[Cite as State ex rel. Feathers v. Pittman, 2025-Ohio-3014.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO EX REL. DAVID E. C.A. No. 24CA012120 FEATHERS
Relator
v.
JUDGE LAURIE PITTMAN, ET AL. ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS, PROCEDENDO, AND PROHIBITION Respondents
Dated: August 25, 2025
PER CURIAM.
{¶1} Relator, David E. Feathers, has petitioned this Court for writs of mandamus,
procedendo, and prohibition. The complaint names numerous respondents including Portage
County Common Pleas Court Judge Laurie Pittman and a group of people related to the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, collectively referred to as the ODRC Respondents,
including Annette Chambers-Smith, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Corrections, Warden Jerry Spatney, Lt. Torres, and any parties acting for the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections.
{¶2} The ODRC Respondents filed an answer and the parties filed several motions and
responses. Upon review of the complaint, however, this Court concludes that the complaint must
be sua sponte dismissed because “the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the
complaint.” State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 2006-Ohio-6573, ¶ 14. Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate if, after presuming the truth of all material
factual allegations and making all reasonable inferences in the claimant’s favor, it appears beyond
doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief.
Id.; accord Civ.R. 12(B)(6). State ex rel. Dodson v. Phipps, 2024-Ohio-4928, ¶ 12.
{¶3} We begin by reviewing the facts set forth in the complaint. In doing so, we
recognize that Mr. Feathers referred to his past criminal cases in his complaint and attachments to
the complaint. We can also take judicial notice, pursuant to Civ.R. 44.1, of the trial court’s orders
and decisions of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, to the extent those are not incorporated in
the complaint. That rule authorizes a trial court in a civil action to take judicial notice of the
“decisional” law of courts of this state. “In applying this particular rule in the context of an original
action, this court has indicated that judicial notice of an earlier final determination can be taken as
part of an analysis on the merits of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.” State ex rel. Smith v.
Vettel, 2010-Ohio-3809, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.).
{¶4} Mr. Feathers was sentenced to prison for convictions of Aggravated Burglary,
Felonious Assault, and Domestic Violence. State v. Feathers, Case No. 2004 CR 0424 (Portage
Co.). He received jail time credit as part of his 15-year sentence.
{¶5} Following an appeal, Mr. Feathers was resentenced in the 2004 Portage County
case. The new 13-year sentence also included credit and credit for previously served time.
{¶6} In February 2015, Mr. Feathers was granted judicial release in the Portage County
case. In 2016, he violated the conditions of community control while on judicial release. In the
2016 Portage County case, he was sentenced to community control. {¶7} In 2019, Mr. Feathers was sentenced to prison for new offenses he committed in
Ashland County. He was then transferred to Portage County for revocation proceedings in both
the 2004 and 2016 Portage County cases.
{¶8} In the 2004 case, he was found to have violated the conditions of his probation,
which was subsequently revoked, and he was ordered to serve the remainder of his initial prison
term. In the 2016 case, he was also sentenced to prison. Mr. Feathers received credit for time
served toward those sentences. Mr. Feathers was then returned to prison to serve his sentence.
{¶9} Mr. Feathers sought writs of mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition against Judge
Pittman and the ODRC Respondents. The complaint includes nine counts, as summarized below:
Count One – Prohibition – declare common pleas court and Judge Pittman’s lack of authority to create erroneous sentences and compel them to vacate original sentences and altered commitment papers
Count Two – Prohibition – declare common pleas court and Judge Pittman’s lack of authority to revoke probation terms and reimpose consecutive prison sentences
Count Three – Prohibition – declare common pleas court and Judge Pittman’s lack of authority to revoke probation terms and reimpose consecutive prison sentences
Count Four – Prohibition – declare common pleas court and Judge Pittman lack of authority to revoke probation and authorize ODRC to impose consecutive prison sentences
Count Five – Prohibition – declare common pleas court and Judge Pittman lack of authority to revoke probation terms and authorize ODRC to reimpose consecutive prison sentences, declare ODRC lack of authority to reimpose consecutive prison sentences, and compel ODRC Director to either resend Judge Pittman two commitment papers or release Mr. Feathers.
Count Six – Mandamus – compel ODRC Respondents acting as mail room officers from opening incoming legal mail and copying it without his presence in this or any other action filed in Lorain County
Count Seven – Mandamus - compel Judge Pittman and common pleas court to order the judgment orders that were sent to ODRC to be recalled and vacated and to resolve all matters in the cases and provide Feathers and ODRC with final appealable orders Count Eight – Mandamus – order ODRC to resend and vacate 2019 commitment papers to common pleas court
Count Nine – Procedendo – compel Judge Pittman and common pleas court and ODRC to sentence Mr. Feathers in open court and enter final judgments
{¶10} To the extent the counts in the complaint name the Portage County Common Pleas
Court, relief is not available against the court. The Ohio Supreme Court has held repeatedly that
courts are not sui juris. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v. Cleveland City Council,
34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121 (1973); Page v. Geauga Cnty. Prob. & Juvenile Court, 2023-Ohio-2491,
¶ 3. This Court has reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Pamboukis v. Summit Cnty. Domestic
Relations Court, 2023-Ohio-4507 (9th Dist.). As such, the common pleas court is not properly
named as a party in an original action and Feathers’ claims as to the court must be dismissed. See,
also, State ex rel. Feathers v. Portage Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 2024-Ohio-6005, ¶ 21 (11th
Dist.) (dismissing claims against Portage County Court of Common Pleas because the court is not
sui juris).
{¶11} We now turn to address the counts raised in the complaint. As will be explained
below, because Mr. Feathers obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint, it must
be dismissed.
Prohibition
{¶12} For this Court to issue a writ of prohibition, Mr. Feathers must establish, by clear
and convincing evidence, that (1) the judge is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of
that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) an injury would result from denial of the writ for which
no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Edward Smith
Corp. v. Marsh, 2024-Ohio-201, ¶ 6. “[T]he purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior
courts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73 (1998). A writ of prohibition “tests and determines solely and only the subject matter
jurisdiction” of the lower court. State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster, 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409
(1988).
{¶13} In many prohibition cases, the relator seeks to prevent anticipated unauthorized
judicial action. This reflects the well-established rule that the writ of prohibition provides a
preventative rather than corrective remedy. State ex rel. Feltner v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of
Revision, 2020-Ohio-3080, ¶ 6. In this case, however, Mr. Feathers seeks the writ to correct Judge
Pittman’s past actions. For a corrective writ of prohibition to issue, Mr. Feathers must demonstrate
that Judge Pittman patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to take the action about which
he complains. Id. at ¶ 6, 8. Under these circumstances, Mr. Feathers is not required to
demonstrate that he lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel.
Koren v. Grogan, 68 Ohio St.3d 590 (1994).
{¶14} Mr. Feathers must, however, demonstrate that Judge Pittman patently and
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to act. Mr. Feathers has not alleged in the complaint that Judge
Pittman and Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction over his case. He has not alleged that
there was a jurisdictional defect in the indictment. What he has alleged is that Judge Pittman
committed error.
{¶15} Count one of the complaint alleged Judge Pittman lacked authority to create the
sentences she imposed. Count two alleged that Judge Pittman improperly sentenced Mr. Feathers
because the offense of conviction should have been charged as a misdemeanor. In counts three
and four, the complaint alleged that Judge Pittman lacked authority to act because the prior
sentences she entered were void, entered erroneously, and Mr. Feathers was deprived the right of allocution. Count five of the complaint alleged that Judge Pittman lacked authority to revoke
probation and order the ODRC Respondents to calculate credit for time served.
{¶16} The Eleventh District Court of Appeals considered identical allegations in an action
Mr. Feathers filed:
{¶26} Feathers argues that Judge Pittman lacks the authority to sentence him at various stages in the 2004 and 2016 cases. Feathers seeks vacation of his sentences. Feathers’s claims include allegations that Judge Pittman did not comply with sentencing provisions by improperly packaging his sentences; that Judge Pittman lacked the authority to revoke his community control and sentence him to prison; that the sentencing documents are altered or falsified; that there are indictment defects in the 2016 Case; and that Judge Pittman unlawfully imposed consecutive sentences. Feathers also asserts that the ODRC lacks the authority to judicially re- impose consecutive sentences.
(Footnote omitted) State ex rel. Feathers v. Portage Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 2024-Ohio-
6005, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.). The court dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶17} In this case, Mr. Feathers included in almost every allegation that Judge Pittman
patently and unambiguously lacked authority. The complaint is devoid of facts to support that
conclusory allegation. This Court is not required to accept as true unsupported allegations for
purposes of deciding whether to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv.
Emps. Assn. v. State, 2016-Ohio-478, ¶ 21 (a legal conclusion is “not an allegation of fact that a
court must accept as true for purposes of Civ.R. 12(B)(6).”); Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio
St.3d 190, 193 (1988) (unsupported conclusions are not taken as admitted by a motion to dismiss
and are not sufficient to withstand such a motion.). Instead, all of those allegations assert a claim
of trial court error and trial court error is not a basis for granting a writ of prohibition. Those
alleged errors could have been raised on appeal. And they were. See State v. Feathers, 2024-
Ohio-5373, ¶ 7, 11 (11th Dist.) (these same claims were raised in three appeals). {¶18} Mr. Feathers further attempts to label all of these alleged errors as actions of Judge
Pittman that were void. He does this to support his argument the actions were taken without
jurisdiction and to avoid the application of res judicata. The allegations in the complaint do not
support this conclusion. As discussed above, the allegations in the complaint constitute trial court
errors.
{¶19} Judge Pittman and the Portage County Common Pleas Court had jurisdiction over
these criminal cases. The alleged errors identified in the complaint amount to error in the exercise
of jurisdiction rather than patently and unambiguously extrajudicial actions. Mr. Feathers made
the same argument in his appeal in the Eleventh District, and that court also concluded that the
trial court’s judgments were not void. Feathers, 2024-Ohio-5373, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.). Accordingly,
as it relates to Judge Pittman, counts one through five must be dismissed.
{¶20} The ODRC Respondents are mentioned in counts one, two, four, and five, but are
only identified as respondents in count five, so our review will be limited to count five. In that
count, considering the complaint’s allegations as true, Mr. Feathers is not entitled to relief. The
complaint alleges that the ODRC Respondents patently and unambiguously lacked authority to
order the Bureau of Sentence Computation to calculate his release date based on Judge Pittman’s
orders. The complaint specifically seeks a writ of prohibition to order Director Chambers-Smith
“to either resend Judge Pittman two commitment papers or release Mr. Feathers forthwith.”
{¶21} The allegations of the complaint do not set forth a claim for a writ of prohibition
against the ODRC Respondents. The complaint does not allege the ODRC Respondents are about
to exercise judicial power or that the exercise of that power is not authorized, as is required for this
Court to grant a writ of prohibition. To the extent that the complaint sought Mr. Feathers’ release
from prison, that claim could only be presented in habeas corpus. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nelson v. Griffin, 2004-Ohio-4754, ¶ 5 (habeas corpus rather than prohibition is the proper action to seek
release from prison).
{¶22} Upon review of counts one, two, three, four, and five, this Court concludes that Mr.
Feathers obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint. After presuming the truth
of all material factual allegations, and making all reasonable inferences in Mr. Feathers’ favor, it
appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary
relief.
Mandamus
{¶23} Mr. Feathers presented claims for a writ of mandamus in counts six, seven, and
eight. As discussed below, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations in these
counts, and making all reasonable inferences in Mr. Feathers’ favor, it appears beyond doubt that
he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief.
{¶24} “For a writ of mandamus to issue, a relator must demonstrate that (1) the relator has
a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) respondent is under a corresponding clear legal duty
to perform the requested acts, and (3) relator has no plain and adequate legal remedy.” State ex
rel. Serv. Emp. Internatl. Union, Dist. 925 v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 173, 176
(1998). Mr. Feathers must demonstrate all three elements in order for this Court to grant the writ
of mandamus.
{¶25} The complaint seeks writs of mandamus in counts six, seven, and eight. In count
six, Mr. Feathers seeks a writ of mandamus to order the ODRC Respondents to prevent prison
mail room officers from opening incoming legal mail and copying it outside his presence in this
or any other case. In count seven, Mr. Feathers seeks a writ of mandamus to order Judge Pittman
to correct her erroneous orders and to enter final, appealable orders. In count eight, Mr. Feathers seeks a writ of mandamus to order the ODRC Respondents “to resend and vacate” the 2019
commitment papers to the Portage County Court of Common Pleas. We will address each count
in turn.
{¶26} Count six seeks a writ of mandamus to order the ODRC Respondents to prevent
prison mail room officers from opening incoming legal mail and copying it outside his presence
in this or any other case. It further seeks the writ to order the ODRC Respondents to provide the
Lorain County Clerk of Courts with a mail “control number” pursuant to a revised prison legal
mail policy. The complaint alleges that problems with mail delivery prevented him from amending
a habeas corpus petition he filed in this Court resulting in its dismissal. Feathers v. Reynolds,
2024-Ohio-1311 (9th Dist.).
{¶27} Taking the last point first, this Court dismissed the petition because Mr. Feathers
failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25 when he filed it. Id. at ¶ 1. Those
requirements are mandatory at the time the action is filed. Mr. Feathers would not have been able
to correct his failure even if his mail had been delivered. Id. at ¶ 4, 9.
{¶28} The remainder of the allegations under this count reflect Mr. Feathers’
dissatisfaction with the manner in which mail is delivered to him in prison. The complaint
requested an order directing the ODRC Respondents to prevent his mail from being opened,
compel them to hand deliver mail to Mr. Feathers, and order them to provide a control number to
the Lorain County Clerk of Courts. The allegations, however, do not establish that he has a clear
legal right to a specific manner of mail delivery or that the ODRC Respondents have a clear legal
duty to deliver the mail to him as he requests. There is also no requirement, or allegation of a duty,
that the ODRC Respondents must provide the Lorain County Clerk of Courts with a control
number. {¶29} Mr. Feathers obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in count six of the
complaint. Scott, 2006-Ohio-6573, ¶ 14. The allegations in the complaint for this count fail to
state a claim for a writ of mandamus.
{¶30} Count seven seeks a writ of mandamus to order Judge Pittman to correct her
erroneous orders and to enter final, appealable orders. To the extent that Judge Pittman erred in
the orders she entered, appeal provided an adequate remedy. Likewise, to the extent that Judge
Pittman failed to enter final, appealable orders, Mr. Feathers could move the trial court to enter
final, appealable orders and, if the trial court denied the motion, he could appeal that order. And
Mr. Feathers has done that. State v. Feathers, 2024-Ohio-5373, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.) (citing three
earlier instances where Mr. Feathers had raised these issues). After presuming the truth of all
material factual allegations, and making all reasonable inferences in Mr. Feathers’ favor, it appears
beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief.
Mr. Feathers is not entitled to relief on count seven.
{¶31} Count eight seeks a writ of mandamus to order the ODRC Respondents to resend
commitment papers to the Portage County Court of Common Pleas. The complaint alleges that
the ODRC Respondents patently and unambiguously lacked authority to “adjudge and decree
Judge Pittman’s two consecutive probation reimprisonments when sentencing Feathers. . . .” It
further alleges that the ODRC Respondents have “refused to deal with the problems” resulting in
Mr. Feathers serving additional prison time. There are additional allegations that the journal
entries are erroneous for a variety of reasons.
{¶32} The complaint lacks any allegation that Mr. Feathers has a right to the relief
requested (and it is not even clear what that relief is). Further, the complaint contains no
allegations that the ODRC Respondents have a clear legal duty to provide that relief. Because there are no allegations that would support a claim for a writ of mandamus, Mr. Feathers is not
entitled to relief on count eight.
{¶33} Finally, we recognize that Mr. Feathers presented the allegations contained in
counts seven and eight in a mandamus action in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. That court
addressed the claims in its recent decision:
{¶31} Feathers is not entitled to mandamus because he had an adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal. Indeed, in at least one prior appeal, Feathers asserted error regarding the imposition of his sentence. State v. Feathers, 2021-Ohio-2886 (11th Dist.).
State ex rel. Feathers v. Portage Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 2024-Ohio-6005, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.).
{¶34} Upon review of counts six, seven, and eight, this Court concludes that Mr. Feathers
obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint. After presuming the truth of all
material factual allegations, and making all reasonable inferences in Mr. Feathers’ favor, it appears
beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of mandamus.
Procedendo
{¶35} In count nine of the complaint, Mr. Feathers seeks a writ of procedendo to order
Judge Pittman and the ODRC Respondents to enter final judgments.
{¶36} To obtain a writ of procedendo, Mr. Feathers must establish that he has a clear legal
right to require the judge to proceed, that the judge has a clear legal duty to proceed, and that there
is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Ward v. Reed, 2014-
Ohio-4512, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 72 Ohio
St.3d 461, 462 (1995). Procedendo is the appropriate remedy when a judge has refused to render
a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment. State ex rel. M.D. v. Kelsey,
2022-Ohio-2556, ¶ 10. {¶37} We can quickly dispose of this count as it relates to the ODRC Respondents. The
complaint does not allege that any of the ODRC Respondents are judges or that they are acting in
a judicial capacity. Because the complaint contains no allegations that would support the granting
of a writ of procedendo against the ODRC Respondents, the complaint must be dismissed as to the
ODRC Respondents on count nine.
{¶38} That leaves count nine of the complaint against Judge Pittman. The complaint
alleges that Judge Pittman failed to sentence Mr. Feathers in open court and refused to enter final
judgments. The documents attached to the complaint, however, demonstrate that Judge Pittman
entered final, appealable orders. While Mr. Feathers alleges that Judge Pittman committed errors
in entering these judgments, those arguments are not appropriate in seeking a writ of procedendo.
Judge Pittman has not failed to proceed to judgment. She entered orders and Mr. Feathers could
have, and did, appeal from those orders.
{¶39} Again, we recognize that Mr. Feathers presented the identical claims in the
Eleventh District Cout of Appeals. It considered these arguments regarding Judge Pittman:
{¶33} As in the above claims, Feathers seeks the vacation of his sentence and the issuance of entries in compliance with Crim.R. 32(C) and 43(A). He asserts that Judge Pittman has refused to issue judgments. This assertion is factually incorrect. Judge Pittman denied Feathers’s motion to vacate judgment of convictions and correct judgment entries pursuant to Criminal Rules 32(C) and 43(A) on February 1, 2022. Feathers had an adequate remedy at law to appeal any error in that decision. Because he has an adequate remedy at law, and because Judge Pittman has already ruled on his request, Feathers is not entitled to a writ of procedendo. Therefore, in accordance with Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the claims for writ of prohibition are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
State ex rel. Feathers v. Portage Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 2024-Ohio-6005, ¶ 33 (11th Dist.).
{¶40} Judge Pittman entered judgments of conviction. Mr. Feathers appealed those
orders. He also moved to vacate those judgments and to issue corrected judgment entries, which
Judge Pittman denied. Mr. Feathers appealed the denial of those orders. The allegations of the complaint do not demonstrate that Judge Pittman has failed to proceed to judgment or
unnecessarily delayed in proceeding to judgment.
{¶41} Upon review of count nine, this Court concludes that Mr. Feathers obviously cannot
prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint. After presuming the truth of all material factual
allegations, and making all reasonable inferences in Mr. Feathers’ favor, it appears beyond doubt
that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of procedendo.
Conclusion
{¶42} This Court has reviewed the allegations of the nine counts of Mr. Feathers’
complaint. For the reasons outlined above, Mr. Feathers obviously cannot prevail on the facts
alleged in the complaint. After presuming the truth of all material factual allegations, and making
all reasonable inferences in Mr. Feathers’ favor, it appears beyond doubt that Mr. Feathers can
prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief. Accordingly, this case is
dismissed.
{¶43} Costs taxed to Mr. Feathers. The clerk of courts is hereby directed to serve upon
all parties not in default notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. See Civ.R.
58(B).
BETTY SUTTON FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J. FLAGG LANZINGER, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DAVID E. FEATHERS, Pro Se, Relator. DAVE YOST, Ohio Attorney General, and MARCY VONDERWELL and JENNIFER A. DRISCOLL, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for the ODRC Respondents.
JUDGE LAURIE PITTMAN, Respondent.