State ex rel. Hardacre v. Dalton

1 Ohio C.C. 139
Ohio Circuit Courts·Decided October 15, 1885·Published

Opinions

Cox, J.

The relator in this case files his petition in mandamus, setting forth that at the October election, 1885, in the county of Hamilton, he, with three others, was duly elected by a plurality of the legal votes of said county to the office of Senator, to the General Assembly. That the defendants, the canvassers, on the 19fch of October began to canvass and abstract the returns of said election made to said clerk, in order to ascertain and declare the result of said election, but they have not yet abstracted all the votes of all the precincts- in said county, nor have they as yet declared the result of said canvass and abstract, nor certified nor signed the abstract of said votes, nor deposited the same in the office of said clerk: and he avers that defendants have failed to canvass and- abstract the returns of said election according to law, and are still failing and refusing so to do. That they have canvassed and abstracted a large number of votes which do not appear on the legal returns of said election returned to said clerk, and credited the same.to the Democratic candidates. To support this allegation, a number of specific acts'are alleged on the part of the clerk and canvassers. Defendant has moved to strike out [141]*141nearly all these specific averments, on the ground that they are irrelevant, immaterial, and furnish no ground for the relief asked, and this motion has been treated and argued by both parties as a demurrer to each and every specification, in order that upon the threshold of the case, the question of the jurisdiction of the court to grant the relief asked may be decided. . ■

It is claimed by defendant, that mandamus will not lie to compel the canvassing board to count' the votes and issue the certificate, as asked for, for the reason:

First, that the canvassing board in counting the votes and declaring the result, acts as a quasi judicial body, and that it is the sole judge of what are and what are not legal returns, and that its decision can not be controlled by mandamus; and, second, that the court can not proceed by mandamus to examine into the acts of the canvassing board and require them to_ count the votes and grant a certificate, because there was a plain and adequate remedy at law. That each house of the Legislature was made by the Constitution, Article 2, Section 6, the judge of the election returns and qualifications of its own members. And by Sec. 3003, Revised Statutes, the proper place to inquire into these irregularities was by contest in the Senate.

• Let us, then, inquire, first, what is the position of the canvassing board. Is it a ministerial or judicial body ?

We had supposed that this qustion was so well settled as no longer to be a subject of debate. The doctrine that canvassing boards and return judges are ministerial officers, possessing no discretionary or judicial powers, is settled in nearly, or quite, all the States. See McCrary’s Election Law, Section 84, and cases there cited.

Their duties are purely ministerial, and extend only to the casting up of the votes and awarding the certificate to the person having the highest number; they have no judicial power. McCrary, Section 81.

Our Statute, Section 2980 and following, fully sets forth t^eir duties.

On the 6th day after the election, or sooner, in case the returns are made, the clerk of the court of common pleas, taking [142]*142to his assistance two justices of the peace of the county, shall proceed to open the returns made to his office and make abstracts of the votes in the following manner :

First — Upon a single sheet an abstract of the vote for Governor and other State officers.

Second — And, upon another sheet, an abstract of votes for Governor and others.

Third — And, upon another sheet, an abstract of votes for Governor, State and other officers, and Representatives and Senators to the General Assembly.

R. S. 2981. The clerk and justices shall not receive any paper as a poll-book of any precinct unless it be delivered at the cler’ks office by one of the judges of the election held in such precinct; and in making the abstract of votes, they shall not decide on the validity of the returns, but shall be governed by the number of' votes stated in the pool-books; and they shall certify and sign the abstracts, and deposit the same in the office of the clerk. By Sec. 2982, after such deposit with the clerk, he is required to make duplicate copies, under the seal of his office, inclose and seal the same, and indorse a certificate of the votes for officers named in title of Section 2980, and transmit the same by mail to the Secretary of State at Columbus. By section 2995, the clerk is required without fail to give a certificate to any elected candidate on demand.

If these statutes were not clear as to the purely ministerial character of this board, the supreme court has put it beyond the possibility of a doubt in the case of Ingerson v. Berry, 14 O. S., 322, and in the case of The State ex rel. Campbell v. Foster, Governor, 38 O. S., 603, where the court say, “ We fully concede that the duties of the defendant (the canvassing board) were ministerial in their nature.”

The second question is, can the court by mandamus examine into the acts of the canvassing board, and require them to correctly count the votes, and give a certificate to the person legally entitled thereto? By Sec. 6741~ R. S., mandamus is defined to be a ‘ writ issued in the name of the State to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board or person; commanding the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins -as a duty resulting from an office, trust [143]*143or station. Sec. 6742 : And although it may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment, or to proceed to the discharge of any of its functions, it can not control judicial discretion. Sec. 6744: “ The writ must not be issued in a case where there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” That these defendants are a board having duties to perform which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, we think is clear, and the supreme court has said in the case of Ingerson v. Berry, 14 O., 322, that they saw “ nothing in-the intrinsic nature of the duty, nor in the character of the office or station, to prevent the enforcement of its performance by mandamus in a proper case.” And so in the case of the State ex rel. Campbell v. Foster, in 38 O. S., 602, the supreme court, without in any way questioning this right so to do, proceeded to hear a case in mandamus against the Governor and Secretary of State, as the State Canvassing Board, on the vote for member of congress.

But it is claimed by defendant that mandamus will not lie, because there is a plain and adequate remedy at law afforded to relators by a contest before the Senate. To determine whether relator has a remedy at law by contest, let us see what he demands by his < petition. It is simply that defendants shall proceed to count the legal returns, and award a certificate to him if it be 'found on such count that he has a plurality of votes. This is not an application “ to contest the right of a person declared duly elected to the office of senator,” for which section 3003, revised statutes, provides. It differs widely from a contest. If relator has received a majority or plurality of votes, it is his right to have that declared and certified.

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State ex rel. Hardacre v. Dalton, 1 Ohio C.C. 139 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1885).

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