State Ex Rel. Darrell J. Robinson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana

• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana
• Decided: June 27, 2025
• Docket: 2021-KP-00812
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #031

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 27th day of June, 2025 are as follows:

PER CURIAM:

2021-KP-00812 STATE EX REL. DARRELL J. ROBINSON VS. DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, ANGOLA, LOUISIANA (Parish of Rapides)

AFFIRMED. SEE PER CURIAM.

Weimer, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons. Griffin, J., dissents and assigns reasons. Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2021-KP-00812

STATE EX REL. DARRELL J. ROBINSON

VS.

DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, ANGOLA, LOUISIANA

On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides

ON SECOND REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

We granted rehearing in this matter to consider the case in light of the recent

decision of the United States Supreme Court in Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 145

S.Ct. 612, 221 L.Ed.2d 90 (2025). State ex rel. Robinson v. Vannoy, 21-0812 (La.

3/20/25), 403 So. 3d 530 (granting rehearing). After careful consideration, the Court

finds that the holding in Glossip does not alter the outcome of our prior decision. We

therefore affirm our opinion rendered on December 13, 2024, State ex rel. Robinson

v. Vannoy, 21-812 (La. 12/13/24), 397 So. 3d 333.

AFFIRMED. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

DARRELL VANNOY, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, ANGOLA, LOUISIANA

On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides

WEIMER, C. J., dissenting.

Although “a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,”1 life and

death cases demand that a decision be rendered with certainty. The fluctuation of

decisions rendered by some of those involved in handling and deciding this case

demonstrates the inconsistency in the result, which began with the post-conviction

stipulation and has continued throughout the extended time this matter has,

unfortunately, lingered in this court. With so many minds being changed, can there

be any confidence in this outcome?

I respectfully dissent from the affirmation of defendant’s conviction and

sentence. My reasons for vacating both defendant’s conviction and sentence are fully

set forth in the original opinion in this matter and in my dissent from the decision on

first rehearing. Those reasons are adopted here and need not be repeated in detail.

I write primarily to emphasize that this is a case involving both Brady2 and

1 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” Essays: First Series (1841). 2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Napue/Giglio3 violations, and under the law applicable to both type of violations, the

State’s evidentiary omissions do not pass constitutional muster.

Insofar as the Brady violations are concerned, I believe it is important to

underscore two points. First, this case does not involve one or two isolated instances

of evidentiary suppression, but many–so many, in fact, that it took nine pages to

document them all in the Joint Stipulation of Facts signed by both the assistant

district attorney then prosecuting the case and by the defense, presented to the district

court, and entered into evidence, along with the associated exhibits. While a

substituted post-conviction prosecutor later unilaterally attempted to withdraw from

the Joint Stipulation, that stipulation remains of record, and documents the plethora

of evidence that was withheld by the prosecution, to which the State stipulated. This

stipulation is significant because it memorializes the factual basis of the motion to

vacate submitted in conjunction with the Joint Stipulation, a factual basis that the trial

of the post-conviction claims did not refute or disprove. This matter is also unique

because the original prosecutor, after retiring, became embroiled in the case, in effect

intervening in the proceedings in a highly irregular and potentially unprecedented

move.

Given the multiple evidentiary omissions established by the Joint Stipulation

and by the evidentiary hearing that followed, the second point that bears emphasis is

the standard for determining whether those omissions rise to the level of a

constitutional due process violation. That standard involves the materiality

determination, which was recently succinctly summarized by the U.S. Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals as follows:

3 Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

2 As to the materiality element, “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” The touchstone of the materiality analysis is “a reasonable probability of a different result,” such that “the government’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” The Brady materiality analysis is “not considered in the light of the probability of acquittal” and instead simply asks whether there is a reasonable probability that the resulting proceeding “would have been different.” Materiality “is not a sufficiency of evidence test.”

Holberg v. Guerrero, 130 F.4th 493, 500-501 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995);

Floyd v. Vannoy, 894 F.3d 143, 166 (5th Cir. 2018); Youngblood v. West Virginia,

547 U.S. 867, 870 (2006)).

Moreover, and most importantly for this case, in determining whether the

evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the verdict and is therefore

material, the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence must be considered.

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436; State v. Marshall, 94-0461, p. 15 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d

819, 826 (“It is not enough for reviewing courts to consider the impact of each item

of exculpatory evidence standing alone; the cumulative effect of the suppressed

evidence must be considered.”). Applying this standard to the record evidence, I

continue to adhere to my original opinion that the multiple suppressions that occurred

below, considered cumulatively and not item by item, can reasonably be taken to put

the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict and

require a new trial. The requirement of a new trial is underscored by the previously

referenced nine pages stipulating evidentiary violations.

Insofar as the Napue/Giglio violation is concerned–which in this case consists

of evidence of an understanding between jailhouse informant Leroy Goodspeed and

3 the State with regard to Goodspeed’s pending charges in Lafayette Parish, and of the

State’s failure to correct Goodspeed’s testimony that no such understanding or

agreement existed, or that Goodspeed had received favorable treatment even prior to

his testimony–a slightly different materiality determination is required:

In Napue v. Illinois, this Court held that a conviction knowingly “obtained through use of false evidence” violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed it “to go uncorrected when it appear[ed].” Ibid. If the defendant makes that showing, a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony “may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial,” id., at 272, 79 S.Ct. 1173–that is, if it “ ‘in any reasonable likelihood [could] have affected the judgment of the jury.’” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173)). In effect, this materiality standard requires “ ‘ “the beneficiary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680, n.9, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ___ (2025); 145 S.Ct. 612, 626-627.

Because Goodspeed’s testimony regarding an alleged jailhouse confession was

the only direct evidence indicating defendant was the actual perpetrator of the crime

and Goodspeed’s credibility was therefore critical, I remain convinced that the State

did not meet its obligation, under Napue/Giglio, as recently affirmed by the Supreme

Court in Glossip, of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the Napue/Giglio

violation did not contribute to the verdict. Under either Brady or Napue/Giglio, or

both, I remain convinced that defendant is entitled to a new trial.

A defendant who is properly tried and convicted of first degree murder may

face the death penalty. Had my original majority opinion remained the decision of

this court, this case could have been re-tried, and capital punishment would have

remained an option for the prosecution. The various and changing opinions in this

4 matter, which will now result in defendant’s death sentence being affirmed, stresses

the importance of certainty in our opinions and the need to ensure there was a fair

trial. But there is no confidence here, where the reversals and changes of hearts are

not a result of new facts or changes in the law, but a change of opinion. The fact that

opinions of some of those deciding the case have changed so often in and of itself is

proof that there is a question about the validity of the trial and a lack of confidence

in the verdict itself. Our justice system appears arbitrary in a case where exactitude

and certainty are of the utmost importance because the penalty is irrevocable.

The crime committed in this case is absolutely horrific. But the horrific nature

of a crime is not the constitutional touchstone; fairness as required by the due process

clause, is the touchstone. The individual who is accused of this crime, or of any

crime, is entitled by the rule of law to a trial without pages and pages of stipulated

evidentiary omissions that, considered cumulatively, violate the guarantee of the due

process clause of both the federal and state constitutions. In each case, no matter how

horrific, the accused is entitled to a fair trial, free of multiple constitutional violations.

5 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, ANGOLA, LOUISIANA

On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides

GRIFFIN, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

I maintain my position that defendant’s conviction should be vacated for the

reasons articulated by Chief Justice Weimer. See State ex rel. Robinson v. Vannoy,

21-0812 (La. 1/26/24), 378 So.3d 11; State ex rel. Robinson v. Vannoy, 21-0812 (La.

12/13/24), 397 So.3d 333 (“Robinson III”) (Weimer, C.J., dissenting).

It is undisputed that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. There

is also no doubt the resulting prejudice to a defendant is weighed under a cumulative

evaluation of all the evidence as recently reaffirmed by the United States Supreme

Court in Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. --- (2025), 145 S.Ct. 612, 629 (citing Kyles

v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995)) – a jurisprudential reality which

the State ignores. The State further surmises this Court must necessarily infer the

State’s witnesses – including district attorneys – committed perjury for the

improperly undisclosed evidence to be material. That is incorrect. Credibility

determinations are for the jury. A judge, however, has a duty to enforce

constitutionally guaranteed safeguards to protect the process in which a jury decides

a defendant’s fate. So, too, a “prosecuting attorney must be fair and impartial, and see that [a] defendant is not deprived of any constitutional or statutory right.”1 State

v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 1019, 171 So. 108, 112 (1936). It is far from a radical or

novel proposition to think “it more dangerous that even a guilty person should be

punished without the forms of law, than that he should escape.” From Thomas

Jefferson to William Carmichael, 3 June 1788, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS

JEFFERSON, vol. 13, March – 7 October 1788, ed. Julian P. Boyd, Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. 229-35

Four people – including an infant – were horrifically murdered. They and

their families deserve justice. But justice and due process are not meted out on a

sliding scale inversely proportional to society’s distaste for the accused or the

circumstances of the crime.2 “The question here is not whether a terrible crime was

committed, but whether, in light of the undisclosed evidence, the defendant received

a fair trial … resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Robinson III, 21-0812,

397 So.3d at 384 (Weimer, C.J., dissenting). I find he did not.

1 A district attorney “represents the State, and the State demands no victims. It seeks justice only, equal and impartial justice, and it is as much the duty of the district attorney to see that no innocent man suffers as it is to see that no guilty man escapes.” Tate, supra. 2 Neither should the imperative to correct the deprivation of a constitutionally guaranteed right cede to reliance interests and administrative concerns. See State v. Reddick, 21-1893 (La. 10/21/22), 351 So.3d 273, 297 (Griffin, J., dissenting). Practical difficulties with retrying this case decades later are ultimately attributable to the State by its initial failure to disclose to the defendant the evidence at issue. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, ANGOLA, LOUISIANA

On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides

GUIDRY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

Based on the credible and substantial evidence presented in the postconviction

proceedings and for the reasons articulated by Chief Justice Weimer in State ex rel.

Robinson v. Vannoy, 21-00812 (La. 1/26/24), 378 So. 3d 11, 17-45, opinion vacated

and superseded on reh'g, 21-00812 (La. 12/13/24), 397 So. 3d 333, reh'g granted,

21-00812 (La. 3/20/25), 403 So. 3d 530 and in State ex rel. Robinson v. Vannoy, 21-

00812, p. 63 (La. 12/13/24), 397 So. 3d 333, 383-88 (Weimer, C.J., dissenting), reh'g

granted, 21-00812 (La. 3/20/25), 403 So. 3d 530, the defendant is entitled to a new

trial wherein all the relevant evidence, including that wrongfully withheld by the

prosecution, can be presented to and be considered by the jury.

The murders committed are without question horrible, senseless, and

unjustifiable. There should be punishment meted out to the person who committed

the murders, but that decision should be determined by a jury, beyond a reasonable

doubt, based on all available and relevant evidence.

This purely circumstantial evidence case turns on doubt and whether the

newly discovered evidence of certain beneficial treatment received by one of the

prosecution’s key witnesses would be sufficient to tip the scale not just on on the

determination of sentencing, but the determination of guilt. The prosecution and some members of this court contend that the newly discovered evidence does not

rise to the level of a violation of the legal principles espoused in Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), Napue v. People of State of

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), Giglio v. United States,

405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.

419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) by improperly assessing the materiality

of the postconviction evidence separately rather than cumulatively as required by

the foregoing cases. While the majority contends that the prosecution’s case was

strong enough to convict the defendant even without the highly contested testimony

of Leroy Goodspeed, the fact that the prosecution offered Goodspeed’s testimony

indicates that his testimony was of value to its case. Moreover, in combination with

the several items of relevant and critical evidence that even the majority

acknowledges the prosecution withheld, the cumulative effect dictates a new trial

wherein the jury, rather than the majority, can assess the weight and importance of

the additional evidence in determining the defendant’s guilt.

By failing to properly evaluate the undisclosed exculpatory evidence withheld

by the prosecution, the majority improperly invades upon the province of the jury to

determine the defendant’s guilt with extremely grave consequences. For these

reasons, I dissent.