State ex rel. Kingsbury v. Caperton

441 S.E.2d 662, 190 W. Va. 699, 1994 W. Va. LEXIS 3
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 18, 1994
DocketNo. 22089
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 441 S.E.2d 662 (State ex rel. Kingsbury v. Caperton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Kingsbury v. Caperton, 441 S.E.2d 662, 190 W. Va. 699, 1994 W. Va. LEXIS 3 (W. Va. 1994).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

In this original proceeding in mandamus, the relators are state employees who are affected by the employee classification and pay plan (plan) that was developed by the respondent, the Director of the Division of Personnel and his staff. The claim is made that the plan is being implemented contrary to the mandatory provisions of W.Va.Code, 29-6-10(2) (1992).1 Also included as respon[701]*701dents in this proceeding are the members of the State Personnel Board (Board).

The particular provisions of W.Va.Code, 29-6-10(2), which the relators claim are being violated, are that the Board has not held a public hearing to enable employees to have input on the plan. Nor was there any approval obtained by the governor before the plan was implemented. The relators also contend that the Division of Personnel has been preparing the plan under its memorandum dated November 21, 1991, entitled “STATEWIDE RECLASSIFICATION PROJECT” and subtitled “Pilot Administrative Guidelines,” which is contrary to the provisions of W.Va.Code, 29-6-10(2), and certain administrative regulations of the Board.2

The relators also claim that the plan originally was implemented in the smaller departments of state government. However, in December, 1992, the plan was extended to the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) and produced about 800 grievances. It also was asserted in the petition that the Department of Highways (DOH) was about to be classified under the plan and this action would produce additional grievances.3 The relators seek a writ of mandamus to order the “Respondents to submit the aspects of the current reclassification plan pertaining to pay as Respondents are required to do under Code § 29-6-10(2), and, then, following public hearing, submit the matter to the Governor for approval.”

At the full argument on this case, the respondents agreed that the Board was planning to hold a public hearing on the plan in the near future.4 However, of even more significance was the admission by counsel for both parties that as the plan was implemented in each department or division of state government, the pay provisions also were implemented. Numerous employees have received pay raises pursuant to the plan.

In paragraph 8 of their petition, the relators state, in part:

“Since about January of 1992 the Division of Personnel has been formulating combined pay classification plans pursuant [702]*702to a ‘Pilot Administrative Guidelines’. The ‘Pilot Guidelines’ were not legally promulgated. The Pilot plan, contrary to the Code § 29-6-10(2), does not require a public hearing on pay issues or approval by the Governor of the pay plan.” (Footnote omitted).5

The petition reflects that the smaller agencies were covered under the plan in 1992, and DHHR, the Statens largest agency, came under the Plan in December of 1992. Yet, this petition challenging the plan was not filed in this Court until November 23, 1993. We have established in Syllabus Points 2 and 3 of State ex rel. Waller Chemicals, Inc. v. McNutt, 152 W.Va. 186, 160 S.E.2d 170 (1968), that the doctrine of laches applies to a mandamus action and that an unreasonable delay in bringing the action may bar relief:

“2. The extraordinary remedy of mandamus, though on the law side of the court, is limited as to time by the equitable doctrine of laches; and the burden of showing sufficient excuse for what appears from the record to be an unreasonable delay in the assertion of a clear legal right through the remedy of mandamus rests upon the person asserting such right.
“3. The writ of mandamus will be refused when the petitioner has unreasonably delayed his application for such writ and by reason of the delay the rights of the defendant or innocent third parties will be prejudiced by the issuance of the writ.”

See also White v. Manchin, 173 W.Va. 526, 535, 318 S.E.2d 470, 479 (1984); State ex rel. Musick v. Londeree, 145 W.Va. 369, 371-72, 115 S.E.2d 96, 98 (1960); Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Kay v. Steinmetz, 144 W.Va. 802, 111 S.E.2d 27 (1959).

In the present case, we conclude that the delay of more than one year in bringing the mandamus is unreasonable and the relators offer no sufficient excuse for the delay. Furthermore, and of more critical importance, the rights of many innocent parties will be prejudiced. These parties are those employees who already have been reclassified and have received pay raises under the plan.

For the foregoing reasons, the writ of mandamus is denied.

Writ denied.

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Related

Colobro v. Mercer County Board of Education
468 S.E.2d 343 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
441 S.E.2d 662, 190 W. Va. 699, 1994 W. Va. LEXIS 3, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-kingsbury-v-caperton-wva-1994.