State Ex Rel. Giamarco v. Smith

162 N.E.2d 229, 110 Ohio App. 65, 81 Ohio Law. Abs. 412, 12 Ohio Op. 2d 245, 1959 Ohio App. LEXIS 720
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 28, 1959
Docket6025
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 162 N.E.2d 229 (State Ex Rel. Giamarco v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Giamarco v. Smith, 162 N.E.2d 229, 110 Ohio App. 65, 81 Ohio Law. Abs. 412, 12 Ohio Op. 2d 245, 1959 Ohio App. LEXIS 720 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).

Opinion

OPINION

By WISEMAN, J.

This is an appeal on questions of law from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County, dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus after a hearing on the merits.

Relator, Henry Giamarco, a resident of Franklin County, as a citizen and taxpayer of the State of Ohio, a fireman by occupation and a mem *413 ber of the Ohio State Fireman’s Association, Inc., filed this action in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County, seeking a writ of mandamus requiring respondents as members of the State Civil Service Commission of the State of Ohio to hold competitive examinations for the offices of Inspector in the Bureau of Inspection and Fire Prevention Bureau, Office of the State Fire Marshal, Department of Commerce.

Relator alleges that on July 19, 1956, the State Civil Service Commission passed a resolution in which it found “the position of Inspector in the Bureau of Inspection within the Office of the State Fire Marshal, Department of Commerce, not to be of such a confidential nature that fitness and merit for such position could not be determined by competitive examination and that such position ‘shall be in the competitive classified civil service and the effective date of this Resolution shall be February 1, 1957/ ” Prior to the effective date of the resolution, to-wit: On January 11, 1957, the State Civil Service Commission rescinded its action taken on July 19, 1956.

Respondents filed a demurrer to the petition, which was overruled. Respondents then filed an answer specifically denying the capacity of relator to challenge the action of respondents, denying that the acts of which relator complains constitute arbitrary action, gross abuse of discretion or error of law, and generally denying each and every allegation not admitted to be true. Motion of relator for judgment on the pleadings was overruled.

At the hearing on the merits the trial court denied the writ and dismissed the petition.

Relator assigns as error: First, error in holding that §121.14 R. C., places all personnel in the Office of the State Fire Marshal in the unclassified Civil Service; second, error in ruling that the inspectors within the Bureau of Inspection are not subject to the classified service; third, error in failing to determine that this proceeding is the proper remedy to compel the preparation and giving of competitive examinations for such fire inspectors; fourth, error in overruling the relator’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Sec. 3737.03 R. C., creates the Bureau of Inspection, in the Office of the State Fire Marshal, consisting of a chief inspector and twenty-four assistants, none of whom has ever taken a Civil Service examination for the position. The Ohio Fireman’s Association, on June 2, 1954, passed a resolution calling upon the State Civil Service Commission to hold competitive examinations for the office of inspector. The resolution of the Commission and its rescission followed.

The facts are not in dispute; the question for determination is one of law. The question presented is one of first impression in Ohio.

Does §121.14 R. C., place all the personnel or at least the inspectors in the unclassified Civil Service? We are only concerned here with the classification of the inspectors. Sec. 121.04 R. C., in part provides:

“Offices are created within the several departments as follows: * * *
“In the department of commerce:
“Superintendent of building and loan associations.
“Fire marshal.
*414 “Superintendent of insurance.” (Emphasis ours.)

Sec. 121.05 E. C., refers to directors and assistant directors of departments. Sec. 121.14 R. C., provides:

“Each department may employ, subject to the civil service laws in force at the time the employment is made, the necessary employees, and, if the rate of compensation is not otherwise fixed by law, fix their compensation.
“All offices created by §§121.04 and 121.05 R. C., shall be in the unclassified civil service of the state.” (Emphasis ours.)

We do not deem it necessary to set forth or discuss the historical background of these statutory provisions. It is sufficient to state that the State Fire Marshal and his assistants in the person of inspectors have not been included in classified Civil Service by the express words of the statute.

In §121.04 R. C., the word “offices” is used to describe the division or sub-department of “Fire Marshal.” Again, in §121.14 R. C., the word “offices” is used, and this section in part provides that: “All offices created by §§121.04 and 121.05 R. C., shall be in the unclassified civil service of the state.”

We come now to the section on definitions of terms. Sec. 121.01 R. C., in part provides:

iisjs * *
“(C) ‘Departments, offices, and institutions’ include every organized body, office, and agency established by the constitution and laws of the state for the exercise of any function of the state government, and every institution or organization which receives any support from the state.”

A consideration of these sections alone would not warrant the conclusion that the Chief Fire Marshal and his assistants, such as inspectors, were intended to be placed in the unclassified civil service; other sections must be considered. The question whether other employees of said office are in the unclassified civil service is not before us and we make no determination with respect to them. The inspectors have a different status than the clerical personnel of the office of fire marshal. Sec. 3737.05 R. C., provides:

“The chief of the arson bureau and his deputies, the chief of the bureau of inspection and his assistants, and the chief of the bureau of fire prevention, shall have and exercise, in the performance of general or specific duties assigned to them by the fire marshal, the duties, powers, authorities, and rights which are conferred upon the fire marshal or his assistants, by §§3737.01, 3737.08 to 3737.14, inclusive, and §3737.26 R. C.”

Thus it appears that the chief of the bureau of inspection and his assistants, who now are twenty-six in number; “shall have and exercise, in the performance of general or specific duties assigned to them by the fire marshal, the duties, powers, authorities and rights which are conferred upon the fire marshal or his assistants.” Such persons, in our opinion, are not public employees but are properly described as public officials within the principle of law laid down in State, ex rel. Milburn. et al, v. Pethtel, Auditor, 153 Oh St 1, 90 N. E. (2d), 686, the first and second paragraphs of the syllabus being as follows:

*415 “1. A public officer, as distinguished from an employee, is one who is invested by law with a portion of the sovereignty of the state and who is authorized to exercise functions either of an executive, legislative or judicial character.
“2.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Farnsworth v. Bd. of Medina County Commrs.
399 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1978)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
162 N.E.2d 229, 110 Ohio App. 65, 81 Ohio Law. Abs. 412, 12 Ohio Op. 2d 245, 1959 Ohio App. LEXIS 720, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-giamarco-v-smith-ohioctapp-1959.