State ex rel. Ives v. Kansas Central Railroad

47 Kan. 497

• Court: Supreme Court of Kansas
• Decided: July 15, 1891
• Status: Published

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Horton, C. J.:

The question for our consideration'in this case is not what power the legislature of the state may delegate or confer upon the board of railroad commissioners, but what power is conferred by the existing statutes. It is contended upon the part of the state that the finding of the railroad commissioners of the 13th day of May, 1891, that the Kansas Central railroad “is in an unsafe and dangerous condition for the transportation of persons and property, by reason of the insufficient condition and weight of the iron rails in the tracks thereof,” is final and conclusive upon the defendants and this court. Further, that the order of the commissioners requiring the Kansas Central railroad to be relaid with new rails of standard pattern, and of not less weight than 56 pounds to the lineal yard, is also final and conclusive; that, in proceedings in this court to compel a compliance with the order of the commissioners, the statute neither contemplates nor allows any issue to be made or inquiry had of the condition of the railroad examined by the commissioners, or of the reasonableness of the order made by them. The defendants claim that the order of the commissioners, under the terms of the statute, is advisory only. If the finding of the commissioners and their order are final and conclusive, this court has no power to hear or determine any issue of fact, except upon the allegation that the defendants have refused to comply with the order for repairs. If the finding and order of the commissioners are final and conclusive, this court, upon a railroad company refusing a compliance therewith, must at once, upon proper application being made, register the order and enforce the same literally.

Railroad company-repairs-recommendation of railroad commissioner. The power which is. claimed by the commissioners to be conferred upon them, so far as this case is concerned, must be found, if found anywhere, in § 5, chapter 124, Laws of 1883. (Gen. Stat. of 1889, ¶ 1328.) The legislature has not conferred upon the commissioners by said statute the power claimed. There is nothing in the statute which states, or can be construed to state, that the orders of the commissioners concerning repairs upon a railroad shall be final or conclusive, or that'the courts must carry out their determinations or judgments. Upon the other hand, the statute provides only that whenever in the judgment of the commissioners any repairs upon a railroad are demanded for the security, convenience and accommodation of the public, they shall inform the railroad corporation of the improvements and changes which they’ adjudge to be necessary, and then report their proceedings to the governor. Nowhere is it stated in the statute that the recommendations of the commissioners concerning repairs must be complied with nolens volens by the company; nor does the statute authorize the governor to carry into execution the order of the commissioners. As to the necessary # • rePairs of a railroad, the finding and order of the commissioners, under the statute, are advisory only — nothing more. The order cannot be enforced by the commissioners; it cannot be enforced by the governor; and it cannot be enforced specifically by this or any other court. Under the statute, as existing, whenever an action is brought in any court to compel a railroad corporation to repair its tracks or operate its road in a particular way, for the security, convenience and accommodation of the public, the corporation is entitled to an opportunity to traverse its alleged violation of duty, and to have a judicial investigation of the charges made against it, under the forms provided for in the trial of other civil actions. Not only is the finding and order of the commissioners not an absolute finality, but the statute concerning repairs does not make them even prima fade evidence. When the courts are to decide such a case as this, the whole truth of the matter alleged or denied is subject to a judicial investigation. Each party is entitled to its day in court before a conclusive finding is made or a final order entered. The commissioners are not clothed with judicial functions. They have neither the powers of masters, referees, juries, or judges. Their findings are not like the findings of a master, referee, jury, or court. When performing duties under said § 5 of chapter 124, Laws of 1883, they may examine and decide what repairs are proper, and give notice thereof to the railroad corporation, and report their- proceedings to the governor. The statute confers no other duty or power.

The persons first appointed as commissioners were Hon. James Humphrey, Hon. L, L. Turner, and Hon. Henry Hopkins. In the first report of the commissioners, their powers under said § 5 were very clearly and fully defined by them. They said:

“The commissioners, under this section, have no power to enforce an order. They can simply advise the company in fault of the changes desired or deemed necessary. To have invested the commission with the power to enforce its own orders, it would have been necessary to have changed the character of the board and the scope of its functions and powers. It would have been necessary to have given to the commission all the powers of a court of chancery, to bejexercised within the scope of its assigned duties, with such ministerial officers attached to the board as are usual and necessary to such tribunals, to execute its injunctions and mandates. It would have rendered it necessary to have instituted a formal investigation, upon proper complaint and notice to the company complained pi', and the rendition of a formal judgment and decree upon the evidence which should be submitted to the board. Manifestly, in such case it would have been improper for the board to have acted upon knowledge and information gathered from personal observation, or the ex parte statements of individuals, as much so as it would be for regularly-organized courts to act judicially upon evidence which has never been disclosed to the opposite party to the suit. The supervisory powers of the commission would in such case extend only to such matters as should be formally brought before it by complaint, and no such complaint would be made until some one had become the suffering victim of some neglect, failure, or other violation of duty on the part of a railroad company. Thus the chief benefits which were intended to be secured by giving the commissioners general supervisory powers would be sacrificed by imposing upon them those limitations in the exercise of functions which are necessary to impress upon judicial decrees the weight and character of impartiality.” (First Annual Report of Railroad Commissioners, 1883, p. 4.)

In 1888, the commissioners were Hon. Albert R. Greene, Hon. Almerin Gillett, and Hon. James Humphrey. They evidently did not understand that their orders were final or conclusive, and that the courts, under the existing statute, without a full investigation and hearing thereof, are required to enforce their orders. They said:

“The orders, decisions and recommendations of the board, upon the various matters which have come before it the past year, have in nearly all instances been complied with and carried out by the railroad companies affected by such decision or order. In one instance, however, the company affected by a decision of the board has demurred, and so far, we have been advised, has refused to comply with its requirements. . . . It is respectfully recommended that provision be made by statute for the enforcement, by appropriate remedy, in courts having jurisdiction, of the decisions and orders of the board.” (Sixth Annual Report of Railroad Commissioners, 1888, pp. 45, 46.)

In compliance with the foregoing request, the legislature passed an act on the 2d of March, 1889, attempting to compel the enforcement of the orders of the railroad commissioners for the erection and maintenance of depots, the construction of connections, side-tracks, switches, etc.j but the act of March 2,1889, does not attempt to confer any additional power upon the commissioners or the courts in enforcing their orders concerning the repairs or the actual operation of railroads.

In 1890, the commissioners were Hon. James Humphrey, Hon. George T. Anthony, and Hon. Albert R. Greene. In their report they also asked for additional power. They said:

“It should by provided by law that the order of the railroad commissioners shall be the governing law of the railroad companies, to be obeyed and respected by them, until vacated by a competent judicial tribunal on appeal.” (Eighth Annual Report of the Railroad Commissioners, 1890, p. 10.)

No additional power was conferred at the session of the legislature for 1891. Therefore, as before stated, the only act that it is necessary to construe in this case is § 5, chapter 124, Laws of 1883. (Gen. Stat. of 1889, ¶ 1328.) When the legislature of 1889 gave additional powers to the commissioners concerning railroad stations, connections, side-tracks, switches, etc., but refused to change the statute for the enforcement of the recommendations of the commissioners concerning the necessary repairs, etc., of railroad tracks, it is clearly evident that the members thereof did not think the order of the commissioners in such matter should be an absolute finality, or should be enforced without the ordinary judicial investigations in the courts. The counsel representing the state in this case, upon tbe hearing thereof, made a very able argument to establish that, within the police power, the state has ample authority to compel the repairs of any railroad, so that it may be operated safely for the public. This argument, although strong and ingenious, cannot be applied here, because the legislature has not, by statute, conferred, or attempted to confer, the power claimed, even if it had the authority so to do. It will be noticed, however, by the language of said § 5, that the power of the commissioners is as effective in matters relating to the convenience and accommodation of the public as to those having reference to security or safety. In Minnesota, in 1887, the legislature granted by statute to the railroad commissioners of that state the power to fix the rates of charges for the transportation of property by railroad companies, and provided their orders should be final and conclusive. The statute was held' by the supreme court of the United States in conflict with the constitution of the United States, and therefore void. (Railroad Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418.)

It is an historical fact, well known by those who attended the session of the legislature of 1883, and by those acquainted with the proceedings of that body, that there was a bitter contention among its members as to what power should be conferred upon or delegated to the commissioners to be appointed under the act or bill then pending for adoption. A part of the members, under the lead of Hon. Eugene E. Ware and others, were favorable to the delegation to the commissioners and the courts full authority for the enforcement of their orders; others, and a majority, opposed the delegation of such power; and the result was that advisory action only on the part of the commissioners was provided for. The national interstate commerce act of February 4, 1887, differs widely from the act of 1883 of our legislature, in expressly providing for writs of mandamus to be issued out of the United States circuit courts to compel railroad companies to comply with the orders of the national commission, and also for punishing in such courts railroad companies for violating or neglecting to obey any lawful order or requirement of the national commission. (Vol. 1, Interstate Commerce Commission Reports, 665— 671.) We understand that generally the recommendations of the state commissioners have been complied with by all of the railroád__companies affected thereby, and if the road and track of the Kansas Central are in the dangerous condition reported by the commissioners, it is most unfortunate to the public that the corporation having the operation of the road has not long since carried out the requests of the commissioners, so as to put the road and track in a safe and secure condition for the transportation of freight and the carrying of passengers; but when we are called upon to perform a judicial duty, we cannot go beyond the limits of our power as defined by the constitution and statutes of the state, however strong the necessity may be apparent for the immediate exercise of arbitrary control.

Without deciding other questions raised upon the argument, the motion to quash must be sustained, because the legislature has not provided, or attempted to provide, that the recommendations of the railroad commissioners concerning the repairs of railroads, their tracks, etc., are an absolute finality. The plaintiff will have leave to amend the alternative writ, if it so desires, by setting forth all allegations necessary of the dangerous condition of the track or road-bed of the Kansas Central Railroad Company; its refusal to operate its road safely or securely, and its neglect of duty, if any, in any other matters, and also to ask for such orders in the premises as may be deemed proper. Issues may be joined thereon, as in other mandamus cases, and an investigation will be judicially had of the truth of the matters in controversy. What power this court may lawfully exercise in compelling necessary repairs upon a railroad, or in requiring the safe operation of such a road, we leave for future consideration. f

All the Justices concurring.