State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Munson

174 So. 2d 923, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4396
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 12, 1965
DocketNo. 6362
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 174 So. 2d 923 (State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Munson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Munson, 174 So. 2d 923, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4396 (La. Ct. App. 1965).

Opinion

ELLIS, Judge.

On August 21, 1958, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways, expropriated all of a certain parcel of unimproved land in East Baton Rouge Parish for the Alsen-Port Hudson Highway and deposited $7450.00 into the court registry. By an amended petition and amended order of expropriation dated May 8, 1962 the description of the parcel was corrected and an additional $899.00 was deposited. After trial on the merits the lower court rendered judgment fixing the value of the expropriated parcel at $23,997.25 from which determination the State has appealed. The defendants have answered the appeal seeking to have the award increased to $42,-495.00.

[924]*924The parcel of land on which this court must fix a market price as of the date of the taking contains an area of 6.636 acres and fronts 928.78 feet on Scenic Hig'hway with a depth on its north side of 483.74 feet and a depth on its south side of 124.11 feet. The rear of the property measures 963.05 feet. Because of the existence of two servitudes on the subject property, it is convenient to consider it in three parts: the first or unencumbered portion containing 3.036 acres; the second portion containing .8 acre, subject to a servitude for the Baker Canal which lies on the north side of the property; and the third portion containing 2.8 acres subject to a servitude for the KCS railroad tracks which cross the west side of the property.

It is clear that the determination of value fixed by the trial court cannot be approved. The value was determined by averaging the opinions of the four experts who testified, two for each side. The averaging of opinions, though very convenient and probably sound in a case where there is very little difference between the opinions of the various experts, cannot be resorted to to reconcile greatly divergent estimates. To do so would encourage gross exaggerations on both sides and produce wholly unreliable expert testimony. Greater Baton Rouge Consolidated Sewer Dist. v. Nelson, 144 So.2d 186.

Just as it is clear that the method of arriving at the award of the lower court cannot be approved, it is equally certain that the amount deposited by the State is inadequate. The evidence indicates that some seven months before the initial order of expropriation the State secured an appraisal of the unencumbered portion of the parcel from Mr. William J. Fort and Mr. Verdie Reece Perkins in the amount of $7450.00.

A supplemental appraisal was ordered by the State from Messrs. Fort and Perkins and this was made and submitted, taking into consideration the comparable sales in the area during the intervening seven months. Inasmuch as these gentlemen were not called by the State, their failure to testify must be construed against the State.

The final certificate of value attached to the supplemental petition and supplemental order of expropriation was signed by Mr. Leroy Cobb and Mr. John Lejeune who estimated market value as of August 21, 1958 at $8349.00 and $8295.00, respectively. However, Mr. Cobb did not include any amount for the 2.8 acres comprising the railroad servitude and Mr. Lejeune assigned it only a nominal value of $10.00. The evidence indicated that there was only a single interstate track running through the center of a 100 foot wide right-of-way. The co-existent but subordinate right to use the 2.8 acres, together with the naked ownership thereof, has a value.

Mr. Heidel Brown, with the property owner’s other expert, Mr. Kermit Williams, concurring, divided the 2.8 acres into two' equal parts, assigning a proportionate value per acre, as compared with the per acre value of the unencumbered portion, of one-fourth to that part east of the railroad and one-eighth to that part west of the railroad and, therefore, somewhat inaccessible. While these fractions are necessarily arbitrary, we are impressed with the reasonableness of this approach and accept it as the proper method for calculating the value of the 2.8 acres once the per acre value of the unencumbered portion has been determined.

With reference to the .8 acre lying at the bottom of Baker Canal, Mr. Williams assigned a value of $875.00 to this on the theory that it would act as a buffer from competition and provide for waste disposal. Mr. Brown was of the opinion that its value was offset by its liability to the adjoining 3.036 acres. We are impressed with this conclusion, and accordingly will not allow any amount for the title to the submerged land nor subtract any amount [925]*925because of the proximity of the subject property to a large canal.

Having arrived at the appropriate formula to apply to the per acre value of the unencumbered property in order to calculate the market price of the whole, we turn to a consideration of that value. Needless to say, there is a wide difference of opinion between the two groups of experts as to the per acre value of the 3.036 acre unencumbered part. The experts found this value to be as follows:

Cobb $ 2750.00
Lejeune 2725.29
Brown 10416.66
Williams 10457.84

The most reliable and approved method for determining the market value of an immovable is to consider comparable sales. This is so well established and accepted that citation of authority would be superfluous. Whether or not a sale is in fact comparable to the subject property is often a perplexing problem over which experts frequently disagree. There is never a fully comparable sale, that is, one of property exactly like the subject property. If there were, there would be no need to litigate the issue of value in that case. It is, therefore, necessary in all cases, to make some adjustment, either up or down, to bring the sale into comparability with the subject property. Both the direction and amount of the adjustment are matters of opinion over which reasonable men and conscientious qualified appraisers will differ. Courts must examine the sales purported to be comparable and analyze the reasoning on which the expert’s opinion is founded. Appropriate weight must then be given to the various opinions and the value of the property established with some degree of precision. We turn now to a consideration of the sales purported to be comparable.

Mr. Lejeune and Mr. Cobb relied on three comparables, namely, Murphy to Scenic Heights Corporation dated February 4, 1958; Newman to Dolese Concrete dated September 20, 1957; and General Realty to Watson dated May 13, 1958.

The first of these was a tract containing 16.5 acres lying across Scenic Highway from the subject property. It was without railroad frontage and cannot be considered comparable for the additional reason that the vendor was president of the vendee corporation. The per acre price was $2006.00. In addition, on July 2, 1959, Scenic Heights Corporation sold 2.852 acres of that property to Southern Utility Supply Co., Inc., for a price of about $5400.00 per acre.

The second comparable likewise has serious limitations. The Dolese Concrete property has a depth of more than ten times the average depth of the subject propcity and contained 28.299 acres. The per acre price was $2350.00. It did front on Scenic Highway and have railroad access. However, the experts for the defendant pointed out that on the same day that sale took place, Newman sold another tract containing 129.77 acres to North Batan Rouge Development Co. for only $1562.00 per acre.

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Bluebook (online)
174 So. 2d 923, 1965 La. App. LEXIS 4396, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-department-of-highways-v-munson-lactapp-1965.