State ex rel. Henry v. Seventeen Thousand Twenty-Three Dollars & Thirty-Six Cents ($17,023.36) in United States Currency

1992 OK CIV APP 29, 828 P.2d 448, 63 O.B.A.J. 1303, 1992 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 22, 1992 WL 85255
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedMarch 24, 1992
DocketNo. 76664
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 1992 OK CIV APP 29 (State ex rel. Henry v. Seventeen Thousand Twenty-Three Dollars & Thirty-Six Cents ($17,023.36) in United States Currency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Henry v. Seventeen Thousand Twenty-Three Dollars & Thirty-Six Cents ($17,023.36) in United States Currency, 1992 OK CIV APP 29, 828 P.2d 448, 63 O.B.A.J. 1303, 1992 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 22, 1992 WL 85255 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

BAILEY, Judge:

Appellant Robert Isaacs (Isaacs) seeks review of the Trial Court’s order denying Isaacs’ motion to vacate default judgment granted to Appellee State of Oklahoma (State) in State’s forfeiture action. Herein, Isaacs asserts error of the Trial Court in denying his motion to vacate, State having failed to conduct a “distinct and meaningful search of all reasonably available sources to ascertain the whereabouts of ... Isaacs,” rendering the notice of forfeiture by publication as was given (and on which State’s default judgment rested) fatally flawed.

In June, 1987, officers of the Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Oklahoma City Police Department and the Forest Park Police Department served a search warrant on Isaacs at his place of residence in Oklahoma County. Pursuant thereto, the officers seized, among others, nine (9) pounds of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, several guns and $17,023.36 in currency.

On October 29, 1987, State initiated the instant forfeiture action seeking forfeiture of the currency, and mailed (by registered mail) Notice of Seizure and Forfeiture to Isaacs at his last known address. The Post Office returned the notices unclaimed with the notation, “Moved Left No Address.”

In November, 1987, having failed to obtain service of notice by registered mail, State then published Notice of Seizure and Forfeiture in a newspaper of general circulation in Oklahoma County. In March, 1988, upon Isaacs’ failure to answer, State obtained judgment by default in the forfeiture action. In October, 1988, Isaacs was finally arrested on drug charges arising from the June, 1987 search and seizure.1

In October, 1990, Isaacs filed his motion to vacate the default judgment of forfeiture, asserting failure of State to conduct a meaningful search for Isaacs’ whereabouts, commensurate insufficiency of the notice of forfeiture by publication,2 and [450]*450“that if ... Isaacs could be located for purpose of arrest [in October, 1988] he certainly could have been located for personal service [in October or November, 1987] for purpose of the related currency seizure.” In support of the motion to vacate, Isaacs attested to lack of actual notice of the forfeiture action until May, 1990, and to “no actions to hide my whereabouts or otherwise hinder personal service, ... at all times a resident within Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma.” Concurrently, Isaacs also filed an answer to the forfeiture action, asserting invalidity of the 1987 search warrant, the search warrant based on an allegedly insufficient affidavit, and illegality of the seizure under the 1987 search warrant as violative of United States and Oklahoma Constitutional guarantees.

State responded, asserting no statutory requirement for personal service of notice of forfeiture and propriety of notice by publication upon failure of attempted service of notice by registered mail.3 The Trial Court, “without receiving any in-court testimony, and, after reviewpng] only the Court file and the briefs submitted by both parties,” denied Isaacs’ motion to vacate. Isaacs now appeals.

As preliminary matter, we note the rules of statutory construction clearly provide that where two statutes deal with the same subject, one general and one specific, the specific statute .controls.4 Thus, while 12 O.S. § 2004(C)(3) deals with “service of summons” generally (and admittedly requires a showing of “due diligence” to ascertain the whereabouts of interested parties as a condition precedent to notice by publication), 63 O.S. § 2-506(C) specifically deals with notice requirements in [451]*451drug related forfeiture actions and makes no requirement for showing of “due diligence” as a condition for notice by publication. We consequently find 63 O.S. § 2-506(C), providing for notice by registered mail, or alternatively notice by publication, controls the methods of notice to be given in drug related forfeiture cases generally, and the present case is specific.

However, § 2-506 cannot be read to be devoid of constitutional protections. That is to say, § 2-506, by requiring mailing to the last known address, must clearly contemplate some investigation to determine the validity of that last “known” address. In that regard, it is well-established that due process requires notice reasonably calculated to inform interested parties, and due process allows notice by publication only where service of notice on the person cannot reasonably be obtained.5 A party seeking notice by publication must show the avenues followed in the attempt to locate interested parties for effecting personal service.6 In the instant case, the record is totally silent on the efforts taken by State, other than by registered mail to a no longer valid address, to locate Isaacs for service of notice of forfeiture.

Under these circumstances, we believe the instant matter should be remanded to the Trial Court for hearing on whether the efforts undertaken by State to give Isaacs notice met due process standards. On remand, if State shows, after failure of notice by mail, a search of reasonable sources of information7 in a fruitless effort to locate Isaacs’ whereabouts, State must be held to have met the requirements of due process, rendering notice by publication justified and proper, and dictating denial of Isaacs’ motion to vacate. On the other hand, if State has failed to conduct such a search for Isaacs’ whereabouts, due process requires that Isaacs, having no notice of the forfeiture action in accord with due process requisites, be afforded an opportunity' to appear and defend on the merits of State’s forfeiture action, and dictating vacation of the default judgment.

The order of the Trial Court denying Isaacs’ motion to vacate is therefore REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings.

GARRETT, P.J., and ADAMS, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)
1992 OK CIV APP 29, 828 P.2d 448, 63 O.B.A.J. 1303, 1992 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 22, 1992 WL 85255, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-henry-v-seventeen-thousand-twenty-three-dollars-thirty-six-oklacivapp-1992.