State ex rel. Department of Highways v. McNeely

130 So. 2d 136, 1961 La. App. LEXIS 1905
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 5, 1961
DocketNo. 9453
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 130 So. 2d 136 (State ex rel. Department of Highways v. McNeely) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. McNeely, 130 So. 2d 136, 1961 La. App. LEXIS 1905 (La. Ct. App. 1961).

Opinion

GLADNEY, Justice.

The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways, deposited $11,-000 in the registery of the Clerk of Court of Ouachita Parish, as proper compensation for the expropriation of the property of the defendant, William C. McNeely. The property so taken is located in the City of Monroe and consists of a lot approximately 70 feet by 130 feet on St. John Street, improved with a two-story apartment house divided into four apartments. After the filing of plaintiff’s petition in June, 1960, the defendant answered alleging the value of his property to be $20,000. McNeely then made a withdrawal of the sum deposited and contested the [137]*137issue of compensation. After trial judgment was rendered fixing the compensation for the property at the sum of $17,000, and plaintiff has appealed.

A proper resolution of the question presented must be determined primarily from the testimony of witnesses who are skilled and experienced in the field of real estate appraisal. Each of the parties was represented by two expert witnesses, all of whom concededly were well qualified. These witnesses were E. A. Porter, Jr. and W. Dean Carter, for the defendant, and Jerry Tharpe and Chester Driggers for the plaintiff.

In what appears to be normal and usual procedure, separate values were assigned to the lot and to the improvements. With one exception each witness used the three accepted methods in ascertaining the market value of the subject property. These are denominated as market data approach, cost approach and income approach. Because of non-availability of comparables of probative worth the experts generally agreed the market data approach was insufficient and that the income approach afforded a better method of determining the market value of defendant’s property at the time of the taking. The determinations of the several appraisers were:

Improvements Land Total

Mr. E. A. Porter, Jr. $12,274.00 $4,575.00 $16,850.00

Mr. W. Dean Carter 12,950.00 4,550.00 17,500.00

Mr. Jerry Tharpe 6,328.00 4,372.00 10,700.00

Mr. Chester Driggers 6,610.00 4,390.00 11,000.00

The trial judge approved the values fixed by Porter and Carter and assigned written reasons which reflect thoughtful and careful analysis of all the evidence presented. As indicated by the above figures the appraisers were substantially in agreement as to the value.of the lot, but there were decided differences of opinion between defendant’s and plaintiff’s experts as to the value of the improvements located thereon.

The building was described by all witnesses as being in fair or good state of repair,1 although there admittedly was some [138]*138relaxation in the maintenance thereof after it became known that the property would be condemned.

The Department of Highways is empowered through Article 6, § 19.1 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, LSA-Const., to take property for highway purposes by ex parte orders prior to trial and Judgment. The enabling act thereunder is to be found in LSA-R.S. 48:441 et seq. ■Where it is necessary for a court to determine the value of an entire property to be expropriated, a trial may be had for ascertaining the market value of the property. LSA-R.S. 48:450. Section 453 provides: that such market value shall be determined as of the time the estimated compensation was deposited. If a part of a tract is expropriated, damage to the remainder of the property is determined as of the date of the trial. However, in either case the defendant has the burden of proving his claim. LSA-R.S. 48:453. In State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Highways v. Rownd, La.App., Orleans 1959, 119 So.2d 282, 288, the court observed that when the owner claims the value of the expropriated property is in excess of the estimate, he has the burden of proving his claim, and

“He must produce convincing evidence that the value is in excess of that shown in the estimate on which the Department of Highways has made the deposit.”

Generally speaking, although the court may examine the qualifications of the several experts giving testimony and, in consequence thereof, accord greater weight to the testimony of some, yet where it appears the expert appraisers on both sides are equally well qualified and are grounded from the standpoint of sincerity and good reason, the testimony of each witness should be given consideration. Thus, it was said in Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Boudwine, 1954, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541, 543:

“The greater part of the evidence adduced at the trial consisted of opinions of experts, and on them the decision herein hinges. Testimony of this nature is admissible and is often resorted to in fixing value in expropriation proceedings. Moreover, the opinion of each witness qualified and accepted as an expert should be given effect if and when it appears to be well grounded from the standpoints of sincerity and good .reasoning. City of New Orleans v. Larroux, 203 La. 990, 14 So.2d 812; State v. Landry, 219 La. 456, 53 So.2d 232, and Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Brinkman (Young) [224 La. 262, 69 So.2d 37], supra.”

Also in State v. Landry, 1951, 219 La. 456, 53 So.2d 232, 236, the court stated:

“We are aware, of course, that there are several kinds of evidence which may be taken into consideration in determining the value of property which has to be condemned in an expropriation suit. Counsel for the State lists seven different kinds in their brief and they state that all except one was introduced either by plaintiff or the defendants, or both in this case. It is a fact that there is a smattering of proof by other evidence of values but the real and substantial proof on which the judgment will have to .rest arises [139]*139out of the testimony of the various expert witnesses on both sides. What proof there is of other sales of property of a similar character in the vicinity and of rental values, is not sufficient to be of any aid in assisting the Court in fixing a true value.”

The application of the above stated principles, however, does not necessarily limit the court in its evaluation of the testimony, and it is free within judicial discretion to discover error and attribute proper weight and effect thereto. The import of the rule, we think, is that the trier of fact must recognize the probative value of all the evidence adduced and should not substitute its own opinion where competent expert testimony is presented. In the Landry case the Supreme Court found deficiencies in the testimony of the experts and accorded commensurate weight thereto.

The compensation to be awarded shall be the market value of the property taken. The market data approach, where such data may be obtained, has been preferred by the courts for determining the market value. Thus, we find this pronouncement in State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Highways v. Havard, 1960, 239 La. 133, 118 So.2d 131, 132:

“The best guide in determining the market value to which the owner is entitled under the law in expropriation suits is evidence of sales of similar or comparable properties in the vicinity. Housing Authority of Shreveport v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295; Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Persson, 203 La. 255, 13 So.2d 853; Louisiana Highway Commission v. Israel, 205 La. 669, 17 So.2d 914; City of New Orleans v. Noto, 217 La. 657, 47 So.2d 36; City of Shreveport v. Abe Meter Corp., 219 La.

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Bluebook (online)
130 So. 2d 136, 1961 La. App. LEXIS 1905, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-department-of-highways-v-mcneely-lactapp-1961.