State ex rel. Kidd v. Indus. Comm.

2022 Ohio 450
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 15, 2022
Docket20AP-364
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2022 Ohio 450 (State ex rel. Kidd v. Indus. Comm.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Kidd v. Indus. Comm., 2022 Ohio 450 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Kidd v. Indus. Comm., 2022-Ohio-450.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Donna J. Kidd, :

Relator, :

v. : No. 20AP-364

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on February 15, 2022

On brief: Schaffer and Associates, L.P.A., and Thomas J. Schaffer, for relator.

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Anna Isupova, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

LUPER SCHUSTER, P.J. {¶ 1} Relator, Donna J. Kidd, initiated this original action requesting this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its order denying her application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation, and to enter a new order, either granting or denying the application, that complies with State ex rel. Libecap v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 96APD01-29, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3892 (Sept. 5, 1996), aff'd without opinion, 83 Ohio St.3d 178 (1998). {¶ 2} This matter was referred to a magistrate of this court pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued the appended decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate determined that the commission did not abuse its discretion because its order denying No. 20AP-364 2

Kidd's PTD compensation application is supported by some evidence. Thus, the magistrate recommends this court deny Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus. Kidd has filed objections to the magistrate's decision. First, she argues that the magistrate improperly concluded the commission's denial of Kidd's PTD compensation application is supported by some evidence. Second, she argues the magistrate failed to adequately recite Dr. Sanjay Shah's finding that Kidd be "[a]llow[ed] rest periods every 15-20 minutes for 1-2 minutes as needed during standing, sitting, or walking." (Oct. 28, 2021 Objs. to Mag.'s Decision at 6.) {¶ 3} For this court to issue the requested writ of mandamus, Kidd must show a clear legal right to the relief sought and that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A clear legal right to a writ of mandamus exists where the relator shows that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel. Elliott v. Indus. Comm., 26 Ohio St.3d 76 (1986). But when the record contains some evidence to support the commission's findings, there has been no abuse of discretion and mandamus is not appropriate. State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co., 29 Ohio St.3d 56 (1987). The commission "has substantial leeway in both interpreting and drawing inferences from the evidence before it." State ex rel. Lawson v. Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-6086, ¶ 34. Thus, we must not "second-guess the commission's evaluation of the evidence." State ex rel. Black v. Indus. Comm., 137 Ohio St.3d 75, 2013- Ohio-4550, ¶ 22. The relevant inquiry in a PTD compensation determination is the claimant's ability to do any sustained remunerative employment. State ex rel. Domjancic v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 693, 695 (1994); Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). {¶ 4} Here, Kidd submitted her PTD compensation application with a report completed by Mickey E. Frame, D.C., who opined that Kidd is unable to work due to her allowed conditions. On her application form, Kidd indicated that she was limited to driving for one hour at a time, sitting for 30 minutes at a time, standing for 30 minutes at a time, and walking for approximately one-half mile at a time. At the commission's request, Dr. Shah performed an independent medical examination of Kidd. In his report, Dr. Shah opined that Kidd could work at a sedentary level, but he noted, inter alia, the following limitations: "standing for approximately 20 minutes, sitting for 20-30 minutes with change No. 20AP-364 3

in position and is able to walk 1/2 mile. * * * Allow rest periods every 15-20 minutes for 1-2 minutes as needed during standing, sitting, or walking." (Specialist Report at 4-5, Stip. of Evidence at 20986-Y61 & Y62.) Dr. Shah further noted that Kidd reported that she uses a treadmill for approximately 30 minutes four times per week. A vocational specialist, Anne Savage Veh, evaluated Kidd and opined that she is no longer capable of engaging in sustained, remunerative employment. {¶ 5} A commission staff hearing officer ("SHO") determined that Dr. Shah's findings and restrictions were consistent with Kidd's reported limitations and the definition of sedentary work for the purpose of reviewing her PTD compensation application. The SHO noted that modern innovations in office equipment, such as sit or stand desks and wireless telephones, and the advancements in remote work technology, enable work-from- home employees to change positions at their convenience. Consequently, the SHO rejected Kidd's argument that she is physically incapable of performing sedentary work. The SHO also considered non-medical disability factors and concluded that Kidd is capable of returning to sustained remunerative employment and therefore denied the PTD compensation application. The commission refused continuing jurisdiction, and Kidd filed this mandamus action. {¶ 6} Before the magistrate, Kidd argued the commission abused its discretion because it relied on a medical report (of Dr. Shah) that does not constitute some evidence under Libecap. The magistrate disagreed, finding Libecap distinguishable. The magistrate found that Dr. Shah's report sets forth restrictions that do not limit Kidd from activities in a sedentary job, noting, like the SHO, the advancements in work-from-home technology and workspace furniture that readily accommodate position changes. Concerning Kidd's second objection to the magistrate's decision, we note the magistrate's findings of fact provide an extensive recitation of the report of the vocational specialist, Veh, which includes Veh's quotation of Dr. Shah's statement that Kidd be "[a]llow[ed] rest periods every 15-20 minutes for 1-2 minutes as needed during standing, sitting, or walking." (Mag.'s Decision at ¶ 23.) Although the magistrate did not directly quote Dr. Shah's statement regarding Kidd needing rest periods, his indirect reference was sufficient to adequately recite that finding. Thus, Kidd's second objection lacks merit. No. 20AP-364 4

{¶ 7} Kidd's first objection, however, is convincing. We agree that the reasoning of the SHO and magistrate was flawed as to the law's application to the facts of this matter. In their analyses of Kidd's ability to perform sedentary employment, both the SHO and magistrate emphasized advancements in workplace technology and furniture as means for Kidd to change her working position at her convenience. Although workspace flexibility has advanced significantly in recent years, the definition for sedentary work in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2)(a) is the same as it existed when Libecap was decided in 1996. As in Libecap, Kidd's limitations found by Dr. Shah are seemingly inconsistent with that definition. {¶ 8} For the purpose of the adjudication of PTD compensation applications, Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2)(a) defines "sedentary work" as the following: exerting up to ten pounds of force occasionally (occasionally: activity or condition exists up to one-third of the time) and/or a negligible amount of force frequently (frequently: activity or condition exists from one-third to two-thirds of the time) to lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise move objects.

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Bluebook (online)
2022 Ohio 450, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-kidd-v-indus-comm-ohioctapp-2022.