State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Lascaro

153 So. 2d 116, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1625
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 3, 1963
DocketNo. 5746
StatusPublished

This text of 153 So. 2d 116 (State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Lascaro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Lascaro, 153 So. 2d 116, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1625 (La. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

ELLIS, Judge.

This suit was instituted by the State of Louisiana through the Department of Highways, for the expropriation of a servitude of right of way on, over and across a parcel of ground owned by the defendant, consisting of one hundred sixteen one-thousandths (0.116) of an acre, together with the full ownership of the improvements situated thereon, composed of a brick barbeque pit and approximately fifteen feet of ornamental fence, flowers and a concrete walk, for highway purposes, in accordance with the authority conferred by Article VI, Sec. 19.1 of the LSA-Constitution of Louisiana and the provisions of LSA-R.S. 48:441 — 460. The servitude or right of way was required on State Highway La. U. S. 51 in the Parish of Tangipahoa, so as to eliminate to a great extent a sharp and hazardous “S” curve at the location of defendant’s property. The plaintiff deposited in the registry of the court a total amount of $4,560.00, which represented a value of $660.00 for the servitude expropriated and the improvements thereon, and $1500.00 for moving the residence adjacent to the servitude, and $1000.00, relocation costs such as new foundations, water connections, plumbing, and electrical connections, walks and a new septic tank.1

Defendant answered plaintiff’s petition and asked for $10,000.00 as a fair value for the servitude of right of way over the 0.116 acre together with the improvements thereon consisting of a brick barbeque pit and approximately fifteen feet of fence, and itemized his severance damages “and diminution in the market value of the remainder of his property caused by the taking herein of the public improvements, as follows:

“A. To the portion of property used as a home and restaurant:
(1) Loss of accessibility to restaurant-$15,000.00
(2) Utility or usefulness- 10,000.00
(3) Ingress and egress -- 5,000.00
(4) Accessibility to home 7,000.00
(5) La. U. S. Highway influence- 7,000.00
(6) Plottage and amenities - 5,000.00
(7) Light, air and view- - 5,000.00
$54,000.00”

Nowhere in the defendant’s answer does he allege it is necessary to move and relocate the residence or the commercial build[118]*118ing, nor does he request in his pleadings any amount for this purpose, however, it is conceded by the plaintiff it is necessary to move and relocate the residence. The necessity for the moving and relocation of the commercial building and the cost thereof was put at issue without objection.

After trial on the merits, the District Court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant for the value of the servitude of right of way taken, and the improvements in the amount of $660.00 and for the cost of moving the home, $1400,00, moving the restaurant and bar, $3600.00, the cost of relocating the house and commercial property, $6601.00, making a total award of $12,261.00, which represented $7,701.00 in excess of the amount of $4560.00 originally deposited in the registry of the Court.

The plaintiff deposited the excess award together with the accrued interest in the registry of the court.2 The defendant withdrew the excess award under order of Coürt and the matter is now before this court on a devolutive appeal taken by the plaintiff.3

There is no dispute by either plaintiff or defendant as to the correctness of the amount deposited in the registry of the' court, which was the same amount awarded by the District Court, for the servitude of right of way and the improvements thereon in the amount of $660.00. Both parties agree it is necessary to move the residence of the defendant and Richard W. Darouse, who has been engaged in such a business, in the surrounding area for a number of years fixed the cost of moving the house to its new location at $1400.00. Darouse stated he was not an expert in the building-business but only in moving, and would give no estimate whatsoever as to the relocation costs. Mr. Thompson, the expert-on behalf of the plaintiff, fixed the moving cost at $1500.00 and estimated the cost of the relocation of the house, meaning rein-stallation and reconnection of outside plumbing, gas connections, outside electrical work, foundations and septic tank at [119]*119the sum of $1000.00 but did not break down this lump sum estimate. The defendant also offered the testimony of Kelly Giacone, a contractor and builder of many years experience, who testified in his opinion the cost of moving and relocation of the house and commercial building would be $12,-202.00. He gave this lump sum figure without breaking it down in any manner whatsoever as to the cost of labor and materials for new foundations, pipe and plumbing, reconnection of the electricity and gas, and installation of a new septic tank in connection with the relocation of the residence and the commercial building. The Lower Court found it necessary to move and relocate both buildings but specifically found that it would be dangerous to the public .and the commercial building not to move .and relocate it due to its proximity the right of way. The Lower Court stated that it should be moved approximately fifteen feet farther from the right of way, in which ■case it would only be necessary to add an .additional fifteen feet to the presently existing concrete slab. The testimony of plaintiff's expert, Thompson, and defendant’s expert, Giacone, because of their failure in breaking d&wn or detailing their ■estimates of the costs of relocation of the residence is practically worthless and, at most, totally insufficient for this court to base any judgment on this item. It is also ■obvious that the relocation of the residence would not be as costly as the relocation of the commercial building, particularly if the latter is to be moved completely off of the ■old concrete slab and Giacone’s testimony ■does not separately estimate the cost of relocating each building. Additionally, the record reveals that Giacone testified his estimate was based upon the expectancy ■of the buildings being considerably damaged by the mover, which would necessitate ■quite a bit of additional work in their relocation. This basis is purely speculative and should not have been included in his ■estimate.

The plaintiff originally contended, and its experts so testified, that it is not necessary to move and relocate the restaurant and bar building as the building was serving the same purpose for which it has always been used and in the same capacity and produced approximately the same revenue to the defendant, and the customers were parking in the same place and some of them were using the public property for this purpose in front of the establishment as they had prior to the reestablishment of the right of way. Also that the addition of a parking lot on the south of the building would guarantee defendant ample parking space without the co-owned north parking lot. In order to remove any doubt as to the sufficiency of the parking space or damage because of the expropriation by virtue of the fact that the building is closer to the east right of way line than previously, the plaintiff had deposited the sum of $1400.00 to establish a parking lot on the south side of the building. There was and had been since the construction of the restaurant and bar building a parking lot on the north of the building which was owned by the defendant and his co-heirs in indivisión.

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Related

State v. Rownd
119 So. 2d 282 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1960)

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Bluebook (online)
153 So. 2d 116, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1625, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-department-of-highways-v-lascaro-lactapp-1963.