismissed.
14. {¶ 30} O’Briant’s motion to intervene and the Knoxes’ motion to exclude are
denied.
{¶ 31} The stay issued in Williams County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division, case No. 20263002 is lifted.
{¶ 32} The Knoxes are ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding under App.R.
24.
To the clerk: Manner of service.
{¶ 33} The clerk is directed to immediately serve upon all parties a copy of this
judgment entry in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B).
{¶ 34} It is so ordered.
Writ dismissed.
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. ____________________________ JUDGE Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
15.