State Ex Rel. Hilbig v. McDonald

839 S.W.2d 854, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 2315, 1992 WL 207721
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 2, 1992
Docket04-92-00223-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 839 S.W.2d 854 (State Ex Rel. Hilbig v. McDonald) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State Ex Rel. Hilbig v. McDonald, 839 S.W.2d 854, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 2315, 1992 WL 207721 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

OPINION

BIERY, Justice.

This is an original proceeding in which the relator, State of Texas through its Be-xar County District Attorney, Steve Hilbig, seeks a writ of mandamus requiring the respondent, Honorable Terry McDonald, judge of the 187th 1 District Court of Bexar County, to set aside his order of May 1, 1992, entitled “Order Granting Production of Statement of Loniel Thomas Bell to the Texas Department of Human Services, entered in cause number 92-CR-1897, The State of Texas v. Loniel Thomas Bell.” Pursuant to our order of June 12, 1992, we have conditionally granted the writ.

Bell has been indicted for aggravated sexual assault. On behalf of the alleged child victim and the victim’s parents, an attorney filed an application for disclosure of documents from the district attorney’s files for use in a civil suit which may be filed. The trial court granted the application in the May 1st order.

The State does not have an adequate remedy by appeal because the order is not one from which the State may appeal. Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.01 (Vernon Supp.1992).

The State maintains the trial court did not have authority to issue the order because the victim lacked standing to act, in effect, as a party. State ex rel. Wade v. Stephens, 724 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, orig. proceeding); Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(e); Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 56.02(d) (Vernon Supp.1992). The State also argues that discovery from the district attorney’s file is not one of the rights of a crime victim. Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a), (b); Tex Code Crim.Proc. art. 56.-02(a), (b) (Vernon Supp.1992).

Respondent counters that the victim was asserting constitutionally mandated rights and was not acting as a party. Respondent asserts the victim was entitled to the statement under the right to be treated with fairness and the right to confer with a representative of the prosecutor’s office. Tex. Const, art. I, § 30(a)(1), (b)(3). Additionally, respondent argues that the victim has standing because under Tex.Code Crim. Proc.Ann. art. 21.31 (Vernon 1989) the victim is the only one who can request that the defendant be tested for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection.

The victim, as a real party in interest, raises arguments in concert with Judge McDonald. The victim stresses the statement is necessary to determine whether to *856 petition the court to have Bell tested for AIDS or HIV infection and that there is a suggestion in the record that Bell may be HIV positive. Additionally, the victim maintains that disclosure of the statement is required by the Texas Open Records Act. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp.1992).

Bell, also as a real party in interest, contends that disclosure of his statement may serve as a waiver of his rights pertaining to the statement. He further argues that prejudicial pretrial publicity may result, denying him a fair trial.

In this case of first impression, we conclude that a crime victim does not have a constitutional or statutory right to discover evidence regarding the pending criminal case that is contained within the prosecutor’s file.

Initially, we hold that the Texas Open Records Act does not control this matter. This is not an Open Records Act case.

The statute and constitutional amendment do not contain any provision expressly giving crime victims the right to discover evidence within the prosecutor’s file. 2

*857 In looking at the intent of the Legislature and people of the State of Texas we have examined the analyses of the two bills. Cf. Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

Article 56.02 was enacted through House Bill 235 of the 69th Legislature, ch. 588, § 1, of the Texas General Session Laws. The bill analysis of the House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence, attached as Appendix A, describes the purpose of the bill, which created other statutes in addition to article 56.02: “This bill would provide certain rights to victims of sexual assault and bodily injury crimes and to families of victims who have died as a result of criminal offenses. These rights include the right to be informed, to be heard, and to be protected.” HOUSE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 235, 69th Leg., R.S. (1985).

In the House Study Group analysis of HB 235, attached as Appendix B, the digest portion of the report states in part:

... Victims would have the right to receive adequate protection from harm and threats arising form cooperation with prosecution efforts; to have the magistrate consider the safety of the victim or his or her family’s safety when setting bail; to be informed of relevant court proceedings, criminal-investigation procedures, and general criminal-justice procedures; to provide information to a probation department conducting a presentenc-ing investigation; to receive information concerning victim restitution, to receive payment of medical expenses incurred as a result of sexual assault; to be referred to available social-service agencies; and to be notified of parole proceedings and be given a chance to provide information to the Board of Pardons and Paroles if a parole hearing is held....

HOUSE STUDY GROUP, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex.H.B. 235, 69th Leg., R.S. (1985).

This bill analysis summarizes the arguments of the bill’s supporters:

For too long, the victims of crime have been left out of the criminal-justice process. They are often regarded as mere witnesses of the state or simply as troublesome spectators.
*858 This attitude gives an increasing number of victims and their families the impression the state is more concerned with the rights of the criminal than with those of the victim.
This bill would help restore society’s confidence in the legal system by making victims active participants in the criminal-justice process. Under the bill, victims could could (sic) provide vital information to criminal-justice officials who determine punishment or parole. Now victims often are not even aware that their assailants have been released and are back on the streets.
This bill would cost very little. Any modest burden this bill would place on criminal-justice officials is fully justified. ...

Id.

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839 S.W.2d 854, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 2315, 1992 WL 207721, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-hilbig-v-mcdonald-texapp-1992.