State ex rel. Ellis v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad

53 Fla. 650
Supreme Court of Florida·Decided January 15, 1907·Published·Cited by 52 cases

Opinion

Whitfield, J.:

The attorney general in mandamus proceedings alleges that the respondent railroad company for more than a year has not performed its duty to the public as a common 'carrier in that its roadbed and track are not' maintained in a safe and suitable condition, its motive power and fiat and box cars are not sufficient in numbers, and the freights accepted are not transported with safety and dispatch, by reason of which great injury has resulted to the public. The alternative writ commands the performance of this duty.

It is contended on motion to quash the alternative writ that the duty therein alleged is not commanded by statute or by the terms of the charters, and that therefore mandamus is not the proper remedy; and further, that the allegations and commands of the writ are so general, vague and uncertain that they cannot be definitely replied to, performed or enforced.

The alternative writ does not require the performance of specific/ acts, but in rather broad terms it commands the respondent to perform certain branches or parts of a general duty it owes to the public in rendering the service of a common carrier. The ' statutes of this state do not enumerate all the duties which a railroad cor[668]*668poration owes to the public. There are, however, certain general duties to the public a railroad company assumes in consideration of its franchises and privileges received from the state, and as a result of its undertaking to render to the public the service of a common carrier. The duty here commanded is implied by law and is binding upon the railroad corporation when it receives and exercises franchises and privileges thát can be held and exercised only by legal authority derived from the sovereign power.

The common law writ of mandamus may be issued to specifically enforce the performance of a duty imposed by law upon a railroad corporation where no other adequate remedy is provided by law. The writ of mandamus does not supersede legal, remedies, but rather supplies the want of a legal remedy, therefore two prerequisites must exist to warrant a court in granting this extraordinary remedy: First, it must appear that the relator has a clear, legal right to the performance of the particular duty by the respondent; and, second, that the law affords no other adequate or specific remedy to secure the performance of the duty which it is sought to coerce. See High on Ex. Legal Rem. sections 1, 10; Merrill on Mandamus, section. 51; People ex rel. Bailey v. Supervisors of Green, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 217; People ex rel. Township of LaGrange v. State Treasurer, 24 Mich. 468; State ex rel. Hathorn v. United States Express Co., 95 Minn. 442, 104 N. W. Rep. 557; 6 Current Law 499; Ray v. Wilson, 29 Fla. 342, 10 South. Rep. 613, 14 L. R. A. 773; State ex rel. Lamar v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 41 Fla. 377, 27 South. Rep. 225; 6 Bacon's Ab. 418.

In the case of Loraine v. Pittsburg, J., E. & E. R. Co., [669]*669205 Pa. St. 132, 54 Atl. Rep. 580, the court, in awarding mandamus to compel the railroad company to continue to furnish cars that it had been furnishing but had ceased to furnish, said: ” The defendant, under the statute from which it derives it being, is a common carrier and as such has imposed upon it certain public duties, such as to construct its road, to equip it with cars, locomotives and employ hands to. run them for all the public. This is a public duty. If it fail in performing it, it fails to carry out the very purpose of its charter, and the public, without distinction, suffers by the breach of duty. In -such case, both at common law and under our statute of 1893, proceedings should be instituted by the commonwealth at the instance of the attorney general.”

“While the law affords railroad corporations adequate and complete protection in the exercise of their chartered rights, it also holds them to a strict performance of the public duties enjoined upon them as a consideration for the rights and powers thus granted.” Railroad Commissioners v. Portland & O. C. R. R. Co., 63 Me. 269, 18 Am. Rep. 208.

“The object of incorporating railroad companies is to secure to the public increased facilities for transit from point to point, and an improved mode of carrying persons and property. * * * Railroad companies are' creatures of the law, and are intrusted with the exercise of certain powers to promote the public interest, and are therefore bound to conduct their affairs in furtherance of the public objects of their creation.” People ex rel. Cantrell v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 176 Ill. 512. 52 N. E. Rep. 292, 35 L. R. A. 656.

“All jurists and judges will at once agree that char[670]*670tered companies are obliged fairly and fully to carry out the objects for which they are created, and that they can be compelled by mandamus to do it; and it will not be question that in the case of public highways, whether turnpikes or railroads, they are bound to keep them fit for use, and, in the case of railroads, to keep them furnished with .suitable cars, engines and attendants, without which they cannot be used at all.” State v. Hartford & N. Haven R. R. Co., 29 Conn. 538.

“A railroad company is a quasi public corporation, and all its rights and powers are conferred upon it not merely for the benefit of the corporation itself, but also in trust for the benefit of the public; and whenever it neglects or fails to perfom any of its corporate duties, it may generally be compelled to perform the same by an action of mandamus. The duty resting upon a railroad corporation to perform whatever has been legally enjoined upon it by legal and proper authority, is a duty resulting from a public trust, and is also a duty resulting from a public station, and the public may through the attorney general enforce the performance of such duty by mand'amus, whenever no other plain and adequate remedy exists.” State v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 33 Kan. 176, 5 Pac. Rep. 772.

“The duty of a railroad company to carry and charge only reasonable compensation are incidents to its occupation as a common carrier. * * * It is the duty of a common carrier to receive and carry whatever is properly offered to it for carriage. * * * The safety of human life and the good of every public interest require of railroads the soundest condition, the fullest equipment, and most skillful and careful operation; and it is the province [671]*671of the court to enforce, when properly called upon, the law which imposes these entirely proper and indispensable demands.” Pensacola & A. R. Co. v. State, 25 Fla. 310, 324, 325, 326, 5 South. Rep. 833, 839, 840, 3 L. R. A. 661.

“It must also be remembered that railways are public corporations organized for public purposes, granted valuable franchises and privileges, among which the right to take the private property of a- citizen in inmtum is not the le'ast, Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., 135 U. S. 641, 657; that many of them are the donees of large tracts of public lands and of gifts of money by municipal corporations, and that they all primarily owe duties to the public of a higher nature even than that of earning large dividends for their shareholders.” United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n., 166 U. S. 290, text 332, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep.

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State ex rel. Ellis v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 53 Fla. 650 (Fla. 1907).

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