State ex rel. Davis v. Forney

21 Neb. 223
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1887
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 21 Neb. 223 (State ex rel. Davis v. Forney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Davis v. Forney, 21 Neb. 223 (Neb. 1887).

Opinion

Cobb, J.

This action arises upon the application of George P. Davis, a citizen of Dodge county, and a resident tax payer •of the town of Cottrell, in said county, for a mandamus to George H, Forney, county clerk of said county, commanding him to forthwith'fill, by appointment, the several vacancies existing in the said town of Cottrell, to-wit, the .several- offices of supervisor, town clerk, town treasurer, assessor, two justices of the peace, three judges, and two -clerks of election, of said town.

It appears from the.record presented that upon a proper application by the requisite number of electors of said county, the question of the adoption of township organization was duly submitted to and adopted by the electors of .said county at the general election for the year 1886.

It also appears that at said election the electors of a ma[224]*224jority of the precincts in said county elected supervisors; that there was held, commencing on the fifteenth dqy after such election, at the county seat of said county, a special meeting of the newly-elected county board; that at said special meeting the said board proceeded to divide said county into towns in accordance with the provisions of the statute in such case made and provided [Comp. 'Stat., Ch. 18, Art. IV, Sec. 5]; and that among the other towns into which the said county was divided as aforesaid, is the town of Cottrell. It further appears that in the said division of said county into towns the lines of such towns were so adjusted in respect to the lines of the precincts theretofore existing in said county as to leave a full quota of town officers as elected at said election in and by said several precincts still residing in each of said towns respectively, except the said town of Cottrell; but leaving no town officer, of any name or grade whatever, residing within the limits of said town, but leaving each and all of the offices of said town vacant.

It also appears that before the presentation of the relation in this case, to-wit, on the 11th day of January, 1887, the relator, together with divers other resident tax-payers of said towns, personally requested and demanded of the respondent that he, as county clerk of said county, appoint proper and suitable persons to fill said several offices of the said town, which he, the said respondent, then and there refused to do.

By stipulation the cause is presented to this court to be considered and disposed of the saule as though the matters of fact stated in the relation were denied by the respondent and sufficiently proved by the relator; so that the only question for our consideration is the question of law arising upon the facts pleaded, to-wit, whether upon the above state of facts the county clerk possesses the power, and is it his duty, to fill by appointment the vacant offices created by the creation of the said town of Cottrell?

[225]*225Section 5, of Article IV, of Chapter 18, of the Compiled Statutes of 1885, provides that “In case a majority of the legal votes cast at said election ” (referring to an election at which the question of the adoption of township organization shall be submitted under the provisions of said chapter) “shall be for township organization, and the electors have chosen supervisors in a majority of precincts of the county, as provided in the preceding sections, there shall beheld a special meeting of the newly-elected county board, commencing on the fifteenth day after such election, at the county seat. * * * At such special meeting the county board may transact such county business as may be required to be transacted before the next regular’ meeting of the board, and shall proceed to divide such county into towns, or townships, making them conform as near as practicable to townships according to the government surveys,” etc.

Section 14 provides that “In case any town in any county wherein township organization has been, or may be, adopted, shall refuse or neglect to organize and elect town officers at the time fixed by law, it shall be the duty of the board of supervisors of the county, upon the affidavit of any freeholder, resident of said town, filed in the office of the county clerk, setting forth the facts, to proceed at any regular or special meeting of the board, and appoint the necessary town officers for such town, and the persons so appointed shall hold their respective offices until others are chosen or appointed in their respective places, and shall have the same power and be subject to the same duties and penalties as if they had been duly chosen by the electors of tire town.”

Section 15 provides that “Whenever it shall be made to appear to the board of supervisors that the town officers appointed by them or by any preceding board, as provided. in the. foregoing section, have failed to qualify, as required by law, so that such town cannot become organized, the board of supervisors may annex such town to any adjoin[226]*226ing town, and the said town so annexed shall thereafter form and constitute a part of such adjoining town.”

By observing the language of section fourteen, as above quoted, it will be seen that the provisions of that section cannot be held to apply to the town of Cottrell, as at present situated, as it has neither neglected nor refused to organize and elect town officers at the time fixed by law — no such opportunity having been offered it. If the provisions of said section be held to apply to the case at bar, then it is the duty of the county board, and not of the county clerk, to appoint officers for said town.

But it is contended by counsel for the respondent, that although it was made the imperative duty of the county board to create the said town (they deeming the same to be necessary) at their meeting held fifteen days after the election at which township government was adopted in said county, yet that the said new town would nevertheless remain a part of the precinct or precincts from which its territory was taken, converted into towns by virtue of said election, until the next annual election, and not until that time be possessed of a separate autonomy. This contention is based upon section 4 of the same article, which, as printed in the Compiled Statutes, and contained in the enrolled bill in the office of the secretary of state, reads as follows: “Sec. 4. For the purpose of temporary organization each voting precinct shall be a township until otherwise ordered by the county board, and at the general election at which the question of adoption of township organization is submitted as aforesaid; Provided further, . That in wards of cities of the first and second class whose limits are co-extensive with precincts, the electors thereof shall only choose supervisors, assessors, and judges, and clerks of election.”

A bare inspection of the above section, or that part of it which comes before the proviso, will not fail to satisfy any one that the legislature never intended to pass it in that [227]*227form; and an examination of section five as printed, will show that section four as originally drafted contained the words of section five as printed, occurring after the brackets in the twenty-fifth line, and such was the form of the bill as introduced, and as it stood until it came from the hands of the printer, in the form in which it finally passed and stands in the statute book. That part of section four as printed, coming before .the proviso, means nothing at all, and no rule of construction will give any meaning to it.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
21 Neb. 223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-davis-v-forney-neb-1887.