[Cite as State ex rel. Holloway v. Saffold, 2025-Ohio-1936.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE EX REL. CASE HOLLOWAY, :
Relator, : No. 115017
v. :
JEFFREY P. SAFFOLD, :
Respondent. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: WRIT DENIED DATED: May 23, 2025
Writ of Mandamus Motion No. 583869 Order No. 584659
Appearances:
Case Holloway, pro se.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:
Relator Case Holloway, pro se, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering
respondent Judge Jeffrey P. Saffold to “grant” his “Motion to Vacate Void Judgment;
Contrary to Law” and to “sever relator from co-defendant’s indictment.” For the reasons that follow, relator’s request for relief is moot, respondent’s motion for
summary judgment is granted, and the request for writ of mandamus is denied.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On April 14, 2025, Holloway filed the instant petition for a writ of
mandamus. In his petition, Holloway requests that respondent be ordered to
“grant” the “Motion to Vacate Void Judgment; Contrary to Law” (“motion to
vacate”), which Holloway filed pro se, on October 24, 2024, in his underlying
criminal case, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-673380-C. Holloway asserts that his
motion to vacate should be granted because the trial court’s judgment with respect
to Count 1 (engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity) was not supported by sufficient
evidence and is, therefore, “void” and “contrary to law.” Holloway contends that
there is “no other way” to get the remedy he seeks because his sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge was “denied/dismissed on appeal” and that he “can’t appeal [his]
motion [sic] to vacate void judgment” because “respondent did not issue finding of
fact or conclusion of law for said judgment.” Holloway also requests, without any
further details, argument, or explanation, that respondent be ordered to “sever
relator from co-defendant’s indictment.”
On April 22, 2025, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment.
Attached to that motion, and incorporated by reference in a supporting affidavit,
was a certified copy of a journal entry journalized on April 21, 2025 that states:
On October 20, 2023, defendant filed an appeal of his convictions in Case Number CR-22-673380-C in State v. Holloway, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga App. No. 113296, 2024-Ohio-3189 (“Holloway”). On August 22, 2024, the Eighth District Court of Appeals in Holloway remanded Case Number CR-22-673380-C for resentencing. Id., ¶ 74.
On November 14, 2024, the trial court resentenced defendant in Case Number CR-22-673380-C as mandated by the Eighth District Court of Appeals in Holloway. (See attached entry).
For the foregoing reasons defendant’s motion to vacate void judgement filed on October 24, 2024, is denied.
Respondent argues that because of the entry, Holloway’s request for
a writ of mandamus is moot. Respondent further argues that Hollway’s petition is
defective, and should be dismissed, because it is not properly captioned “in the name
of the state” as mandated by R.C. 2731.04.
Holloway did not timely file an opposition to respondent’s motion for
summary judgment.
II. Law and Analysis
A writ of mandamus is “a writ, issued in the name of the state to an
inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.” R.C. 2731.01. A writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. To be entitled to mandamus relief, the
relator must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he or she has a clear
legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondent has a clear legal duty to provide
it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex
rel. Schwarzmer v. Mazzone, 2025-Ohio-1246, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Duncan v.
Chambers-Smith, 2025-Ohio-978, ¶ 10. “A writ of mandamus will generally not be
issued to control judicial discretion.” State ex rel. Tentman v. Sundermann, 2025- Ohio-1284, ¶ 24, citing State ex rel. Hunter v. Goldberg, 2024-Ohio-4970, ¶ 8; R.C.
2731.03 (“The writ of mandamus may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its
judgment, or proceed to the discharge of any of its functions, but it cannot control
judicial discretion.”). In other words, although a writ of mandamus may be used to
require a judge to issue a ruling on a particular matter, it cannot be used to control
what decision is issued. Wesley v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2020-
Ohio-4921, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). Thus, this court cannot issue a writ of mandamus
ordering a lower court to grant relator’s motion or otherwise rule in a certain way.
See, e.g., Clough v. Lawson, 2012-Ohio-5831, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.) (“‘[I]n the context of
cases involving a judge’s duty to rule upon pending motions, . . . [a writ of
mandamus] cannot be used as a means of mandating a trial judge’s holding on a
particular matter; that is, while the writ will lie to require a judge to dispose of a
pending motion, it will not lie to require a specific ruling.’”), quoting State ex rel.
Verbanik v. Girard Mun. Court Judge Bernard, 2007-Ohio-1786, ¶ 7 (11th Dist.).
Further, mandamus will not compel the performance of a duty that
has already been performed. State ex rel. S.Y.C. v. Floyd, 2024-Ohio-1387, ¶ 15. A
mandamus claim becomes moot when a respondent performs the duty requested to
be performed. Id. at ¶ 14-15. Thus, where a relator seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel a respondent to issue a ruling, and, during the course of the action, the
respondent issues a ruling, the mandamus claim becomes moot. State ex rel. Scott
v. Gall, 2020-Ohio-929, ¶ 8. The case is before this court on respondent’s motion for summary
judgment. Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when no
genuine issue exists as to any material fact and, viewing the evidence most strongly
in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion
that is adverse to the nonmoving party, entitling the moving party to judgment as a
matter of law. State ex rel. Dodson v. Phipps, 2024-Ohio-4928, ¶ 21; Civ.R. 56(C).
With respect to respondent’s argument that Holloway’s petition
should be dismissed because Holloway did not properly caption his petition “in the
name of the state on the relation of the person applying” as required under R.C.
2731.04, we note that Holloway used a form that had “State ex rel.” preprinted as
part of the caption, then filled in his name, inmate number, and address in the
blanks that followed. Accordingly, Holloway properly captioned his petition “in the
name of the state on the relation of the person applying” in accordance with R.C.
2731.04.
Respondent, however, has submitted evidence in support of his
motion for summary judgment that demonstrates that relator’s claim for mandamus
is moot and should be denied. Judge Saffold has now issued a ruling denying the
motion to vacate. To the extent that Holloway sought a writ to compel Judge Saffold
to “grant” the motion or to “sever relator from co-defendant’s indictment,” such
relief is not available through a writ of mandamus. See, e.g., Wesley, 2020-Ohio-
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[Cite as State ex rel. Holloway v. Saffold, 2025-Ohio-1936.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE EX REL. CASE HOLLOWAY, :
Relator, : No. 115017
v. :
JEFFREY P. SAFFOLD, :
Respondent. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: WRIT DENIED DATED: May 23, 2025
Writ of Mandamus Motion No. 583869 Order No. 584659
Appearances:
Case Holloway, pro se.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:
Relator Case Holloway, pro se, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering
respondent Judge Jeffrey P. Saffold to “grant” his “Motion to Vacate Void Judgment;
Contrary to Law” and to “sever relator from co-defendant’s indictment.” For the reasons that follow, relator’s request for relief is moot, respondent’s motion for
summary judgment is granted, and the request for writ of mandamus is denied.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On April 14, 2025, Holloway filed the instant petition for a writ of
mandamus. In his petition, Holloway requests that respondent be ordered to
“grant” the “Motion to Vacate Void Judgment; Contrary to Law” (“motion to
vacate”), which Holloway filed pro se, on October 24, 2024, in his underlying
criminal case, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-673380-C. Holloway asserts that his
motion to vacate should be granted because the trial court’s judgment with respect
to Count 1 (engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity) was not supported by sufficient
evidence and is, therefore, “void” and “contrary to law.” Holloway contends that
there is “no other way” to get the remedy he seeks because his sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge was “denied/dismissed on appeal” and that he “can’t appeal [his]
motion [sic] to vacate void judgment” because “respondent did not issue finding of
fact or conclusion of law for said judgment.” Holloway also requests, without any
further details, argument, or explanation, that respondent be ordered to “sever
relator from co-defendant’s indictment.”
On April 22, 2025, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment.
Attached to that motion, and incorporated by reference in a supporting affidavit,
was a certified copy of a journal entry journalized on April 21, 2025 that states:
On October 20, 2023, defendant filed an appeal of his convictions in Case Number CR-22-673380-C in State v. Holloway, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga App. No. 113296, 2024-Ohio-3189 (“Holloway”). On August 22, 2024, the Eighth District Court of Appeals in Holloway remanded Case Number CR-22-673380-C for resentencing. Id., ¶ 74.
On November 14, 2024, the trial court resentenced defendant in Case Number CR-22-673380-C as mandated by the Eighth District Court of Appeals in Holloway. (See attached entry).
For the foregoing reasons defendant’s motion to vacate void judgement filed on October 24, 2024, is denied.
Respondent argues that because of the entry, Holloway’s request for
a writ of mandamus is moot. Respondent further argues that Hollway’s petition is
defective, and should be dismissed, because it is not properly captioned “in the name
of the state” as mandated by R.C. 2731.04.
Holloway did not timely file an opposition to respondent’s motion for
summary judgment.
II. Law and Analysis
A writ of mandamus is “a writ, issued in the name of the state to an
inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.” R.C. 2731.01. A writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. To be entitled to mandamus relief, the
relator must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he or she has a clear
legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondent has a clear legal duty to provide
it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex
rel. Schwarzmer v. Mazzone, 2025-Ohio-1246, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Duncan v.
Chambers-Smith, 2025-Ohio-978, ¶ 10. “A writ of mandamus will generally not be
issued to control judicial discretion.” State ex rel. Tentman v. Sundermann, 2025- Ohio-1284, ¶ 24, citing State ex rel. Hunter v. Goldberg, 2024-Ohio-4970, ¶ 8; R.C.
2731.03 (“The writ of mandamus may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its
judgment, or proceed to the discharge of any of its functions, but it cannot control
judicial discretion.”). In other words, although a writ of mandamus may be used to
require a judge to issue a ruling on a particular matter, it cannot be used to control
what decision is issued. Wesley v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2020-
Ohio-4921, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). Thus, this court cannot issue a writ of mandamus
ordering a lower court to grant relator’s motion or otherwise rule in a certain way.
See, e.g., Clough v. Lawson, 2012-Ohio-5831, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.) (“‘[I]n the context of
cases involving a judge’s duty to rule upon pending motions, . . . [a writ of
mandamus] cannot be used as a means of mandating a trial judge’s holding on a
particular matter; that is, while the writ will lie to require a judge to dispose of a
pending motion, it will not lie to require a specific ruling.’”), quoting State ex rel.
Verbanik v. Girard Mun. Court Judge Bernard, 2007-Ohio-1786, ¶ 7 (11th Dist.).
Further, mandamus will not compel the performance of a duty that
has already been performed. State ex rel. S.Y.C. v. Floyd, 2024-Ohio-1387, ¶ 15. A
mandamus claim becomes moot when a respondent performs the duty requested to
be performed. Id. at ¶ 14-15. Thus, where a relator seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel a respondent to issue a ruling, and, during the course of the action, the
respondent issues a ruling, the mandamus claim becomes moot. State ex rel. Scott
v. Gall, 2020-Ohio-929, ¶ 8. The case is before this court on respondent’s motion for summary
judgment. Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when no
genuine issue exists as to any material fact and, viewing the evidence most strongly
in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion
that is adverse to the nonmoving party, entitling the moving party to judgment as a
matter of law. State ex rel. Dodson v. Phipps, 2024-Ohio-4928, ¶ 21; Civ.R. 56(C).
With respect to respondent’s argument that Holloway’s petition
should be dismissed because Holloway did not properly caption his petition “in the
name of the state on the relation of the person applying” as required under R.C.
2731.04, we note that Holloway used a form that had “State ex rel.” preprinted as
part of the caption, then filled in his name, inmate number, and address in the
blanks that followed. Accordingly, Holloway properly captioned his petition “in the
name of the state on the relation of the person applying” in accordance with R.C.
2731.04.
Respondent, however, has submitted evidence in support of his
motion for summary judgment that demonstrates that relator’s claim for mandamus
is moot and should be denied. Judge Saffold has now issued a ruling denying the
motion to vacate. To the extent that Holloway sought a writ to compel Judge Saffold
to “grant” the motion or to “sever relator from co-defendant’s indictment,” such
relief is not available through a writ of mandamus. See, e.g., Wesley, 2020-Ohio-
4921, at ¶ 10 (8th Dist.); Clough, 2012-Ohio-5831, at ¶ 9 (11th Dist.); R.C. 2731.03. Further, with respect to Holloway’s conclusory request for an order
requiring Judge Saffold to “sever relator from co-defendant’s indictment,” the
publicly available, online dockets for Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-22-673380-A, CR-22-
673380-B, CR-22-673380-C, and CR-22-673380-D — the criminal cases against
Holloway and his codefendants1 — show that a separate jury trial was held in
September 2023 on the charges against Holloway after his codefendants entered
guilty pleas. See also State v. Holloway, 2024-Ohio-3189 (8th Dist.).
Given that Judge Saffold has now ruled on Holloway’s motion to
vacate, Holloway has received all the relief he could have received on his mandamus
claim. State ex rel. S.Y.C., 2024-Ohio-1387, at ¶ 15-16; Wesley, 2020-Ohio-4921, at
¶ 11 (“[W]here relators seek to compel a respondent to issue a ruling, and during the
course of the action the respondent issues such a ruling, the relators have then
received all the relief to which they are entitled. The action, therefore, becomes
moot.”). Accordingly, to the extent Holloway’s petition presents a claim properly
raised in mandamus, Holloway’s mandamus claim is moot. Holloway has not filed
a response to respondent’s motion for summary judgment and, therefore, has not
disputed that the action is moot based on the trial court’s ruling.
1 See, e.g., State ex rel. Fischer Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Scott, 2023-Ohio-3891, ¶ 3, fn.
1 (8th Dist.) (observing, in original action, that “[t]his court is permitted to take judicial notice of court filings that are readily accessible from the internet”); Patterson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2019-Ohio-110, ¶ 2, fn. 1 (8th Dist.) (setting forth procedural history relevant to mandamus action based on review of “publicly available dockets”), citing Cornelison v. Russo, 2018-Ohio-3574, ¶ 8, fn. 2 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8. Finally, Holloway could raise (or could have raised) any alleged error
with respect to the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate, severance of claims,
or the indictment in an appeal, providing him with an adequate remedy at law,
which precludes relief in mandamus. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rosolowski v. Scott,
2024-Ohio-2074, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.) (“Generally, where a party possesses a right to
appeal, ‘[t]he availability of an appeal is an adequate remedy sufficient to preclude
a writ.’”), quoting State ex rel. Luoma v. Russo, 2014-Ohio-4532, ¶ 8; see also State
ex rel. Sands v. Culotta, 2019-Ohio-4129, ¶ 12 (“[R]elief in mandamus is unavailable
to challenge a defective indictment. . . . A relator has an adequate remedy at law by
way of appeal to challenge the sufficiency of a charging instrument.”), citing State
ex rel. Hamilton v. Brunner, 2005-Ohio-1735, ¶ 6, and State ex rel. Bennett v.
White, 93 Ohio St.3d 583, 584 (2001).2
We, therefore, grant respondent’s motion for summary judgment and
deny relator’s request for a writ of mandamus. Costs assessed against relator; costs
waived. The clerk is directed to serve on all parties notice of this judgment and its
date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B).
2 Indeed, Hollway raised an issue with the indictment in his direct appeal of his
convictions. See Holloway, 2024-Ohio-3189, at ¶ 16-25 (8th Dist.). Writ denied.
_______________________ MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR