State ex rel. Estes v. Goodman

133 Tenn. 375
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedApril 15, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 133 Tenn. 375 (State ex rel. Estes v. Goodman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Estes v. Goodman, 133 Tenn. 375 (Tenn. 1915).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Buchanan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit by the State of Tennessee on the relation of Z.N.Estes, District Attorney-General, in and for the county of Shelby, under the authority conferred on that officer by chapter 6, Code of 1857-58. See sections 2138-2144, inclusive, of that Code. See, also, Shannon’s Code, chapter 6, sections 3825-3837, inclusive. The legislation above referred to applicable to the present suit are those sections dealing with the State’s right by such a proceeding to obtain a decree, declaring an escheat to the State for the benefit of the common school fund of “the estate real and personal of any person dying intestate within this State without issue, and leaving no relatives entitled by the law of descent to his estate.” Such was the purpose of the original bill in the present proceeding. The estate sought to be escheated was that of E. J. Halley, who departed this life in Shelby county, Tennessee, on the 19th day of October of the year 1910. That this estate consisted wholly of personal property seems to be a fact not in dispute. It was for the most part money deposited in bank to the credit of the testator. The balance of the estate was represented by purchase-money notes for two adjoining lots of land located on the east side of Main street, in Memphis. These lots Halley conveyed to May H. Smith, D. M. Armstrong, Abe Goodman, all of Shelby county, by deed dated March 5, 1910. The consideration expressed in this deed was the sum of $60,000, of which $10,000 was cash in hand paid, and [379]*379the balance was to be paid at the rate of $5,000’ annually for ten years, with interest at four per cent, per annum on the deferred payments. These payments were secured by trust deed on the two lots of land, which were fully described in the deed. At the time this deed was executed; Halley and the purchasers entered into a contract whereby he agreed that he would repurchase the property from them at the same price provided the purchasers exercised the option to resell to him within twelve months from March 18,1910. At the time of his death such option had not been exercised by the purchasers, but the time'within which the right was in them to exercise it had not expired. The parties made defendant to the original bill were the purchasers of said real estate (with the exception of May H. Smith); also the legatees named in a paper writing signed by Halley and purporting to be his last will and testament, which writing had been probated in common form between the date of Halley’s death and the filing of the original bill. Abe Goodman was also made a party defendant as administrator with the will annexed, and the unknown heirs of E. J. Halley were named as parties defendant to the bill.

After this bill was filed it was amended and additional defendants were brought in. These were E. K. Keefe et al., who were claiming to be heirs at law of Halley. The parties defendant to the two bills filed by the State may be grouped into two classes: First, those claiming under the probated will; second, those claiming as heirs at law. The State insists that Halley died intestate, [380]*380without issue, and leaving no relatives entitled by the law of descent to his estate. The legatees under the probate will rely upon it to defeat the claim of the State, and also to defeat any claim set up by the heirs at law. E. K. Keefe et al. contend that Halley died intestate, that they are the true heirs at law and entitled to his estate by the law of descent. If the legatees are right, both the State and Keefe et al. are wrong. So, it is apparent that the case turns on the single question: Is the will valid 1 The assault made upon the validity of the will both by the State and Keefe et al. is grounded upon fraud in the procurement of the will at a time when, as they allege, Halley lacked mental capacity to make a will. The probate of the will relied on by the legatees was only in common form. The jurisdiction of the chancery court to set aside the probate of the will where that jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of fraud in its procurement is well settled. See State v. Lancaster,119 Tenn. (11 Cates), 638, 105 S. W., 858, also reported in 14 L. R. A. (N. S.), 991, 14 Ann. Cas., 953. In that case the present Chief Justice, speaking for the court, said:

The rule thus announced is an exception to the general rule that the integrity of a will cannot be questioned unless a contest be first instituted in the county court, and thence carried in the regular way through the circuit court. It appears from the authority just cited that where there is a litigation over specific property, in a case brought for the purpose, and either party claims under a will probated only in common form, [381]*381and the other interposes as an objection to the will that it was procured by fraud, this question may be made in the case itself,” etc.

Upon the issues made by the pleadings a large amount of proof was taken, the record compromising more than 2,200 pages. The legatees under the will were successful both in the chancery court and the court of civil appeals, except that the court of civil appeals taxed all costs against the estate, and the case is before us on petitions for certiorari respectively filed by the State and E. K. Keefe et al., and on a petition filed by the legatees on the question of costs. It is unnecessary to discuss in detail the assignments of error. We will consider only the controlling questions which they raise.

First, was there fraud in the procurement of the will? Second, was Halley of sound and disposing mind when the will was made ? Third, was there fraud in the probate of the will, and if so what was its effect on the rights of the parties to this suit?

The foregoing are the only questions made by the assignments of error which need be discussed. We shall not undertake to answer these questions seriatim, but we will dispose of each of them in the course of the opinion. We will not undertake to state the evidence pro or contra upon any disputed question of fact,'but will state the facts which we have concluded are established by a preponderance of the evidence.

The exact value of the estate owned by E. J. Halley at the time the will was made does not appear, but it consisted, as heretofore indicated, of money in bank and [382]*382purchase-money notes for real estate which he had sold, and the approximate value of this property was $230, 000, or more. This large estate had been accumulated mainly hy his mother and himself in the conduct of a grocery and liquor business in the city of Memphis. The mother of Halley was a woman of unusual character. She is thought to have been a native of Ireland. She was married first to John Halley, and of this marriage E. J. Halley was horn in the year 1858. His father is said to have died during the Civil War. Her second marriage was to John W. Madden, who died in 1878. Of that marriage there was no issue. She remained Madden’s widow until her death, which occurred on February 15,1910. From 1878 until her death her sole interest in life seems to have been the conduct of her business and the accumulation of money. She kept no hank account, lived in rooms over the storehouse in which the business was conducted, did her own housework, would keep no servant, aided in the selling of goods in the store and in the management of the business. She kept no clerk in the store except Halley. She kept one negro porter and sometimes employed assistance for him.

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Bluebook (online)
133 Tenn. 375, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-estes-v-goodman-tenn-1915.