State ex rel. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

2016 Ohio 7128
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 30, 2016
Docket15AP-1106
StatusPublished

This text of 2016 Ohio 7128 (State ex rel. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2016 Ohio 7128 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2016-Ohio-7128.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. : Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., : Relator, : v. No. 15AP-1106 : Industrial Commission of Ohio (REGULAR CALENDAR) and Angela Mohler, :

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on September 30, 2016

On brief: Thomas & Company, L.P.A., and Cheryl L. Jennings, for relator.

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Shaun P. Omen, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

On brief: Larrimer & Larrimer, and Thomas L. Reitz, for respondent Angela Mohler.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

BROWN, J. {¶ 1} Relator, Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. ("relator"), has filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order that granted an award of permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation to respondent Angela Mohler ("claimant") and ordering the commission to find that she is not entitled to that compensation. No. 15AP-1106 2

{¶ 2} This matter was referred to a court-appointed magistrate pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued the appended decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended that this court grant a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its award granting relator PTD compensation and reconsider the issue after taking steps to remedy the ambiguity in Dr. Nancy Rennecker's report. Claimant and the commission have each raised one objection, while relator has raised three objections. {¶ 3} We will address claimant's objection, the commission's objection, and relator's first and second objections together, as they are related. Claimant and the commission argue in their objections that the magistrate erred by substituting her judgment for that of the commission, failing to find Dr. Rennecker's report was "some evidence" on which the commission could rely, and granting a limited writ of mandamus. To the contrary, relator argues in its first objection that the magistrate erred when she failed to determine, as a matter of law, that Dr. Rennecker's report was not some evidence that can be relied on in support of the PTD award. Relator argues in its second objection that the magistrate erred when she substituted her understanding of and/or experience with certain medical conditions/issues for the undisputed medical evidence contained within the claim file and on which the commission previously relied. {¶ 4} The magistrate ultimately found there was "some potential ambiguity" in Dr. Rennecker's report. The magistrate first noted that, despite the fact that lumbosacral radiculitis neuritis was a disallowed condition, Dr. Rennecker stated in her report that claimant suffered from constant low back pain with pain radiating into her legs and assigned impairment based on "L5 and right S1 radiculopathy." However, the magistrate explained that claimant had complained of back pain with pain radiating into her legs since her original 1992 injury and received approval for epidural lumbar injections; thus, regardless of whether her claim was disallowed for lumbosacral radiculitis neuritis, claimant had experienced pain radiating down her legs for a long period and had been approved for treatment for such. The magistrate concluded that the fact that Dr. Rennecker discussed claimant's radiculopathy did not necessarily mean that she considered the disallowed condition, and the radiculopathy was consistent with her allowed conditions and her symptomology. No. 15AP-1106 3

{¶ 5} We agree with the magistrate's analysis up to this point. However, we depart with the magistrate on her subsequent determination that a "potential" ambiguity, nevertheless, arose in this case as to whether Dr. Rennecker's assignment of impairment was based merely on claimant's symptom of pain radiating down her leg or based on the disallowed condition that would also cause pain radiating down the leg. The magistrate found Dr. Rennecker's report was unclear on this issue. However, there is simply nothing in Dr. Rennecker's report that gives any indication that her determination was based on the disallowed condition of lumbosacral radiculitis neuritis. See State ex rel. Tradesmen Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St.3d 336, 2015-Ohio-2342 (commission could rely on doctor's report when there was no indication that doctor had considered any non- allowed medical conditions). Dr. Rennecker never mentions lumbosacral radiculitis neuritis and specifically lists the correct allowed conditions at the beginning of her report. We choose not to create ambiguity where none explicitly exists, and decline to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the commission, which believed Dr. Rennecker's report referred solely to the allowed conditions. See id. (the commission has discretion, as the exclusive evaluator of the weight and credibility of the evidence, to determine whether the doctor's description of the claimant's pain actually refers to the allowed condition). Given that Dr. Rennecker examined claimant on the allowed conditions and explicitly concluded that claimant was permanently and totally disabled based on those allowed conditions, we find her report constitutes some evidence on which the commission could rely. Thus, we sustain the commission's and claimant's objections and overrule relator's first and second objections, finding them to be without merit. We do note that, with regard to relator's second objection that the magistrate erred when she referenced her own experience with certain medical conditions, although the magistrate should consider only evidence within the record, our analysis above does not rely on the complained of references. {¶ 6} Relator argues in its third objection that the magistrate erred when she failed to determine, as a matter of law, that claimant's refusal to participate in vocational rehabilitation efforts precludes her from receiving PTD benefits. Relator is correct that the Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly addressed the obligation of a PTD claimant to undergo opportunities for rehabilitation. See State ex rel. Barfield v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-61, 2010-Ohio-5552, ¶ 30, citing State ex rel. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Indus. No. 15AP-1106 4

Comm., 73 Ohio St.3d 525 (1995); State ex rel. Bowling v. Natl. Can Corp., 77 Ohio St.3d 148 (1996); State ex rel. Wood v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 414 (1997); State ex rel. Wilson v. Indus. Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 250 (1997); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Indus. Comm., 91 Ohio St.3d 261 (2001). However, here, the commission determined that claimant was permanently and totally disabled based solely on medical factors. When medical factors alone preclude sustained remunerative employment, the commission is not required to consider the non-medical factors, including whether claimant had or should have pursued vocational rehabilitation. State ex rel. Tradesman Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-122, 2014-Ohio-1064, ¶ 18, aff'd in Tradesmen Internatl., 2015-Ohio-2342. See also State ex rel. Honda of Am. Mfg. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-82, 2014-Ohio-5245, ¶ 13, citing Tradesman Internatl., 2015-Ohio- 2342. Here, the commission determined claimant was permanently and totally disabled based on medical factors alone pursuant to Dr. Rennecker's report. Therefore, neither the commission nor the magistrate were required to address claimant's failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation efforts.

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State ex rel. Domjancic v. Industrial Commission
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State ex rel. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Industrial Commission
653 N.E.2d 345 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1995)
State ex rel. Bowling v. National Can Corp.
77 Ohio St. 3d 148 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996)
State ex rel. Wood v. Industrial Commission
678 N.E.2d 569 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
State ex rel. Wilson v. Industrial Commission
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State ex rel. Cunningham v. Industrial Commission
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State ex rel. Tradesmen International v. Industrial Commission
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Bluebook (online)
2016 Ohio 7128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-kindred-healthcare-operating-inc-v-indus-comm-ohioctapp-2016.