State ex rel. Kanter Corp. v. Stringer
This text of 424 N.E.2d 282 (State ex rel. Kanter Corp. v. Stringer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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R. C. 4123.89 provides for an additional award of 100 percent of the maximum award established by law, to any minor whose injury, occupational disease or death is caused by working in any employment prohibited by law.1 Here, the Industrial Commission found that claimant’s injury was caused by employment which is prohibited by (former) R. C. 4109.12(D) and (U).2 Accordingly, the commission al[11]*11lowed claimant an additional award of 100 percent of the maximum award established by law.
The courts below ruled that R. C. 4123.89 conflicts with Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution because it mandates an additional award in excess of 50 percent.
In part, Section 35 of Article II authorizes the Industrial Commission to make an additional award to any employee whose injury, disease or death results from the employer’s failure to comply with a specific health or safety requirement enacted by the General Assembly or adopted by the Industrial Commission.* *3 However, Section 35 limits the additional compensation to not less than 15 percent nor more than 50 percent of the maximum award established by law.
Appellants argue that there is no conflict between R. C. 4123.89 and the Constitution. They assert that R. C. 4123.89 was not enacted to provide for specific safety requirements; rather, it provides for additional payments to minors injured when they are engaged in prohibited employment.
[12]*12We do not agree with this position because it ignores both the legislative history of R. C. 4123.89 and the limitations placed upon the General Assembly by Section 35 of Article II.
In State, ex rel. Trydle, v. Indus. Comm. (1972), 32 Ohio St. 2d 257, this court held that R. C. 4109.12(D) and (U) were not specific safety requirements, and a minor who was injured as a result of their violation was not entitled to an additional award pursuant to Section 35 of Article II. In 1973, at its next session, the General Assembly responded to Trydle and amended R. C. 4123.89 by adding the language relevant to this dispute.4 (135 Ohio Laws 1690, 1719.) See, also, Young, Workmen’s Compensation Law (2 Ed. 1980 Cum. Supp.), 63, Section 19.10.
The Court of Appeals ruled, and we agree, that the effect of the 1973 amendment to R. C. 4123.89 was to overrule, legislatively, this court’s decision in Trydle. By amending R. C. 4123.89, the General Assembly exercised its prerogative and made sections of the Revised Code, which prohibit the employment of minors in certain areas, specific safety requirements.
To adopt the appellants' reading of R. C. 4123.89 would bring its validity entirely into doubt. Section 35 of Article II authorizes the enactment of laws establishing a system of workers’ compensation. The Constitution authorizes two types of payments to be made to workers’ compensation and, in the appropriate case, an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement. Other than compensation or an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement, an employer may not be liable for damages under the common law or statute.5 If, as appellants argue, R. C. 4123.89 does not establish specific safety requirements, then it is constitutional only if the payment can be termed compensation.
We believe that a payment made pursuant to R. C. [13]*134123.89 cannot be termed “compensation.” “Compensation” looks to the needs of the injured party with the goal of making that person whole. See Black’s Law Dictionary (5 Ed.). R. C. 4123.89 does not look to the needs of the injured employee; rather, its focus is upon the employment in which the employee was engaged when injured. This payment may be likened to a penalty for the breach of laws enacted for the safety of minor employees. If two minor employees suffer similar injuries, one engaged in prohibited employment and the other not, only the one engaged in prohibited employment can receive an additional award under R. C. 4123.89.6
Therefore, were we to agree with the appellants that R. C. 4123.89 does not establish safety requirements, we would be compelled to hold the entire additional award provision unconstitutional, since an employer may not be held liable for damages under either the common law or statute other than as provided by Section 35 of Article II. However, we hold that R. C. 4123.89 establishes specific safety requirements within the meaning and limitations of Section 35 of Article II. In that such constitutional section provides that the award to a claimant for a violation of a specific safety requirement may not exceed 50 percent of the maximum award established by law, any excess thereof would be in violation of this constitutional provision, and is therefore unconstitutional.
,. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
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424 N.E.2d 282, 67 Ohio St. 2d 8, 21 Ohio Op. 3d 5, 1981 Ohio LEXIS 544, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-kanter-corp-v-stringer-ohio-1981.