State ex rel. Dyke v. Spradling

536 S.W.2d 839, 1976 Mo. App. LEXIS 2734
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 29, 1976
DocketNo. KCD 27578
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 536 S.W.2d 839 (State ex rel. Dyke v. Spradling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Dyke v. Spradling, 536 S.W.2d 839, 1976 Mo. App. LEXIS 2734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinion

WASSERSTROM, Judge.

Relators filed application in the court below for a writ of mandamus in the nature of a class suit to compel the respondent Director of Revenue to issue automobile license plates for the year 1974 containing the same numbers accorded to each respective registrant in prior years. Relators had been assigned license number 1-248 in 1948, and plates containing those numbers had been issued to them for each year through 1973.

Sometime prior to 1973, the Director adopted a new plan for license plates on all non-commercial motor vehicles by which each plate would contain a combination of six numbers and letters. The basic reason for this change was that the old system of six digits of just numbers would permit accommodation of only a million automobiles. As the number of registered automobiles in Missouri increased, that became inadequate, as evidenced by the passenger car renewals in 1972 which were slightly in excess of two million. The new system of combining numbers with letters permitted enough combinations to carry the increased volume while still remaining within six digits.

On October 9,1973, respondents told rela-tors’ attorneys that they did not intend to and would not issue license plates bearing numbers previously assigned to relators or to any non-commercial motor vehicle registrant for subsequent registration periods whether or not application therefor was made, required fees paid and all formalities required by law carried out. Upon that statement, relators filed the present proceeding and their petition stated that it was in behalf “of all owners of non commercial vehicles.” However, the trial court on its own initiative reduced the class to those registrants with numbers under 10,000. The testimony was that in 1973 there were 9,500 of these low numbers outstanding, and the Director of Division of Departmental Services of the Missouri Department of Revenue testified that the holders of these low numbers traditionally request the reis-suance of those numbers each year.

The trial court on December 5, 1973, issued its peremptory writ of mandamus by which it directed the respondents “to issue to persons this date holding non-commercial motor vehicle license plates numbered 1 through 9999 who make proper application therefor and pay all required fees under the statutes of Missouri pertaining to reregistration of motor vehicles license plates for the year 1974 numbered as previously assigned.” We reverse.

A writ of mandamus can properly be issued only if the relators show a clear, unequivocal, specific right thereto. In re Marshall, 478 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1972); State ex rel. Patterson v. Tucker, 519 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.App.1975); Powell v. City of Creve Coeur, 452 S.W.2d 258 (Mo.App.1970). In the present situation there is no statute-[841]*841ry provision expressly establishing property or personal rights in the license numbers to which relators claim a right. In order to try to establish the existence of such right, relators are forced to an attempt to infer the right by implication from the provisions governing the registration and licensing of motor vehicles, Sections 301.010 to 301.540.1 In their effort to do so, they point specifically to three statutory sections.

The principal section so relied on is § 301.130-1, which provides:

“Upon the filing of an application for registration * * * the director shall assign a number or numbers to each applicant and without further expense to the applicant shall issue and mail or deliver to him a certificate of registration * * * and * * * a set of license plates bearing the name or the abbreviated name of the state, the month and year of expiration and the number of numbers assigned; except that a set of plates for commercial motor vehicles shall not be assigned on a permanent basis . . .”

A proper understanding of the section just quoted together with the other relevant current statutory provisions requires reference to changes in the automobile licensing system which has occurred over the years. Prior to 1947, the registration statutes provided for assignment of a number to each automobile. § 8369b RSMo 1939. Those statutes further provided that license plates were to be issued to the owner annually. §§ 8376 and 8377 RSMo 1939. Then in 1947, the statutory scheme was radically changed to a system of permanent plates to be issued to and retained by the owner of the vehicle, and for annual registration to be handled under a series of twelve registration periods. To implement this new system, § 301.130 RSMo 1949 provided that the Director should issue to each applicant “a permanent license plate or set of plates” and that upon reregistration “the director of revenue shall * * * mail or deliver a metal tab * * * designating the year of registration, which tab shall be attached to the license plate in the place provided therefor.” Still later, in 1969, the statutes were further amended to create the present system for issuance of licenses. In the current § 301.130, reference to a “permanent” set of plates and annual renewal “tabs” were deleted.

Thus, the present statutory scheme goes back to that which was in effect prior to 1947 insofar as a new set of license plates being issued annually for each vehicle. No express provision now appears anywhere in the statute stating that the numbers which appear on these plates shall be permanent from year to year. The natural expectation is that when the plates change from year to year, so also may the numbers which appear thereon. Since there is no express statement in § 301.130-1 that the number assigned to each registrant is to be permanent, there is no logical reason to force such an addition by implication.

The exception appearing at the end of subsection 1 raises no implication favorable to relators’ position. The specific statement that license plates for commercial vehicles shall not be on a permanent basis cannot mean that plates for non-commercial vehicles shall be, since that would flatly contradict the purposeful deletions and changes in the old statutory scheme already described and the present direct provision of § 301.130-2. The conclusion is compelled that the exception at the end of § 301.130-1 is a vestigial remnant left on the statute books through mere oversight.

Relators next rely upon § 301.150 which provides that upon a sale or transfer of the registered vehicle, the original owner shall remove the plates and may assign them to any replacement vehicle acquired by him. This section then goes on to provide that:

“If application for registration of another motor vehicle is not made to the director of revenue within one year following the sale or transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle, the license plates held by the person who sold or transferred [842]*842ownership of such motor vehicle shall be declared void, and new license plates bearing the same numbers may be issued to another registrant.”

Relators claim that this section clearly means that the numbers assigned have an ownership life of more than one year. They state in their brief that this provision giving a maximum one year period after transfer to reuse the number clearly indicates “that the right to use the number does not expire at the end of a registration period.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State ex rel. Mantle v. McCuskey
548 S.W.2d 580 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
536 S.W.2d 839, 1976 Mo. App. LEXIS 2734, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-dyke-v-spradling-moctapp-1976.