[Cite as State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 2014-Ohio-4546.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO ex rel. : PER CURIAM OPINION EMMANUEL ELDER, : Relator, CASE NO. 2014-A-0039 : - vs - : HON. JUDGE ALBERT CAMPLESE, ASHTABULA MUNICIPAL COURT, :
Respondent. :
Original Action for Writ of Prohibition.
Judgment: Petition dismissed.
Emmanuel Elder, pro se, PID# A644-514, Richland Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 8107, 1001 Olivesburg Road, Mansfield, OH 44905 (Relator).
Nicholas A. Iarocci, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Courthouse, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Respondent).
PER CURIAM
{¶1} Before this court is relator, Emmanuel Elder’s, Petition for a Writ of
Prohibition. Respondent, Judge Albert Camplese, has filed a Motion to Dismiss,
pursuant to Ohio Civ.R. 12(B)(6), claiming that Elder has failed to meet the elements for
granting a writ of prohibition. For the following reasons, Elder’s Petition is dismissed.
{¶2} On June 24, 2014, Elder filed his Petition for a Writ of Prohibition. In his
Petition, he requests, among other things, that this court vacate the judgment entry sentencing him in a criminal case in the Ashtabula Municipal Court, Case No.
12CRB01970, in which he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of Aggravated
Menacing. He argues that Judge Camplese should be prohibited from exercising
authority over him, by enforcing the sentence and fine, since the court did not have
jurisdiction to issue a judgment in this case.
{¶3} Elder asserts that the complaint instituting the charge was neither
provided to him nor contained all of the necessary information, including the time, date,
and specific location of the offenses. Elder alleges several other defects in his
prosecution, including issues relating to the preliminary hearing, the requirement that he
undergo a psychiatric evaluation for competency, the issuance of a continuance without
a judgment entry, and the trial court’s acceptance of his involuntary guilty plea.
{¶4} Elder further argues that his eviction in Ashtabula Municipal Court Case
No. 12CVG01088 was improper, since he was unable to appear at the hearing due to
being detained in the Ashtabula County Jail.
{¶5} Judge Camplese filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on July 14, 2014,
asserting that Elder fails to raise any claims that are of the type that can be granted
under a writ of prohibition. He also notes that Elder had an adequate remedy at law
through an appeal of the underlying criminal case.
{¶6} Elder filed a Relator’s Motion to Dismiss Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
on August 1, 2014.1 In it, he again argued that the trial court did not have the authority
to exercise power over him and that his rights were violated.
1. Although Elder characterizes this as a Motion to Dismiss, it is actually a response to Judge Camplese’s Motion to Dismiss.
2 {¶7} As an initial matter, Judge Camplese argues that Elder’s claim should be
dismissed due to his failure to comply with R.C. 2731.04, which relates to mandamus
claims, requiring an application for a writ to be made in the name of the State on relation
of Elder. In this case, Elder captioned the case “State of Ohio ex rel. Emmanuel Elder
v. Judge Camplese.” Thus, the argument that it was not brought in the name of the
State is incorrect.
{¶8} “The conditions which must exist to support the issuance of a writ of
prohibition are: (1) The court or officer against whom it is sought must be about to
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power must be
unauthorized by law; and (3) it must appear that the refusal of the writ would result in
injury for which there is no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”
State ex rel. McKee v. Cooper, 40 Ohio St.2d 65, 320 N.E.2d 286 (1974), paragraph
one of the syllabus. “[T]he function of a writ of prohibition is very limited; i.e., the sole
purpose of such a writ is to stop an inferior court or judicial officer from engaging in any
action which exceeds the general scope of its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Feathers v.
Gansheimer, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0038, 2007-Ohio-2858, ¶ 2. Prohibition
generally “will not issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief has an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307,
2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 9.
{¶9} Dismissal of an original action is “appropriate if after presuming the truth of
all material factual allegations of [relators’] petition and making all reasonable inferences
in their favor, it appear[s] beyond doubt that they could prove no set of facts entitling
3 them to the requested extraordinary relief.” State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio
St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14.
{¶10} Judge Camplese argues that, even when accepting Elder’s allegations as
true, he does not satisfy the foregoing elements, since he has an adequate remedy at
law through the appeal of the underlying criminal case.
{¶11} “Where there is a total want of jurisdiction on the part of a court, a writ of
prohibition will be allowed to arrest the continuing effect of an order previously issued by
such court.” State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 285 N.E.2d 22
(1972), paragraph two of the syllabus; State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin, 64 Ohio
St.3d 245, 248, 594 N.E.2d 616 (1992) (where relator asserted that the respondents
“were completely without jurisdiction to act,” the Ohio Supreme Court proceeded to
review the jurisdictional issues, even though respondents had already exercised the
jurisdiction being challenged). When there is a patent lack of jurisdiction for the lower
court to act, the remedy of appeal is “immaterial,” i.e., the relator can maintain an action
in prohibition regardless of his alternative remedy of appeal. State ex rel. Willacy v.
Smith, 78 Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 676 N.E.2d 109 (1997). Thus, we must consider whether
the lower court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction in this case, given that
Elder raises challenges related to its jurisdiction.
{¶12} Elder’s claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction is based on his
contention that the complaint did not contain all necessary information required under
Crim.R. 3, including the time and specific location of the criminal offense. He does not
contend that no complaint was filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. He cites to no
4 case law to support a conclusion that certain defects in a complaint result in the trial
court patently and unambiguously lacking jurisdiction.
{¶13} We recognize that a defective complaint can result in reversal of the case
or a finding that the court lacked jurisdiction under certain circumstances, such as when
the complaint is not signed. See State v. Green, 48 Ohio App.3d 121, 121-122, 548
N.E.2d 334 (11th Dist.1988). However, such reversals are generally on appeal and do
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[Cite as State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 2014-Ohio-4546.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO ex rel. : PER CURIAM OPINION EMMANUEL ELDER, : Relator, CASE NO. 2014-A-0039 : - vs - : HON. JUDGE ALBERT CAMPLESE, ASHTABULA MUNICIPAL COURT, :
Respondent. :
Original Action for Writ of Prohibition.
Judgment: Petition dismissed.
Emmanuel Elder, pro se, PID# A644-514, Richland Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 8107, 1001 Olivesburg Road, Mansfield, OH 44905 (Relator).
Nicholas A. Iarocci, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Courthouse, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Respondent).
PER CURIAM
{¶1} Before this court is relator, Emmanuel Elder’s, Petition for a Writ of
Prohibition. Respondent, Judge Albert Camplese, has filed a Motion to Dismiss,
pursuant to Ohio Civ.R. 12(B)(6), claiming that Elder has failed to meet the elements for
granting a writ of prohibition. For the following reasons, Elder’s Petition is dismissed.
{¶2} On June 24, 2014, Elder filed his Petition for a Writ of Prohibition. In his
Petition, he requests, among other things, that this court vacate the judgment entry sentencing him in a criminal case in the Ashtabula Municipal Court, Case No.
12CRB01970, in which he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of Aggravated
Menacing. He argues that Judge Camplese should be prohibited from exercising
authority over him, by enforcing the sentence and fine, since the court did not have
jurisdiction to issue a judgment in this case.
{¶3} Elder asserts that the complaint instituting the charge was neither
provided to him nor contained all of the necessary information, including the time, date,
and specific location of the offenses. Elder alleges several other defects in his
prosecution, including issues relating to the preliminary hearing, the requirement that he
undergo a psychiatric evaluation for competency, the issuance of a continuance without
a judgment entry, and the trial court’s acceptance of his involuntary guilty plea.
{¶4} Elder further argues that his eviction in Ashtabula Municipal Court Case
No. 12CVG01088 was improper, since he was unable to appear at the hearing due to
being detained in the Ashtabula County Jail.
{¶5} Judge Camplese filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on July 14, 2014,
asserting that Elder fails to raise any claims that are of the type that can be granted
under a writ of prohibition. He also notes that Elder had an adequate remedy at law
through an appeal of the underlying criminal case.
{¶6} Elder filed a Relator’s Motion to Dismiss Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
on August 1, 2014.1 In it, he again argued that the trial court did not have the authority
to exercise power over him and that his rights were violated.
1. Although Elder characterizes this as a Motion to Dismiss, it is actually a response to Judge Camplese’s Motion to Dismiss.
2 {¶7} As an initial matter, Judge Camplese argues that Elder’s claim should be
dismissed due to his failure to comply with R.C. 2731.04, which relates to mandamus
claims, requiring an application for a writ to be made in the name of the State on relation
of Elder. In this case, Elder captioned the case “State of Ohio ex rel. Emmanuel Elder
v. Judge Camplese.” Thus, the argument that it was not brought in the name of the
State is incorrect.
{¶8} “The conditions which must exist to support the issuance of a writ of
prohibition are: (1) The court or officer against whom it is sought must be about to
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power must be
unauthorized by law; and (3) it must appear that the refusal of the writ would result in
injury for which there is no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”
State ex rel. McKee v. Cooper, 40 Ohio St.2d 65, 320 N.E.2d 286 (1974), paragraph
one of the syllabus. “[T]he function of a writ of prohibition is very limited; i.e., the sole
purpose of such a writ is to stop an inferior court or judicial officer from engaging in any
action which exceeds the general scope of its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Feathers v.
Gansheimer, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0038, 2007-Ohio-2858, ¶ 2. Prohibition
generally “will not issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief has an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307,
2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 9.
{¶9} Dismissal of an original action is “appropriate if after presuming the truth of
all material factual allegations of [relators’] petition and making all reasonable inferences
in their favor, it appear[s] beyond doubt that they could prove no set of facts entitling
3 them to the requested extraordinary relief.” State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio
St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14.
{¶10} Judge Camplese argues that, even when accepting Elder’s allegations as
true, he does not satisfy the foregoing elements, since he has an adequate remedy at
law through the appeal of the underlying criminal case.
{¶11} “Where there is a total want of jurisdiction on the part of a court, a writ of
prohibition will be allowed to arrest the continuing effect of an order previously issued by
such court.” State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 285 N.E.2d 22
(1972), paragraph two of the syllabus; State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin, 64 Ohio
St.3d 245, 248, 594 N.E.2d 616 (1992) (where relator asserted that the respondents
“were completely without jurisdiction to act,” the Ohio Supreme Court proceeded to
review the jurisdictional issues, even though respondents had already exercised the
jurisdiction being challenged). When there is a patent lack of jurisdiction for the lower
court to act, the remedy of appeal is “immaterial,” i.e., the relator can maintain an action
in prohibition regardless of his alternative remedy of appeal. State ex rel. Willacy v.
Smith, 78 Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 676 N.E.2d 109 (1997). Thus, we must consider whether
the lower court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction in this case, given that
Elder raises challenges related to its jurisdiction.
{¶12} Elder’s claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction is based on his
contention that the complaint did not contain all necessary information required under
Crim.R. 3, including the time and specific location of the criminal offense. He does not
contend that no complaint was filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. He cites to no
4 case law to support a conclusion that certain defects in a complaint result in the trial
court patently and unambiguously lacking jurisdiction.
{¶13} We recognize that a defective complaint can result in reversal of the case
or a finding that the court lacked jurisdiction under certain circumstances, such as when
the complaint is not signed. See State v. Green, 48 Ohio App.3d 121, 121-122, 548
N.E.2d 334 (11th Dist.1988). However, such reversals are generally on appeal and do
not include a finding that the court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction.
{¶14} It has been held that there is not a patent lack of jurisdiction when, under
R.C. 2901.11 and 2931.03, the statutes vesting authority to courts to hear criminal
cases, the court has been granted jurisdiction. State ex rel. Smith v. Lewis, 5th Dist.
Perry No. 2012-CA-9, 2012-Ohio-4257, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Pruitt v. Donnelly, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 95518, 2011-Ohio-1252, ¶ 13 (“[p]rohibition will not lie, if the court has
basic statutory jurisdiction and an appeal in the ordinary course of law is
available”). See R.C. 2901.11(A)(1) (“[a] person is subject to criminal prosecution and
punishment in this state if * * * [t]he person commits an offense under the laws of this
state”) and R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) (“[t]he municipal court has jurisdiction * * * of the
violation of any misdemeanor committed within the limits of its territory”).
{¶15} Under similar circumstances, in a case involving a claim that a complaint
was defective because it did not include the state or city in which it was issued, the
Eighth District held that there was no patent lack of jurisdiction and the court had
“general jurisdiction of the subject matter.” State ex rel. Novak v. Carroll, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 75098, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4089, 8-9 (Sept. 2, 1999). It noted that, to
the extent that there may be some question as to jurisdiction, the relator had the
5 opportunity to have that addressed through the normal appellate process, where the
court would have the benefit of the entire record. Id.
{¶16} Here, since there is no dispute that a criminal act was at issue and the
complaint was filed, and the only question is whether the complaint properly advised
Elder of certain facts, lacking authority to the contrary, the issue of jurisdiction could
properly be determined on appeal. “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack
of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own
jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”
State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485,
¶ 5; State ex rel. Leatherworks Partnership v. Stuard, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2002-T-
0017, 2002-Ohio-6477, ¶ 19 (“if the court or judge generally has subject matter
jurisdiction over the type of case in question and his authority to hear that specific action
will depend on the specific facts before him, the jurisdictional defect is not obvious and
the court/judge should be allowed to decide the jurisdictional issue”).
{¶17} Moreover, while Elder refers to the lack of details in the complaint, he
specifically discusses the affidavit filed by the victim in the criminal matter. Such an
affidavit is not a complaint, but can lead to the filing of a complaint. See R.C.
2935.09(D) (a “private citizen having knowledge of the facts who seeks to cause an
arrest or prosecution * * * may file an affidavit charging the offense committed with a
reviewing official for the purpose of review to determine if a complaint should be filed by
the prosecuting attorney”). Thus, Elder’s contention that the affidavit itself did not
contain certain information does not amount to a claim that the complaint under Crim.R.
3 was defective.
6 {¶18} Elder raises several other matters, such as that a continuance of the
criminal proceedings was incorrectly granted and a competency evaluation was
improper. These issues are not properly raised in prohibition proceedings, since they
relate to actions of the court that have already been completed and do not involve a
judge who is “about to exercise” power. McKee, 40 Ohio St.2d 65, 320 N.E.2d 286, at
paragraph one of the syllabus. Elder had the opportunity to dispute appropriate issues
in an appeal if he chose to do so. The same applies to his claim that he was not
permitted to appear at the hearing on the forcible entry and detainer proceedings that
took place before Judge Camplese.
{¶19} For the foregoing reasons, Elder’s Petition for a Writ of Prohibition is
dismissed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concur.