State Ex Rel. Kelly Servs. v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (11-7-2006)

2006 Ohio 5868
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 7, 2006
DocketNo. 05AP-1192.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2006 Ohio 5868 (State Ex Rel. Kelly Servs. v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (11-7-2006)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Kelly Servs. v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (11-7-2006), 2006 Ohio 5868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Kelly Services, Inc. ("relator") commenced this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its order allocating to relator 50 percent of the permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation award of respondent William E. Ziegler ("the claimant"), and ordering the commission to allocate 100 percent of the claimant's PTD award to respondent, United States Gypsum Company ("USG").

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth Appellate District, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision including findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Attached as Appendix A.) Therein, the magistrate concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion in allocating the claimant's PTD award as it did, and recommended that this court deny the requested writ of mandamus. Both relator and USG filed objections to the magistrate's decision, and the commission filed a memorandum opposing both objections. In addition, relator filed a memorandum in opposition to USG's objections. This cause is now before the court for a full evaluation of the merits.

{¶ 3} In its objections, relator argues that the magistrate erred in refusing to conclude that the case of State ex rel. TheDanis Companies v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1022,2004-Ohio-5252, mandates that the commission extrapolate from an expert's allocation of whole person impairment in order to determine the appropriate percentage of a PTD award to allocate to each employer. We overrule this objection because the magistrate correctly concluded that the Danis case contains no such mandate, and furthermore because the commission is the exclusive evaluator of disability. State ex rel. Kirkendall v.Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 182, 183, 718 N.E.2d 906.

{¶ 4} Relator also objects to the magistrate's finding that Dr. Uberti's report constituted some evidence supporting the commission's decision, arguing that because the SHO mischaracterized Dr. Uberti's opinion, the SHO's order fails to comply with State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991),57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245, and therefore the Uberti report is not "some evidence." Noll requires that the commission specifically state what evidence it has relied upon and briefly explain the reasoning for its decision. Id. at syllabus. The commission did so, and its mischaracterization of whether Dr. Uberti actually allocated impairment does not render the commission's order noncompliant with Noll. Moreover, no matter how the commission characterized Dr. Uberti's report, this does not change the substance of that report and the fact that the commission relied on it. In any case, the Uberti report deals with impairment, which is the province of medical experts, while disability, as we stated earlier, is the exclusive province of the commission.Kirkendall, supra.

{¶ 5} Finally, relator argues that allocating the claimant's PTD award equally between relator and USG is unfair, inappropriate and against public policy. Relator never identifies which public policy is being violated, and we are aware of none. But relator does argue that the commission's decision is unfair because it results in penalizing an employer for hiring a worker that had a preexisting, obvious disability, when that worker's injury in the course and scope of the new job merely "br[oke] the camel's back." (Relator's Objections, at 6.)

{¶ 6} As the magistrate explained, however, the claimant's loss of use of his left arm, occasioned by his second industrial injury, did not merely "break the camel's back." The fallacy of this argument consists in the fact that but for the claimant having lost the use of his left arm while employed by relator, he would not be permanently and totally disabled. After the claimant lost the use of his right arm while employed by USG, he was able to secure full-time employment and fully perform his work duties with his left hand; but after he lost the use of his left arm while employed by relator, he was no longer capable of sustained remunerative employment because his second industrial injury removed the only means he had of performing any job duties. Clearly, the claimant was able to work using either arm, but he must have use of one or the other, and relator and USG are each responsible for the claimant's loss of use of one arm; thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the commission to allocate claimant's disability award equally between the two employers.

{¶ 7} For all of the foregoing reasons, relator's objections are overruled.

{¶ 8} In its objection, USG argues that the magistrate erred in concluding that the corrected tentative order subject of relator's mandamus action is effective against both relator and USG. USG contends that because the commission issued a separate corrected tentative order in the older claim (that is, the claim involving the claimant's industrial injury sustained while employed by USG), which allocated 100 percent of the PTD award to relator, and that order was never challenged, it became final and, therefore, the corrected tentative order allocating the PTD award equally, which was issued in the second claim, is ineffective as against USG.

{¶ 9} We agree with the magistrate that USG has not properly challenged the commission's order because it has filed no complaint or cross-claim in mandamus. Having sought no relief in this court until this point in the proceedings, USG cannot now, in its objections to the magistrate's decision, seek relief from what it feels was an erroneous application to it of the commission's order in the second claim. Accordingly, USG's objections are overruled.

{¶ 10} Having undertaken a review of relator's and USG's objections, considered the arguments of the parties, and independently appraised the record, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein, and we deny the requested writ of mandamus.

Objections overruled; writ of mandamus denied.

Brown and French, JJ., concur.

(APPENDIX A)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio ex rel. Kelly Services, Inc., :

Relator, :

v. : No. 05AP-1192

Industrial Commission of Ohio, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) William E. Ziegler and United States Gypsum Company, :

Respondents. :

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
Rendered on June 23, 2006
Scheuer, Mackin Breslin, J. Kent Breslin and Eric A.Rich, for relator.

Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

Donald R. Ford, for respondent William E. Ziegler.

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State ex rel. Hart v. Indus. Comm.
2020 Ohio 1396 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2020)
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State ex rel. Kelly Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm.
859 N.E.2d 976 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
2006 Ohio 5868, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-kelly-servs-v-indus-comm-unpublished-decision-ohioctapp-2006.