State ex rel. Honda of America Mfg., Inc. v. Industrial Commission

918 N.E.2d 1023, 183 Ohio App. 3d 732
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedAugust 20, 2009
DocketNo. 08AP-899
StatusPublished

This text of 918 N.E.2d 1023 (State ex rel. Honda of America Mfg., Inc. v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Honda of America Mfg., Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 918 N.E.2d 1023, 183 Ohio App. 3d 732 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

Klatt, Judge.

{¶ 1} Relator, Honda of America Mfg., Inc., commenced this original action in mandamus seeking an order compelling respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its February 28 and August 18, 2008 orders that granted additional awards of permanent partial disability (“PPD”) compensation for loss of use to respondent Daniel Z. Kovacevich (“claimant”). Relator also requests that this court order the commission to find that the claimant did not sustain a [734]*734total loss of use of his left hand and to offset a prior award of PPD compensation from the award for loss of use of portions of claimant’s four fingers on his left hand.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate found that the commission abused its discretion by granting a scheduled loss award for the loss of use of claimant’s left hand because the evidence did not support the commission’s determination that claimant suffered the loss of use of two or more fingers by amputation or ankylosis. The magistrate also found that relator’s argument that the commission should have offset a prior PPD award from the commission’s loss-of-use award for portions of four fingers on claimant’s left hand was premature, given that the claimant had not yet experienced a total loss of use of these appendages. Therefore, the magistrate has recommended that we grant a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order granting claimant an award for the total loss of use of his left hand, and to deny such an award. The magistrate also has recommended that we order the commission to grant the appropriate number of weeks of compensation for loss of use of each portion of the four fingers on claimant’s left hand without any offset of the prior PPD award.

{¶ 3} Relator has filed objections to the portion of the magistrate’s decision that ordered the commission to grant compensation for the loss of use of portions of claimant’s four fingers without any offset of the prior PPD award.1 Relator argues that the magistrate erred by not ordering the commission to offset the prior PPD award from the loss-of-use award for the four fingers because the loss of use of his four fingers resulted from the further deterioration of claimant’s original injury. Citing State ex rel. Maurer v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 62, 547 N.E.2d 979, relator asserts that granting claimant a loss-of-use award for the deterioration of the same injury that was the basis of a prior PPD award, without offsetting the prior PPD award, results in an impermissible double recovery. We agree.

{¶ 4} In Maurer, the claimant sustained a workplace injury and his claim was allowed for “left knee, leg and ankle.” As a result, claimant received a PPD award pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) (now R.C. 4123.57(A)). A number of years later, the claimant lost the use of his left leg due to its deterioration after the injuries he originally sustained. The claimant applied for a scheduled loss-of-use [735]*735award under R.C. 4123.57(C) (now R.C. 4123.57(B)). The Maurer court held that a claimant who has received a PPD award under division (B) (now division (A)) for an injury that subsequently deteriorates to the point of a total loss of use of an appendage or other condition qualifying for a scheduled award under division (C) (now division (B)), may not be awarded scheduled benefits without an offset of the prior PPD award. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. The court interpreted R.C. 4123.57 as permitting a division-(B) (now division (A)) award or a division-(C) (now division (B)) award — but not both. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would permit a double recovery for a single injury, contrary to the language and purpose of R.C. 4123.57.

{¶ 5} Here, the medical evidence indicates that claimant’s original injury, for which he received a PPD award pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(A), deteriorated to the point that claimant now qualified for a scheduled loss-of-use award under R.C. 4123.57(B). Therefore, contrary to the magistrate’s decision, we hold that the commission must deduct the claimant’s prior R.C. 4123.57(A) PPD award from the subsequent R.C. 4123.57(B) scheduled loss award. Id.

{¶ 6} The magistrate distinguished Maurer by pointing out that Maurer involved a total-loss-of-use award. Because the case at bar involves only a partial loss-of-use award for four fingers, the magistrate found that it was premature to address the setoff issue. We disagree.

{¶ 7} Although Maurer involved a total-loss-of-use award, the rationale expressed therein would apply with equal force to a scheduled partial-loss-of-use award. Maurer interpreted R.C. 4123.57 as prohibiting a double recovery for the same injury. Here, because the same injury gave rise to the two awards, permitting a scheduled loss-of-use award for the claimant’s four fingers without deducting the prior PPD award would result in a double recovery. In addition, the Maurer court did not limit its holding to situations involving a subsequent total-loss-of-use award. It expressly included “other condition[s] qualifying for a scheduled award.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Here, the claimant’s loss of use of portions of four fingers on his left hand clearly involved a condition qualifying for a scheduled award, even though the claimant did not suffer the total loss of these appendages.

{¶ 8} For these reasons, we sustain relator’s objection to the magistrate’s decision.

{¶ 9} The commission has also filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision. The commission argues that the magistrate erred by failing to find that ankylosis of the knuckles is a new additional condition for which the claimant may receive a scheduled loss-of-use award under R.C. 4123.57(B) as well as an award for the partial paralysis of the left hand under R.C. 4123.57(A). Essentially, the commis[736]*736sion contends that ankylosis of the knuckles is a separate condition for which the injured worker permissibly received an additional scheduled loss-of-use award under R.C. 4123.57(B), not a deterioration of the hand due to the claimant’s original injury — brachial artery, median nerve, and ulnar nerve damage resulting in the partial paralysis of claimant’s left hand. Therefore, the commission contends, it was not required to set off the prior R.C. 4123.57(A) award. We find, however, that the medical evidence in the record does not support the commission’s argument.

{¶ 10} The claimant sustained a work-related injury on June 25, 1998, and his claim was allowed for “injury brachial vessels, left.” Claimant underwent several surgeries following this injury. Dr. Mannava explained:

Initially it was thought he just sustained a brachial artery injury. However, surgery did show further damage to the median nerve and later on ulnar nerve. The artery was repaired and initially the median nerve was repaired. He went through extensive occupational therapies. Three or four months later, his ulnar nerve was repaired by a neurosurgeon, Dr. Minarch and again he went through extensive therapy programs and recovered only partially.

{¶ 11} Subsequently, claimant filed an application for PPD pursuant to R.C.

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Related

State ex rel. Pressley v. Industrial Commission
228 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1967)
State ex rel. Teece v. Industrial Commission
429 N.E.2d 433 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1981)
State ex rel. Elliott v. Industrial Commission
497 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1986)
State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co.
505 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1987)
State ex rel. Maurer v. Industrial Commission
547 N.E.2d 979 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
918 N.E.2d 1023, 183 Ohio App. 3d 732, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-honda-of-america-mfg-inc-v-industrial-commission-ohioctapp-2009.