State Ex Rel. DeGraffenreid v. Keet

619 S.W.2d 873, 1981 Mo. App. LEXIS 3639
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 1, 1981
Docket12107
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 619 S.W.2d 873 (State Ex Rel. DeGraffenreid v. Keet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. DeGraffenreid v. Keet, 619 S.W.2d 873, 1981 Mo. App. LEXIS 3639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

TITUS, Judge.

The parents of a young man who died as the result of injuries sustained in a two-vehicle accident, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Greene County to recover damages allegedly sustained by them because of the death of their son. Defendants in the action are Wilcox Truck Line Incorporated (Wilcox) and Jon E. DeGraffenreid (De-Graffenreid). Deceased was one of two passengers in an automobile being operated by DeGraffenreid when it collided with the rear of Wilcox’s parked truck. Both defendants answered and denied the aver-ments of negligence made against them. Wilcox additionally raised the defense of contributory negligence in that the deceased was negligent in riding with an intoxicated driver. The defendants further cross-claimed for indemnity and/or contribution, seeking an apportionment of liability. Thereafter, Wilcox moved the trial court for an order requiring DeGraffenreid to execute “Medical and/or Hospital Authorization” and “City of Springfield Police Department Authorization” forms. (See Appendix hereto for the text of the forms). When the trial judge indicated his intention of sustaining the motion and requiring execution of the forms, DeGraffenreid petitioned this court to prohibit the circuit judge from sustaining the motion and ordering execution of the forms. Our preliminary rule or order in prohibition issued. The cause has been briefed and argued. We now determine whether our preliminary rule or order, in whole or in part, should be *875 made absolute or permanent, or whether it should be quashed for having been improvidently issued.

Before the involved accident, DeGraffen-reid, the deceased and another young man, all college students, acquired two six-packs of 16-ounce cans of beer which the trio, in part, consumed during the four hours which ensued prior to the casualty. After the collision, a policeman retrieved at least two of the cans of beer from DeGraffenreid’s wrecked automobile, one of which was a quarter full. DeGraffenreid was personally injured in the accident but has made no claim for damages therefor in the lawsuit pending in the circuit court. Following the wreck, DeGraffenreid was transported by ambulance to a hospital and treated for his injuries. While in the hospital and shortly after the casualty, DeGraffenreid signed a permit form at the request of a policeman which allowed hospital personnel to draw a blood sample for blood alcohol testing. The sample was later taken to the Springfield Police Department where it was “tagged and placed in the refrigerator in the Lab.” Where the blood was tested, if so, is not disclosed in any material furnished this court. Apparently DeGraffenreid was released from the hospital shortly after receiving first aid treatment.

DeGraffenreid was not arrested and was not given a summons or traffic ticket at the scene of the accident or while he was at the hospital. About “a week or five days” after the collision, according to DeGraffenreid’s deposition testimony and his petition for writ of prohibition, he was served at his residence by a policeman with a “summons” to appear in the Springfield municipal court to respond to a charge of careless and imprudent driving in connection with the accident. We have not been furnished with a copy of the served “summons” and can only assume it was in the form suggested by Form 37.1164 appearing in the Missouri Rules of Court, V.A.M.R., or in a form similar thereto. The charge was subsequently dismissed. In an affidavit to that effect made by the city attorney of Springfield, he concluded “that all the official records pertaining to the case have now been closed pursuant to Section 610.105, RSMo.’

After the policeman delivered the “summons,” he offered to and did drive DeGraf-fenreid to the university where he was attending classes. In response to a deposition question as to whether the policeman during this encounter told him anything concerning the blood alcohol test, DeGraffen-reid stated: “I think, I’m not sure, but I think he is the one that said they ran it 8 times or something, and that some of it was below the legal level, and some of it was above, and after they averaged them it came out, it was right on .01 or .1, whichever it is.”

I.

In his first point relied on, DeGraffenreid asseverates the trial judge erred by indicating that, unless prohibited from doing so, he would sustain Wilcox’s motion for an order requiring DeGraffenreid to execute the “City of Springfield Police Department Authorization” form [see Appendix] because, in so doing, the judge would exceed his jurisdiction in that the records pertaining to the city case, pursuant to § 610.105, RSMo 1978, are “closed records to all persons except” DeGraffenreid.

The statute referred to in the first point relied on, i. e., § 610.105, states: “If the person arrested is charged but the case is subsequently nolle prossed, dismissed, or the accused is found not guilty in the court in which the action is prosecuted, official records pertaining to the case shall thereafter be closed records to all persons except the person arrested or charged.”

We do not attempt a critique of the arguments of counsel concerning their particular interpretations and sometimes strained analyses of § 610.105. Much of the arguments undertake a fallacious construction of the statute and present overtaxed and unwarranted references to unrelated laws. Missouri’s so-called “Sunshine Law” appears in Ch. 610, RSMo 1978. Although it consists of nine principal sections, § 610.010 itself divides the sections into two groups, *876 namely, “sections 610.010 to 610.030 and 610.100 to 610.115.” To emphasize the statutory division of the nine sections, the Committee on Legislative Research, as provided in § 3.050, RSMo 1978, has labeled §§ 610.-100 to 610.115 “Arrest Records” so as “to enable subjects of a kindred nature to be placed under one general head.” A cursory examination of the sections appearing under “Arrest Records” attests their relationship to the other sections in Ch. 610 is somewhat remote, thereby rendering a cross-reference between the two groups contained in the chapter of little or no assistance.

In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, courts must look to the express language of the law irrespective of what may have been intended. The rational meaning of the express language of an act must be given effect. Courts have no right to read into a statute an intent contrary to the words and phraseology employed. Missourians for Honest Elections v. Missouri Elections Commission, 536 S.W.2d 766, 775[13, 14] (Mo.App.1976). An unambiguous statute should be taken to mean what it says, for the General Assembly is presumed to have intended what the law states directly [State ex rel. Collins v. Donelson, 557 S.W.2d 707, 710[2] (Mo.App.1977) ] and courts have no leave to impose another meaning. DePoortere v. Commercial Credit Corporation, 500 S.W.2d 724, 727[1] (Mo.App.1973).

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Bluebook (online)
619 S.W.2d 873, 1981 Mo. App. LEXIS 3639, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-degraffenreid-v-keet-moctapp-1981.