State ex rel. Healy v. Smither

613 P.2d 49, 46 Or. App. 629, 1980 Ore. App. LEXIS 2880
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJune 16, 1980
DocketNo. 81901, CA 14978
StatusPublished

This text of 613 P.2d 49 (State ex rel. Healy v. Smither) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Healy v. Smither, 613 P.2d 49, 46 Or. App. 629, 1980 Ore. App. LEXIS 2880 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

GILLETTE, P. J.

This is a priority dispute between two claimants to the assets of defendant Smither which are under the control of-plaintiff as receiver of those assets.1 The trial court found respondent Lewelling’s claim to be superior to the claim of appellant American Insurance Company (American). American appeals, contending that the parties should share equally in the receivership assets. We reverse.

Defendant Smither was found by the circuit court to have engaged in fraud and mismanagement in connection with the sale and purchase of securities while he'was an employee of First California Company (First California), a broker-dealer. Pursuant to ORS 59.255(1) of the Oregon Securities Law, a receiver was appointed to take control of his assets. American’s claim arises from payments made under its policy of insurance, a stockholder’s blanket bond, to First California.2 Under that agreement, American was obligated to make payments to customers of First California who were defrauded by Smither’s actions; American now seeks recovery of those payments. Lewelling’s claim is based upon a judgment obtained against Smither in federal district court. The basis of that judgment was the sale of non-registered securities, a violation of the Oregon Securities Law.3

[632]*632The bond issued by American insured First California against any loss it might incur due to the dishonesty or fraudulent acts of its employes. It specifically excluded losses arising from any other violation of the securities law. Therefore, Lewelling’s claim against Smither and First California is not within the coverage of the bond and American has no duty of payment to Lewelling.4 From the record, it appears that American has fully satisfied its obligation under the bond agreement.

For the purpose of this claim, American stands in the place of First California, its insured. As such, it is entitled to all the rights and remedies First California has against Smither. Mayer v. First National Bank of Oregon, 260 Or 119, 130, 489 P2d 385 (1971). American and Lewelling, as claimants, are in the same class; both possessed judgments against Smither. Under these circumstances, it is well established that:

"With general creditors of the debtor whose claims are to be paid out of the general funds of the estate, as with the members of every other class of receivership claimants, the general rule is that 'equality is equity’. The court will not permit one creditor to obtain an inequitable or unlawful preference over the creditors of the same class. To warrant the enforcement in a receivership of one claim over another of the same class, there must be something in the intrinsic nature of such a claim conferring an equity superior to that of the latter claim.” Lewis & Dalin v. Clarke Lbr. Co. et al, 185 Or 522, 525, 204 P2d 130 (1949); see also 66 Am Jur Receivers, § 251.

Preferences are not favored by the courts and usually arise by reason of some definite statutory provision or some fixed principle of common law. 75 CJS Receivers, § 283. Lewelling fails to draw our attention to any statute or case law in support of his claimed [633]*633preferential position.5 However, he argues that the instrinsic nature of his claim, as compared to that of American, entitles him to a superior position.

Lewelling was a direct victim of certain of Smither’s unlawful actions. American, on the other hand, was an insurer which suffered loss because of other unlawful action by Smither. While it may be that a court, under appropriate circumstances and in the exercise of its equitable powers, can establish priorities not mandated by the law, see In Matter of Stirling Homex Corp., 591 F2d 148 (2nd Cir 1978), we hold that this is not such a case. No significant factor distinguishes the claims of the parties here. No equitable consideration weighs in favor of Lewelling over American. The trial judge erred in granting Lewelling a priority over American. The parties are entitled to share equally in the assets now held by the Corporation Commission.

Reversed.

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Related

Mayer v. First National Bank of Oregon
489 P.2d 385 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1971)
Lewis & Dalin, Inc. v. E. H. Clarke Lumber Co.
204 P.2d 130 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1948)

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Bluebook (online)
613 P.2d 49, 46 Or. App. 629, 1980 Ore. App. LEXIS 2880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-healy-v-smither-orctapp-1980.