State ex rel. Davis v. Wayne County Bank

201 N.W. 907, 112 Neb. 792, 1924 Neb. LEXIS 249
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 29, 1924
DocketNo. 23657
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 201 N.W. 907 (State ex rel. Davis v. Wayne County Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Davis v. Wayne County Bank, 201 N.W. 907, 112 Neb. 792, 1924 Neb. LEXIS 249 (Neb. 1924).

Opinion

Rose, J.

This is a controversy between the receiver of the Wayne County Bank of Sholes, an insolvent corporation, and Gottlieb Storz, claimant, who pleads that he is an unpaid depositor entitled to the protection of the bank guaranty law. The department of trade and commerce took charge of the bank in a failing condition August 25, 1922, when it was.indebted to claimant in the sum of $18,000, evidenced by four certificates of deposit which had been issued by the bank to claimant May 16, 1922, three for $5,000 each, bearing interest at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum and maturing respectively November 2, 1922, November 15, 1922, and December 1, 1922, and one for $3,000, bearing interest at the same rate and maturing June 6, 1922. In a proceeding by the state to wind up the affairs of the bank, Storz filed with the receiver a claim for $18,000 and interest, based on the four certificates of deposit mentioned, praying for payment out of the bank guaranty fund. The receiver objected to such payment, and urged as defenses that the certificates were mere renewals of former certificates; that the bank for its own benefit at its own solicitation was a borrower; that claimant and the bank entered into and carried out a secret agreement for the payment of excessive interest; that the original transactions and the renewals resulted in loans instead of deposits; that claimant was a lender and not a depositor [794]*794within the meaning of the bank guaranty law. This is a summary only of the defenses. Upon a trial of the issues raised by formal pleadings, the district court sustained the position taken by the receiver and held that claimant was not entitled to the protection of the bank guaranty law, but entered judgment in his favor for $18,000 and interest as a general creditor of the bank. Claimant has appealed.

Was claimant a lender as distinguished from a depositor within the meaning of the bank guaranty law, providing that — “No banking corporation transacting a banking business under this article shall pay interest on deposits, directly or indirectly, at a greater rate than five per cent, per annum ? ” Comp. St. 1922, sec. 8008.

When the bank failed it was legally indebted to claimant in the sum of $18,000. In money or its equivalent it had received that sum from assignors of claimant. This amount does not include any interest. None of the principal was ever returned. All transactions having any connection with the claim of Storz were evidenced by time certificates of deposit bearing on their face interest at the rate of 5 per cent. only. Some of them were issued as early as 1914, and for several years neither the bank nor any one for it paid any additional interest. The former payees named in the certificates were E. A. Higgins, the Storz Brewing Company, and its successor, the Storz Beverage & Ice Company. The companies named were corporations controlled by claimant, the principal stockholder and the present owner of the four certificates in controversy. At one time the bank had funds of claimant’s assignors to the extent of $25,000. Later this was* reduced by payments to $15,000, and afterward increased to $18,000, the amount of the claim under consideration. It was the practice of the bank to pay interest and issue new certificates upon maturity of the old.

At times when the bank could not pay certificates at maturity its cashier applied to claimant for renewals and for more money. The granting of such favors, however, [795]*795did not necessarily change the character of actual deposits to loans. Entrusting funds to a bank for future repayment, whatever the nature of the transaction, implies the anticipation of mutual benefits. Without the hope of protection or profit in some form there would be no inducement to entrust money to a bank. Regarded either as loans or deposits, funds are solicited and accepted by banks with a view to promoting banking interests. A bank’s solicitation, receipt and retention of funds belonging to others are not of themselves conclusive tests of loans. The question should be determined by the facts and circumstances surrounding each individual case.

Were the transactions involved in this proceeding converted from deposits into loans by the payment of interest in excess of 5 per cent. — the rate specified in all certificates of deposit? The reserve of the bank became impaired. It was unable to pay the time certificates as they matured. Interest rates generally increased. The cashier solicited a retention of the funds and applied for more money. He was told by claimant, while in control' of corporations which owned unpaid certificates aggregating $15,000, that the rate of interest was too low and that he wanted his money. He did not demand usury. The cashier offered additional interest at a rate satisfactory to claimant. Definite terms of the new arrangement do not appear in any writing nor are they stated by any witness. Afterward maturing certificates were surrendered and new ones issued, each, bearing on its face interest at the rate of 5 per cent., which was regularly paid by the bank, the cashier paying in addition by his individual check a bonus varying at different times from 1 to 3 per cent. Claimant testified that the arrangement for additional interest was the individual obligation of the cashier. The payment of the bonus by individual check, while the bank paid 5 per cent, only, tends to confirm the testimony of claimant. The receiver calls attention to evidence that payments of additional interest by private check were afterward charged to the bank and credited to the personal account of the cashier. The result [796]*796was ultimate payment of excessive interest out of funds of the bank. This latter fact was first brought to the attention of claimant at the trial, if he told the truth on the witness-stand. His testimony is consistent with the documentary evidence of the transactions. From evidence that claimant had cautioned the bank to keep entries of the additional interest off its books, the cashier in testifying inferred that claimant knew the excess was being charged to the bank. Under all the circumstances it is more logical to infer that claimant, as the controlling officer of his corporations, meant to make legal deposits without exposing the transactions to unnecessary suspicion. His conduct was consistent with the theory that there were two contracts, one limiting the obligations of the bank to the precise terms of certificates of deposit bearing interest at the rate of 5 per cent, only and the other requiring an interested officer of the bank to pay additional interest on his individual account. Of course, any scheme or subterfuge to procure any part of the bank guaranty fund by evading or cheating the law is ineffectual for that purpose, but there are circumstances under which a bank may pay on a deposit the maximum rate of interest allowed by statute and an officer may, at the same time, in good faith, enter into an agreement to pay additional interest from his personal funds. Misconduct of a bank officer in subsequently taking the excess from the bank is not necessarily imputable to an innocent depositor who had no knowledge of the wrongdoing. State v. Farmers State Bank, ante, p. 474. What is forbidden by the bank guaranty law is payment by the bank on deposits, directly or indirectly, of Ínteres4- at a greater rate than 5 per cent, per annum. The prohibition does not in specific terms prevent an officer of a bank, while acting in good faith, from paying additional interest on his personal account. Comp. St. 1922, sec. 8008.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
201 N.W. 907, 112 Neb. 792, 1924 Neb. LEXIS 249, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-davis-v-wayne-county-bank-neb-1924.