State ex rel. Erie Fire Insurance v. Madden

515 S.E.2d 351, 204 W. Va. 606, 1998 WL 394941, 1998 W. Va. LEXIS 121
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 14, 1998
DocketNo. 25016
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 515 S.E.2d 351 (State ex rel. Erie Fire Insurance v. Madden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Erie Fire Insurance v. Madden, 515 S.E.2d 351, 204 W. Va. 606, 1998 WL 394941, 1998 W. Va. LEXIS 121 (W. Va. 1998).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:1

In the instant case, we grant a writ of prohibition and require the Circuit Court of Marshall County to dismiss several hundred insurance companies as defendants, because the named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit did not establish that there was a “juridical link” among the companies.

I.

This is a writ of prohibition in which this Court is asked to rule that the Circuit Court of Marshall County erred in not dismissing a large number of insurance companies as defendants in a class action lawsuit.

The lawsuit originated in a claim by an infant, Megan Barker (“Barker”), brought by her father, against Nationwide Insurance Company (“Nationwide”). Barker alleged that Nationwide, as the insurer for an alleged tortfeasor, acted wrongfully in obtaining a release for injuries Barker suffered in an accident with Nationwide’s insured. Barker was apparently not represented by counsel and Nationwide did not obtain court approval for the settlement.2

Seeking to act as a class representative for others similarly situated, Barker claimed that by obtaining signatures on purportedly “full and final” releases from the parents or guardians of injured infants like Barker, Nationwide illegally misled the infants/or and their parents and guardians as to the nature and effect of the release.

In addition to Nationwide, Barker joined as defendants several hundred other insurance companies (“the other insurance companies”) that do business in West Virginia. These other insurance companies are the petitioners in the instant case.3 Barker sought to represent a class of similarly situated persons (infants, former infants, and their parents and guardians) who had such signed purportedly “full and final” infant settlement releases with the other insurance companies, without court approval of the settlement.

The other insurance companies made a motion to dismiss, based upon the fact that Barker has no personal claim against any of those companies. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the “juridical link” doctrine permitted Barker to act as a class representative for persons who have claims against the other insurance companies, even though Barker has no personal claim against them.

The circuit court found that Barker could maintain an action against the other insurance companies and act as a representative for those persons who may have claims against those companies — because the circuit court concluded that there is a “juridical link” among the other insurance companies.4

[608]*608The other insurance companies then brought the instant writ of prohibition asking this Court to order the circuit court to not conduct further proceedings against them, and to grant their motion to dismiss.

II.

“In determining whether to grant a rule to show cause in prohibition when a court is not acting in excess of its jurisdiction, this Court will look to the adequacy of other available remedies such as appeal and to the over-all economy of effort and money among litigants, lawyers and courts; however, this Court will use prohibition in this discretionary way to correct only substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in contravention of a clear statutory, constitutional, or common law mandate which may be resolved independently of any. disputed facts and only in cases where there is a high probability that the trial will be completely reversed if [609]*609the error is not corrected in advance.” Syllabus Point 1, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979).

The circuit court’s decision to deny the other insurance companies’ motion to dismiss adopted, by acknowledgment, the “juridical link” doctrine. The doctrine has developed as part of Rule 23 class action certification analysis. The leading case in its development is La Mar v. H & B Novelty and Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.1973).

In La Mar, a plaintiff who had a Truth In Lending Act claim against a single pawn broker sued all of the pawn brokers in Oregon on behalf of all persons who had been allegedly cheated by those pawn brokers in the same fashion.

The Ninth Circuit ruled that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28,

... a plaintiff who has no cause of action against the defendant can not ‘fairly and adequately protect the interests’ of those who do have such causes of action. This is true even though the plaintiff may have suffered an identical injury at the hands of a party other than the defendant and even though his attorney is excellent in every material respect. Obviously this position does not embrace situations in which all injuries are the result of á conspiracy or concerted schemes between the defendants at whose hands the class suffered injury. Nor is it intended to apply in instances in which all defendants are juridically related in a manner that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be expeditious.

489 F.2d at 466 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).

The case law that has evolved under Rule 235 generally holds that in a class action against multiple defendants, if there is not a named representative plaintiff with a claim against a defendant, a class action may not be maintained against such a defendant unless there is alleged to be a conspiracy or concerted action, or a “juridical link,” between such a defendant and a defendant against whom a named representative plaintiff does have a claim. See La Mar, 489 F.2d at 466. See also Leer v. Washington Educ. Ass’n., 172 F.R.D. 439, 447-450 (W.D.Wash.1997); Murer v. Montana State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund, 849 P.2d 1036, 1038-39, 257 Mont. 434, -- (Mont.1993); Cedar Crest Funeral Home, Inc. v. Lashley, 889 S.W.2d 325, 331-32 (Tex.App.1993); Streich v. American Family, 399 N.W.2d 210, 215-16 (Minn.App.1987); Itel Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 104, 117-123 (N.D.Cal.1981); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 689 (D.D.C.1977).

A “juridical link”, is typically found where multiple defendants are, with respect to the conduct at issue in the, litigation, bound together by their official status, agreements, statutes, or in a similar fashion. Trucking Employers, supra, 75 F.R.D. at 686. It appears that no jurisdiction has found such a link among insurance companies. See Kittay v. Allstate Ins. Co., 78 Ill.App.3d 335, 33 Ill.Dec. 867, 397 N.E.2d 200 (1979); Turpeau v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 936 F.Supp. 975 (N.D.Ga.1996), aff'd, 112 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir.1997); Streich, supra; Murer, supra.

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STATE EX REL. ERIE FIRE INS. v. Madden
515 S.E.2d 351 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
515 S.E.2d 351, 204 W. Va. 606, 1998 WL 394941, 1998 W. Va. LEXIS 121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-erie-fire-insurance-v-madden-wva-1998.