State Ex Rel. Jones v. Riggs

Supreme Court of North Carolina

State Ex Rel. Jones v. Riggs

70 S.E. 465, 154 N.C. 281, 1911 N.C. LEXIS 259

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedMarch 8, 1911

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 70 S.E. 465 (State Ex Rel. Jones v. Riggs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State Ex Rel. Jones v. Riggs, 70 S.E. 465, 154 N.C. 281, 1911 N.C. LEXIS 259 (N.C. 1911).

Pincite

Opinion

Clark, C. J.

This action is brought in tbe name of tbe State on tbe relation of a private individual who bas no interest in tbe land, other than as a citizen of tbe State, to vacate a grant to an oyster bed.

Tbe relator claims a right to maintain this action under sections 1748 and 1750 of tbe Revisal. He cannot maintain it under section 1748, as that is limited to one claiming title to tbe land, covered by tbe grant under a patent or grant to himself, and tbe plaintiff makes no such claim. Nor can be maintain it under section 1750, as that authorizes only the Attorney-General to bring tbe action. Such action is to be brought, only in behalf of tbe State, when tbe public interest requires it and when tbe State is tbe beneficiary. Tbe power to bring such action is properly vested in tbe Attorney-General. It was not intended that any citizen of tbe State without any interest himself in the subject-matter should bring an action on behalf of tbe State. Tbe State bas a public officer whose duty it is to look after its interests in such matters.

*282 It is true that in this case the action is brought by the plaintiff upon leave granted by the Attorney-General. But that is only to test the right of the plaintiff to maintain such action. The plaintiff is not a party in interest, in the meaning of the law, and cannot maintain the action in his own behalf, nor can the leave of the Attorney-General authorize him to maintain it in behalf of the State.

A quo warranto as to an office can be brought upon leave of the Attorney-General by any citizen who is a qualified voter and taxpayer of a municipal corporation, or of any jurisdiction over which the officer whose title is questioned exercises his duties and powers, though the relator is not himself a contestant for the office. But this is on the ground that he is a party in interest and has a direct interest in having the office occupied only by an officer who is entitled to it. Foard v. Hall, 111 N. C., 369; Hines v. Vann, 118 N. C., 6; Houghtalling v. Taylor, 122 N. C., 145; Mott v. Comrs., 126 N. C., 877. But the plaintiff has no such interest in the title or ownership of the oyster bed.

The court properly sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action.

Affirmed.

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Clark, C. J.

This action is brought in tbe name of tbe State on tbe relation of a private individual who bas no interest in tbe land, other than as a citizen of tbe State, to vacate a grant to an oyster bed.

Tbe relator claims a right to maintain this action under sections 1748 and 1750 of tbe Revisal. He cannot maintain it under section 1748, as that is limited to one claiming title to tbe land, covered by tbe grant under a patent or grant to himself, and tbe plaintiff makes no such claim. Nor can be maintain it under section 1750, as that authorizes only the Attorney-General to bring tbe action. Such action is to be brought, only in behalf of tbe State, when tbe public interest requires it and when tbe State is tbe beneficiary. Tbe power to bring such action is properly vested in tbe Attorney-General. It was not intended that any citizen of tbe State without any interest himself in the subject-matter should bring an action on behalf of tbe State. Tbe State bas a public officer whose duty it is to look after its interests in such matters.

*282 It is true that in this case the action is brought by the plaintiff upon leave granted by the Attorney-General. But that is only to test the right of the plaintiff to maintain such action. The plaintiff is not a party in interest, in the meaning of the law, and cannot maintain the action in his own behalf, nor can the leave of the Attorney-General authorize him to maintain it in behalf of the State.

A quo warranto as to an office can be brought upon leave of the Attorney-General by any citizen who is a qualified voter and taxpayer of a municipal corporation, or of any jurisdiction over which the officer whose title is questioned exercises his duties and powers, though the relator is not himself a contestant for the office. But this is on the ground that he is a party in interest and has a direct interest in having the office occupied only by an officer who is entitled to it. Foard v. Hall, 111 N. C., 369; Hines v. Vann, 118 N. C., 6; Houghtalling v. Taylor, 122 N. C., 145; Mott v. Comrs., 126 N. C., 877. But the plaintiff has no such interest in the title or ownership of the oyster bed.

The court properly sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

70 S.E. 465, 154 N.C. 281, 1911 N.C. LEXIS 259, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-jones-v-riggs-nc-1911.

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