State ex rel. Harpley Builders, Inc. v. City of Akron
This text of 584 N.E.2d 724 (State ex rel. Harpley Builders, Inc. v. City of Akron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This case requires a review of the extent of the Planning Commission’s authority to rescind its own decisions and a determination of whether preliminary approval, or the decision to rescind preliminary approval, is a final appealable order.
We have previously held that administrative agencies have inherent authority to reconsider their own decisions, unless they are otherwise limited by statute. Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 28 OBR 83, 502 N.E.2d 590, paragraph three of the syllabus; State, ex rel. Borsuk, v. Cleveland (1972), 28 Ohio St.2d 224, 57 O.O.2d 464, 277 N.E.2d 419, paragraph one of the syllabus. An agency retains this jurisdiction to set aside its own decision until a party appeals or the time to file an appeal has passed. Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., supra; State, ex rel. Borsuk, v. Cleveland, supra. We hold that it is this inherent authority that the Planning Commission exercised when it voted to rescind its preliminary approval of Eaton Place.
The court of appeals erred in holding that the Akron Subdivision Plan and Regulations (“the regulations”) deny the Planning Commission the authority to reconsider its preliminary approval. The court reached this conclusion based on the regulation that provides that the Planning Commission shall grant final approval if the developer “has done everything that he was required to do” and fulfilled all of the conditions specified in the preliminary [536]*536approval.1 Appellee suggested that the regulations render final approval nothing more than a ministerial function and basically mandate that final approval be granted if those conditions originally attached to the preliminary approval are fulfilled. Based on this reading of the applicable regulations, the court of appeals held that the original grant of preliminary approval was a final appealable order, and, therefore, that the Planning Commission could not reconsider it once the time for appeal had passed.
The regulations do not expressly or implicitly limit the Planning Commission’s inherent authority to reconsider its own decisions. The regulations provide that “[a]pproval of the preliminary plan shall also be conditional upon compliance with all other applicable statues [sic ] and ordinances (resolutions and regulations) of the City.” 2 This language is contrary to the interpreta[537]*537tion that once conditions noted at the time of preliminary approval are fulfilled, the Planning Commission loses all power to evaluate the proposed plan. A preliminary plan must be approved or disapproved within thirty days and the preliminary approval then remains effective for twelve months, a schedule which is certainly more consistent with a quick nod of approval than with a formal decision which renders all later decisions by the Planning Commission purely ministerial. Akron Subdivision Plan and Regulations Sections 1208.06(B)(4) and (5). Simply speaking, a preliminary approval is just that, preliminary. It connotes initial, not final, approval, after which the parties can hammer out all of the relevant details for final action.
Nor is the original grant of preliminary approval a final appealable order. Preliminary approval is but one step in the approval process. Once preliminary approval is granted, the developer must fulfill the Planning Commission’s conditions, and then submit a final plat for approval. Akron Subdivision Plan and Regulations Section 1208.06(C)(1). These further steps are persuasive evidence that the decision to grant preliminary approval is not final. Preliminary approval of a real estate project does not determine the final rights and duties of the developer until further action is taken. Therefore, the grant of preliminary approval is not a final appealable order under R.C. 2506.01.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the November 18, 1988 order of the Planning Commission.
Judgment reversed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
584 N.E.2d 724, 62 Ohio St. 3d 533, 1992 Ohio LEXIS 213, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-harpley-builders-inc-v-city-of-akron-ohio-1992.