State ex rel. Haley v. Stark

18 Fla. 255
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJune 15, 1881
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 18 Fla. 255 (State ex rel. Haley v. Stark) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Haley v. Stark, 18 Fla. 255 (Fla. 1881).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Westcott

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an information in the nature of a quo warranto, the relator, Haley, claiming the right to hold and exercise the powers and franchises of the office of Mayor of Eernandina as against the respondent, Stark, who now holds and executes the said office as he, Haley, relates, unlawfully and without legal warrant or authority.

On the 4th day of April, A. D. 1881, at an election held in pursuance of law; Haley was elected to the office of Mayor. He qualified and entered upon its duties. This election was held under a municipal, corporate organization had under the general act providing for the incorporation of cities and towns, which was then in force. On the 24th of February, A. D. 1881, the Legislature passed an act entitled “ An act to repeal and dissolve municipal corpora^ tions under certain circumstances, and to provide the manner in which such cities may become re-incorporated;” [262]*262Chapter 3316, Laws. Under its provisions the respondent, Stark, was appointed Mayor of the city of Eernandina, and, after qualifying, entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office. The relator insists that this act dissolving the old corporation and creating the new one, under which respondent was appointed, is unconstitutional; while the respondent maintains that the act is within the constitutional power of the Legislature, and that his title to the office is legal.- It is thus apparent that the question here involved Is the constitutionality of the act mentioned.

The act provides for a dissolution of municipal corporations having a bonded indebtedness, the bonds to be passed due and unpaid, a fund for their payment not having been provided, in the manner following: On the written application of the holders or owners, or their agents, of one-half of the unpaid bonds of the city to -the Judge of the Circuit Court of the Circuit in which the city is situated, accompanied with satisfactory evidence that the city is prima facie bonded, and that the bonds “ are passed due and unpaid and for which a fund for their payment has not been provided, it shall be his duty to make a certificate of such facts, and cause the said application, proofs and certificates to be filed and recorded in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for the -county in which the city is situated.” On the presentation of a certified copy of this certificate to the Governor of the State, he is to issue a .proclamation declaring that the charter of the city is repealed and the corporation dissolved. The act then provides for the incorporation of such dissolved corporation, which is to be had in the manner following : On the petition of twenty or more persons residing within the limits of the city thus dissolved, it is made' the duty of the Governor to appoint a Mayor and five Aldermen, residents of such city. They are to hold their offices for two years, and in case of va[263]*263Caney the office is to be filled by the Governor. The municipal corporation thus organized is called a provisional municipality, but it is in fact a permanent government. Its boundaries are to be the same as those of the dissolved corporation, and it is to have all the powers of the antecedent corporation so far as they existed under the act establishing a uniform system of municipal government, and its amendments. Under this new organization, the Mayor and Aldermen appoint the City Marshal and Clerk, who is to act as Treasurer. Each of these officers is required to give bond. The Mayor and Aldermen are authorized to compromise and settle the existing indebtedness of the defunct corporation, having authority to issue bonds for that purpose, and there is an appropriation of one-half of one per cent, of the revenue of the city authorized by law to the payment of this debt.

Upon the County Commissioners of the county is devolved the duty to hear and determine applications for the correction of assessments of property, and the Tax Collector of the county is made the Collector for the city.

Under the existing system of municipal government applicable to all cities, and which was the system obtaining in the city of Eernandina and all municipalities having 300. registered voters at the passage of this act, the Mayor, the Marshal, City Clerk, Treasurer, Assessor and Collector of Taxes are elected by the people for the term of one year, and while the Aldermen are elected for two years, one-half are elected each year with a term of office of two years, one-half of the old board thus holding over each year.

If the present act is effective, it is thus seen that we have two essentially different kinds of municipal government operating in cities of the same class, as fixed by the original act and its amendments creating the system. In one the officers are appointed and hold their offices for two years. [264]*264In the other, except as to Aldermen, they are elected and hold their offices for one year, and as to the Board of Aldermen they are essentially different in their organizations, in that, under the one system they hold for two years each from the same date, while in the other one-half go out each year.

In view of the plainest deductions and conclusions which follow the application of a simple, honest judgment to these facts, can it be said that that is a uniform system of municipal government in which such plain differences may exist in cities in the same situation and-the same class? Can it be said that a uniform system of municipal government is established by this legislation ? On the contrary, it is plain that the Legislature by its action, instead of establishing a uniform system of government for cities having a bonded debt, past due, for which payment has not been provided, places it within the discretion of the holders of one-half of the city’s bonds and twenty persons residing within its limits, to fix the character of its government, to say whether its Mayor and Aldermen, its Marshal, its Clerk, its Treasurer, shall be elected by the people or appointed by the Governor, and whether the assessment and collection of its revenue shall be done by its own officers or by officers of the county in which the municipality may be situated.

The Constitution, which is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, not a grant of powers to it, provides that “ the Legislature shall establish a uniform system of county, township and municipal government,” and any action of that department of the government which destroys the uniformity of a pre-existing system, and permits and authorizes, in cities similarly situated, systems of government differing essentially in the manner of the selection of officers, their terms of office, and the manner of the assessment and collection of revenue, cannot be sustained. There [265]*265may be ten cities in the precise situation of the city of Eernandina, with reference to population, to indebtedness and in all other respects, and yet, dependent upon the action of one-half of its bond-holders and twenty residents, five of them may continue under the elective system of municipal government and four of them, through the action of some of their creditors and residents, may adopt the system of appointment by the Governor.

The Legislature instead of establishing a uniform system of municipal government leaves it to the discretion of twenty residents and one-half of the bond creditors of corporations to fix the character of the government. The Legislature must so act as to itself

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Bluebook (online)
18 Fla. 255, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-haley-v-stark-fla-1881.