State Ex Rel. Gillespie v. Kendrick

265 S.E.2d 537, 164 W. Va. 599, 1980 W. Va. LEXIS 485
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedApril 4, 1980
Docket14731
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 265 S.E.2d 537 (State Ex Rel. Gillespie v. Kendrick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Gillespie v. Kendrick, 265 S.E.2d 537, 164 W. Va. 599, 1980 W. Va. LEXIS 485 (W. Va. 1980).

Opinion

Harshbarger, Justice:

This original proceeding in prohibition and habeas corpus seeks Evérett Ray Gillespie’s immediate release from the Mercer County Jail and an order prohibiting that county’s Circuit Court from adding thirty-two days to his sentence.

*601 Gillespie pled guilty on November 21, 1978 to attempting to commit a felony. On November 30, 1978, he was sentenced to serve one year in the county jail to begin December 4, 1978. The sentencing order provided that he was to be released every Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. to work. He was employed by Dodson Brothers and regularly left the jail and returned to it each day during the period of his confinement. But in July, 1979, he was terminated by his original employer. He did not inform the jail and continued to leave during the allotted hours. He testified that he sought other employment and did at times work at odd jobs.

His work release privilege was revoked on October 9, 1979, when jail personnel learned that he was no longer employed by Dodson Brothers. A probation officer petitioned the trial court to extend Gillespie’s term of confinement beyond December 3, 1979, to compensate for the time he spent out of jail on work release while not employed; and after a hearing the court ordered that he serve an additional thirty-two days.

Gillespie’s petition alleges that he was entitled to good time credit under W.Va. Code, 7-8-11, which he was not granted by the sheriff, and such credit would be for a greater period of time than the extended sentence; that imposition of an additional thirty-two days to his sentence violated his double jeopardy rights; and that the circuit court had no authority to extend his sentence past December 3.

I.

W.Va. Code, 7-8-11 [1963], 1 provides for deductions from sentences of prisoners in county jails for good conduct or *602 donating blood. We have written several times on the state prison good time statute, but have never interpreted 7-8-11.

The county jail good time statute is mandatory. Every prisoner sentenced to six months or more “shall be entitled to a deduction of five days from each month of his sentence,” if he complies with j ail rules and regulations or donates blood. Code, 28-5-27 [1923], 2 was similar in construction and wording to the county jail statute when interpreted in Woods v. Whyte, _ W.Va. _, 247 S.E.2d 830 (1978):

1) Law-Allowable Good Time —W.Va. Code, 28-5-27 [1923]: This authorizes as much as 10 days per month for inmates who have not violated any prison rules in a given month.
II) Expiration date — The date an inmate will be released if he earns all of his law-allowable good time. An inmate with no infractions against him will be released on this date by operation of law.
Id., at 831 (Emphasis added).

*603 See also Watts v. Skeen, 132 W.Va. 737, 54 S.E.2d 563 (1949) where the Court speaks about “entitlement to good time credit which has been earned”; and 46 Op.Att’y Gen. 159 (1955). The revised penitentiary good time statute, Code, 28-5-28 [1979], is also mandatory. Woodring v. Whyte, _ W.Va. _, 242 S.E.2d 238 (1978).

The good time credit law for federal prisoners, 18 U.S.C. § 4161, 3 follows the language of our county jail and former state penitentiary good time statutes and has been held to entitle prisoners to good time credit unless they have not faithfully observed all the rules. A federal district court stated in Downes v. Norton, 360 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1973):

In sharp contrast, 18 U.S.C. §4161, governing good time, provides that inmates “shall be enti tled” to deductions from sentences when their conduct has been in keeping with the rules of the institution. Unlike parole, which an inmate may be unable to earn no matter how good his conduct ... earned good time is much closer to the “conditional liberty” that Morrissey [v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)] held was entitled to procedural protection.
Id., at 1154.

We have consistently held that legislative use of “shall”, means that that to which the word applies must be done, absent a showing of contrary intent. Woodring, supra; Terry v. Sencindiver, 153 W.Va. 651, 171 S.E.2d 480 (1969), Syllabus Point 2. Therefore, county jail prisoners have the statutory right to good time credit and it is mandatory that they be granted their credits if they *604 “faithfully comply with all rules and regulations”. Code 7-8-11. 4

II.

Mercer County’s sheriff has not promulgated any rules or regulations governing conduct of inmates in his jail and the government argues that Gillespie is not entitled to good time credit because there were no rules for him to obey.

Good time credit is a valuable liberty interest protected by the due process clause. The Supreme Court elaborated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-76, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974):

But the State having created the right to good time ... the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated....
We think a person’s liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State. The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123, 9 S.Ct. 231, 233, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889).

In Wolff, supra, the Court established minimum due process standards which must be met before a state can revoke a prisoner’s statutory right to good time. The Nebraska penal system, which was challenged in Wolff,

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Bluebook (online)
265 S.E.2d 537, 164 W. Va. 599, 1980 W. Va. LEXIS 485, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-gillespie-v-kendrick-wva-1980.