State Ex Rel Dept. of Justice v. Di

Montana Supreme Court

State Ex Rel Dept. of Justice v. Di

DecidedDecember 27, 1976

Docket13605

StatusPublished

This text of State Ex Rel Dept. of Justice v. Di (State Ex Rel Dept. of Justice v. Di) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State Ex Rel Dept. of Justice v. Di, (Mo. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

No. 13605

I N THE SUPREME COURT O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA

S T A T E e x r e l . DEPARTMENT O F J U S T I C E O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA, t h e HONORABLE ROBERT L . WOODAHL, ATTORNEY GENERAL O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA; and t h e S T A T E O F MOP,JTANA,

Relators, -vs- T H E D I S T R I C T COURT O F T H E E I G H T H J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T OF THE STATE O F I N AND F O R T H E COUNTY O F CASCADE, and t h e HON. TRUP.!lAN G. BRADFORQ J u d g e t h e r e o f , Respondents.

No. 13606

S T A T E ex r e l . DEPARTMENT O F J U S T I C E O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA, t h e HONORABLE ROBERT L . WOODABL, ATTORNEY GENERAL O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA; and t h e S T A T E O F MONTANA,

Relators,

-vs- T H E D I S T R I C T COURT O F T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA, I N AND F O R T H E COUNTY O F DEER LODGE and t h e HON. ROBERT J . BOYD, J U D G E presiding. Respondents.

O R I G I N A L PROCEEDING :

C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :

For R e l a t o r s :

G a r l i n g t o n , L o h n and R o b i n s o n , M i s s o u l a , M o n t a n a G a r y G r a h a m argued and S h e r m a n V. L o h n a r g u e d , Missoula, Montana For R e s p o n d e n t s :

S m i t h , E m m o n s , B a i l l i e and W a l s h , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana R o b e r t J. Emmons argued, G r e a t F a l l s , M o n t a n a

Submitted: December 6, 1976

Filed: - D F 2~ 575 TliOiviAS J. /;;:~tizy Clerlc Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e James T. H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e Court.

These two o r i g i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s w e r e c o n s o l i d a t e d by

o r d e r o f t h i s C o u r t d a t e d November 1 5 , 1976. They p r e s e n t t h e

same issue f o r our resolution: Can t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , t h e

Department o f J u s t i c e , o r t h e S t a t e o f Montana b e s u e d f o r

m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n i n a c i v i l a c t i o n f o r damages?

On J u l y 30, 1974, r e l a t o r s f i l e d a n i n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g -

i n g G l o r i a Eusek Carden w i t h o n e c o u n t o f g r a n d l a r c e n y and

two c o u n t s o f f o r g e r y i n v o l v i n g workmen's c o m p e n s a t i o n c l a i m s .

T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was d i s m i s s e d and r e p l a c e d w i t h a s e c o n d i n -

f o r m a t i o n c h a r g i n g Carden w i t h o n e c o u n t o f g r a n d l a r c e n y and

only one count of forgery. The o t h e r f o r g e r y c o u n t c o n t a i n e d

i n t h e f i r s t information w a s not r e f i l e d . A f t e r m o t i o n by

Carden, t h e g r a n d l a r c e n y c o u n t was d i s m i s s e d by t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t f o r l a c k of probable cause. The r e m a i n i n g c o u n t o f f o r -

g e r y was d i s m i s s e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f

j u s t i c e upon m o t i o n by r e l a t o r s .

On J u l y 30, 1976, Carden f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t

r e l a t o r s i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n Cascade County. Carden's

complaint a l l e g e d t h a t i n f i l i n g t h e c r i m i n a l charges a g a i n s t

her, r e l a t o r s acted maliciously, negligently, without probable

c a u s e , and i n v i o l a t i o n o f h e r c i v i l r i g h t s . I n r e s p o n s e , re-

l a t o r s f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t h e c o m p l a i n t a r g u i n g , among

o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e c l a i m a g a i n s t them was b a r r e d by t h e

d o c t r i n e o f p r o s e c u t o r i a l immunity. Respondent d i s t r i c t c o u r t

i n Cascade County h e a r d a r g u m e n t s and d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n on

November 1 0 , 1976.

On August 2 , 1 9 7 6 , F r a n k P r e i t e f i l e d a s i m i l a r com-

p l a i n t a g a i n s t r e l a t o r s i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n D e e r Lodge

County. This complaint a l l e g e d t h a t r e l a t o r s acted maliciously,

n e g l i g e n t l y , w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e , and i n v i o l a t i o n o f P r e i t e ' s civil rights by filing an information on July 31, 1974, charg- ing him with three counts of grand larceny and one count of forgery involving workmen's compensation claims. Further dam- ages were sought because of relatorst efforts to have the charges dismissed and refiled in another county. Relators filed a motion to dismiss Preitets complaint which was denied the respondent district court in Deer Lodge County on Octo- ber 14, 1976. Relators appeared - parte before this Court on November ex 15, 1976, seeking a writ of supervisory control or other appro- priate writ directing the dismissal of the Carden and Preite complaints. An adversary hearing was ordered and held before this Court on December 6, 1976. Relators argue that a prosecuting attorney is a quasi- judicial officer who enjoys absolute immunity from civil lia- bility for conduct within the scope of his duties. They contend it is in the public interest to allow a prosecutor to speak and act freely and fearlessly in enforcing the criminal laws and that he will become intimidated if he must calculate the likeli- hood of a civil suit whenever he files criminal charges. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L ed 2d 128 (1976), the United States Supreme Court said: "The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that under- lie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties. These include concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflec- tion of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercis- ing the independence of judgment required by his public trust. * * *" Respondents, however, do not question the prior existence of prosecutorial immunity in Montana; but argue that such immunity has now been abolished. Article 11, Section 18 of the 1972 Montana Constitution, as amended, effective July 1, 1975, provides: "The state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental entities shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or property, except as may be specifically provided by law by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature." Section 83-706.1, R.C.M. 1947, provides in part: "The state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental entities shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or property. This provision shall apply only to claims for relief and causes of action arising after July 1, 1973. * * * " Section 82-4310, R.C.M. 1947, of the Montana Comprehensive State Insurance Plan and Tort Claims Act provides: "Every governmental entity is subject to lia- bility for its torts and those of its employees acting within the scope of their employment or duties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." Respondents argue from these authorities that all forms of im- munity have been eliminated. They point out that the definition of "personal injury" in section 82-4302, R.C.M. 1947, of the Montana Comprehensive State Insurance Plan and Tort Claims Act includes injury resulting from vmalicious prosecution"; that the definition of "claim" includes negligent acts or ommissions; and that the definition of "employee" includes elected officials. In No11 and Kenneady v. Bozeman, 166 Mont. 504, 505, 534 P.2d 880

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