State ex rel. Howard v. Condon

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 27, 2026
• Docket: 2026-L-0008
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Howard v. Condon, 2026-Ohio-1516.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO ex rel. CASE NO. 2026-L-0008 HASAN HOWARD,

Relator, Original Action for Writ of Mandamus - vs -

THE HONORABLE PATRICK CONDON, JUDGE, LAKE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,

Respondent.

PER CURIAM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Decided: April 27, 2026 Judgment: Petition dismissed

Howard Hasan, pro se, PID# 46759-509, FCI Three Rivers, P.O. Box 4200, Three Rivers, TX 78071 (Relator).

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Eric J. Foisel, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building,105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Respondent).

PER CURIAM.

{¶1} On February 3, 2026, relator, Hasan Howard, filed a petition for a writ of

mandamus. Thereafter, respondent moved to dismiss the petition. For the reasons that

follow, we dismiss.

{¶2} In his petition, Howard maintains that he has been incarcerated in federal

custody for 55 months. Howard states that, during his incarceration, the Lake County

Court of Common Pleas issued a warrant for him on a community control violation complaint and filed a detainer with the institution with which he is incarcerated. Howard

maintains that he has moved respondent to quash the warrant or schedule a prompt

community control violation hearing, but his motions have been denied, and no violation

hearing has been scheduled. Howard anticipates release from federal custody on October

14, 2026, and argues that respondent’s inaction on the community control violation

complaint has caused him adverse consequences with respect to his custody and reentry

planning. Howard maintains that the respondent has a clear legal duty to act on the

warrant by conducting a community control violation hearing or quashing the warrant and

lifting the detainer.

{¶3} On February 19, 2026, respondent filed a motion to dismiss Howard’s

petition for failure to state a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

{¶4} Civ.R. 12(B)(6) allows a responding party to raise the defense of “failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted” by motion. “‘Dismissal of a mandamus

action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate if, after presuming all factual allegations in the

complaint to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the relator’s favor, it appears

beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to a writ of mandamus.’” State

ex rel. Roush v. Hickson, 2024-Ohio-4741, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. A.N. v. Cuyahoga

Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2021-Ohio-2071, ¶ 8; see also State ex rel. Massengale v.

O’Malley, 2025-Ohio-5387, ¶ 4.

{¶5} “Mandamus is a writ issued to a public officer to perform an act that the law

enjoins as a duty resulting from his or her office.” State ex rel. Widmer v. Mohney, 2008-

Ohio-1028, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.), citing R.C. 2731.01. “For a writ of mandamus to issue, the

relator must establish a clear legal right to the relief prayed for; the respondent must have

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Case No. 2026-L-0008 a clear legal duty to perform the act; and the relator must have no plain and adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” Widmer at ¶ 31, citing State ex rel. National

Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 80 (1988).

{¶6} Here, taking as true the factual assertions set forth in Howard’s petition,

respondent argues that he is not entitled to a hearing on, or dismissal of, the community

control violation complaint prior to his completion of his federal sentence. In support,

respondent relies on R.C. 2951.07 and 2963.30.

{¶7} R.C. 2951.07 provides:

A community control sanction continues for the period that the judge or magistrate determines and, subject to the five-year limit specified in section 2929.15 or 2929.25 of the Revised Code, may be extended. If the offender under community control absconds or otherwise leaves the jurisdiction of the court without permission from the probation officer, the probation agency, or the court to do so, or if the offender is confined in any institution for the commission of any offense, the period of community control ceases to run until the time that the offender is brought before the court for its further action.

{¶8} Respondent maintains, pursuant to R.C. 2951.07, Howard’s community

control has been tolled until he is brought back before the court for further action.

{¶9} Pursuant to R.C. 2963.30, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, an

inmate must be brought to trial within 180 days of his notification to the place of his

imprisonment and his request for final disposition of an untried indictment, information, or

complaint. R.C. 2963.30, art. III, § (a). However, the United States Supreme Court in

Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 725 (1985), held:

The language of the Agreement [R.C. 2963.30] therefore makes clear that the phrase ‘untried indictment, information or complaint’ in Art. III refers to criminal charges pending against a prisoner. A probation-violation charge, which does not

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Case No. 2026-L-0008 accuse an individual with having committed a criminal offense in the sense of initiating a prosecution, thus does not come within the terms of Art. III.

{¶10} Therefore, Howard’s community control violation complaint is not a

“complaint” within the meaning of R.C. 2963.30, art. III, § (a).

{¶11} However, irrespective of R.C. 2963.30, Howard contends that the delay in

holding a hearing on the community control violation is extreme, has caused him harm,

and violates his due process rights.

{¶12} In a similar context involving a parole violator imprisoned on a new offense

awaiting a hearing on the parole violation, the Supreme Court of Ohio held:

[U]nder federal due process principles, no liberty interest attaches until a parolee is taken into custody pursuant to the detainer. If a loss of liberty is attributable to detention for new crimes, the parole authority has no constitutional duty to hold an immediate parole revocation hearing, regardless of his request therefor.

State ex rel. Taylor v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 66 Ohio St.3d 121, 125 (1993).

{¶13} Likewise, here, Howard’s liberty interest with respect to his community

control violation complaint does not attach until he is taken into custody on the detainer.

Accordingly, Howard’s petition does not state a clear right to a prompt hearing on the

community control violation complaint or a clear legal duty on the part of respondent to

hold a hearing on the complaint at any particular time.

{¶14} Accordingly, Howard’s petition for mandamus fails on its face. Therefore,

respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the petition for writ of mandamus is

dismissed.

MATT LYNCH, P.J., EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., ROBERT J. PATTON, J., concur.

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Case No. 2026-L-0008 JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the per curiam opinion of this court, respondent’s motion

to dismiss is granted, and the petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed.

Costs to be taxed against relator.

PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs

JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI, concurs

JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON, concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Case No. 2026-L-0008