State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Chapman

631 P.2d 831, 53 Or. App. 268, 1981 Ore. App. LEXIS 2972
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJuly 27, 1981
Docket37783 CA 19630
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 631 P.2d 831 (State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Chapman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Chapman, 631 P.2d 831, 53 Or. App. 268, 1981 Ore. App. LEXIS 2972 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

*270 ROBERTS, J.

The parents appeal from an order terminating their parental rights in their four year-old daughter. The facts amply demonstrate the unusual manner in which the state proceeded. On May 20,1980, police were called to the Chapmans’ home to investigate a family disturbance which had been reported by a neighbor. The deputy who responded to the call found no disturbance, but, finding the house "filthy” and both parents "drunk,” he took the child, Diane, into protective custody. The next day, an order was signed committing Diane to the temporary care and custody of the Children’s Services Division. Two days later, a petition was filed seeking termination of parental rights. Thus, within three days of the first indication that there was any possible problem in the family home, the state took formal steps to sever the parent-child relationship. The parents have not been permitted to see the child since she was first taken from the home.

On appeal the state argues that it based its actions on determinations made in proceedings before Diane was bom in which the Chapmans’ rights in three older children were terminated. The state argues that the conditions which existed then are "essentially uncurable” and "continue to exist,” thus establishing that "the appellants are not capable of providing this child with the necessary parenting.” In order for termination to occur, ORS 419.523 requires the court to find:

"* * * [T]hat the parent or parents are unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child and integration of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable in the foreseeable future due to conduct or conditions not likely to change. In determining such conduct and conditions, the court shall consider but is not limited to the following:
"(a) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental deficiency of the parent of such duration as to render it impossible to care for the child for extended periods of time.
"(b) Conduct toward any child of an abusive, cruel or sexual nature.
"(c) Addictive use of intoxicating liquors or controlled substances.
"(d) Physical neglect of the child.
*271 "(e) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the circumstances of the parent, conduct, or conditions to make the return of the child possible or failure of the parent to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social agencies for such extended duration of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting adjustment can be affected.
“* * * * *.”

A significant portion of the state’s case against the Chapmans was built upon the termination of their rights in the other three children in 1974, and previous psychiatric examinations of the parents, though the psychiatric diagnoses were 25 years old. 1 There was no testimony received at this hearing as to the present psychological status of either parent. It is the state’s position that the father’s mental retardation and the mother’s previously diagnosed hebephrenic schizophrenia are unlikely to change and that, if the parents were mentally, emotionally and psychologically impaired in 1974, that condition continues today. The persistence of, or improvements in, the parents’ mental conditions is beside the point: the fundamental issue in a termination case is whether or not parents are "unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child.” Mental health is only one of many factors to be considered.

Our review of the record is de novo, ORS 419.561(4), ORS 19.125(3), with, of course, due regard for the decision of the trial court which had an opportunity to see the witnesses. State ex rel Juvenile Dept. v. Maves, 33 Or App 411, 576 P2d 826 (1978).

The state presented four grounds for termination in its petition: (1) the family residence was filthy and rodent infested, (2) the child Diane was filthy and, on May 20, 1980, was at a neighbor’s house unbeknownst to her parents, (3) both parents had a history of alcoholism and were, on May 20, 1980, drunk, and (4) parental rights in three other children had been terminated in 1974, based, *272 among other things, on the mental illness and mental deficiency of the parents. 2 Seven witnesses testified for the state at the hearing, including neighbors, a psychologist, the CSD caseworker, the juvenile court counselor, and the foster mother with whom the child was placed following her removal from the home.

*273 The deputy who went to the Chapman’s home said the house was "filthy,” with cans and dirty dishes piled up in the kitchen, food spilled on the floor, unwashed bedclothes in the bedroom and a bad smell everywhere. He said that there were dirty diapers in what he took to be the child’s room and that the child, who was at a neighbor’s, was also "filthy.” He said both parents were drunk the evening he was there.

The state’s main witness was the neighbor who had called the police to the home. She testified that she had known the parents for seven years, that they drank beer "a lot” and that she heard them fighting about once a month. She testified that there were always dirty dishes and food laying around the house and that the child was usually dirty. She related two incidents in which she said the child had been improperly cared for: once, during the winter, the child crawled out of the Chapman’s back door and into the neighbor’s back door, a distance of ten feet, clad only in a diaper. This was the only instance, she said, in which she had ever seen the child unattended. The second incident related was an occasion on which Mrs. Chapman took Diane for an hour’s bike ride in cold, rainy weather and the child was severely chilled when she returned. This neighbor also testified that she had once seen Mr. Chapman choking the child.

The neighbor’s 9 1/2 year old daughter testified that there were dirty diapers and bugs in the house and that she had once seen Mr. Chapman, when he was drunk, try to pour beer down the child’s throat. Another neighbor testified the mother rode her bike in the rain and cold with the child mounted in a bike seat behind her. Mrs. Chapman’s brother testified the parents "possibly had a drinking problem.” The psychologist who testified had not examined the Chapmans. The only psychological report in evidence was an evaluation of Diane which found her to be mildly retarded with "significant delays in communication skills, motor development and practical skills for daily living.” 3

*274

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Related

State ex rel. Children's Services Division v. Brady
899 P.2d 691 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1995)
STATE EX REL. CSD v. Brady
899 P.2d 691 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1995)
State ex rel. Juvenile Department v. Martin
816 P.2d 1186 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1991)
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Pennington
799 P.2d 694 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)
631 P.2d 831, 53 Or. App. 268, 1981 Ore. App. LEXIS 2972, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-juvenile-department-v-chapman-orctapp-1981.