State ex rel. Clark v. Gray

931 S.W.2d 484, 1996 Mo. App. LEXIS 1663, 1996 WL 570738
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 8, 1996
DocketNo. 69960
StatusPublished

This text of 931 S.W.2d 484 (State ex rel. Clark v. Gray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Clark v. Gray, 931 S.W.2d 484, 1996 Mo. App. LEXIS 1663, 1996 WL 570738 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

CRANE, Presiding Judge.

The relators, five City of St. Louis aider-men, petitioned the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, Register of the City of St. Louis, to file, preserve, and publish a Board bill which had been endorsed as approved but subsequently vetoed by the May- or before it was returned to the Board of Aldermen as disapproved. Relators appeal the circuit court’s judgment in favor of the Register. We affirm.

This case was submitted on a joint stipulation of facts. The stipulated facts reveal that on July 21,1995, the City of St. Louis Board of Aldermen adopted Board Bill 130 (Committee Substitute) relating to burglar alarm systems. On July 21, 1995, the signed, enrolled copy of Board Bill 130 was sent to the Office of the Mayor, along with other board bills adopted on that date, as required by Article IV, Section 17 of the Charter of the City of St. Louis.

On July 26, 1995, the Mayor signed all of the enrolled copies of the board bills which had been adopted by the Board of Aldermen [486]*486on July 21, 1995, including Board Bill 130, and checked the “approved” box on these board bills. On July 26, 1995, the signed, enrolled copy of Board Bill 130 and the enrolled copies of all other signed board bills which had been adopted by the Board of Aldermen on July 21, 1995 were hand-delivered to the Office of the Register along with a letter indicating the Mayor’s approval. Respondent, Gladys Gray, was then Register for the City of St. Louis. On July 27, 1995, the Register’s office assigned number 63531 to the signed, enrolled copy of Board Bill 130, filed the enrolled copy, and sent the Mayor’s letter dated July 26, 1995, but not the enrolled copy of Board Bill 130, to the Clerk of the Board of Aldermen. A copy of the Mayor’s letter dated July 26, 1995 was distributed by the Assistant Clerk of the Board of Aldermen to the President of the Board, the Clerk of the Board and the Board’s legal counsel. Later that same day, a clerk from the Register’s Office requested that the Mayor’s letter be returned to the Register’s Office, and the original letter was returned to the Register as requested'. On August 1, 1995, the Register assigned number 63531 to an approved board bill other than Board Bill 130.

On August 4, 1995, a member of the May- or’s staff delivered to the Assistant Clerk of the Board a letter that stated that Board Bill 130 was disapproved. The signed, enrolled copy of Board Bill 130 was returned with the letter, with the box denominated “disapproved” checked next to the Mayor’s signature. Each page of the enrolled copy of Board Bill 130, which was delivered to the Clerk of the Board of Aldermen on August 4, 1995, along with the Mayor’s disapproval letter, was stamped Ordinance Number 63531.

The enrolled copy of Board Bill 130 which was delivered to the Mayor after its adoption by the Board of Aldermen on July 21, 1995, was never returned to the Board of Aider-men with the Mayor’s approval endorsed thereon. The enrolled copy of Board Bill 130 that was delivered to the Mayor after its adoption by the Board of Aldermen on July 21,1995, was returned to the Board of Aider-men with the Mayor’s disapproval endorsed thereon within twenty days after it was presented to the Mayor. The Board of Aider-men had not finally adjourned at any time from July 21, 1995 through August 4, 1995.

Relators petitioned the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis for a writ of mandamus. In their petition, relators alleged that the Mayor approved Board Bill 130 and transmitted this “ordinance” to the Register, and that under the city charter the Register was required to preserve and publish the ordinance she had numbered and filed and was prohibited from returning it to the Mayor’s office. The Register filed an answer along with a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, which was dismissed prior to this appeal. The parties filed a. joint stipulation of facts on November 20, 1995. The trial court filed its order and judgment on December 13, 1995, denying relators’ request for a writ of mandamus. The trial court found that the Mayor did not return the bill with his approval to the Board as required by the city charter and therefore it had not been approved. In their appeal from this judgment, relators claim the bill was approved by the Mayor and therefore the Register was required to number, file, publish and preserve it.

On appeal, we review a judgment denying a petition for a writ of mandamus in the same manner as other non-jury civil matters. We sustain the judgment of the trial court unless no substantial evidence exists to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. State ex rel. Kessler v. Shay, 820 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Mo.App.1991); Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).

The issues on this appeal involve Article IV, Sections 17 and 21 of the City Charter. Section 17 provides in relevant part:

Each bill shall be presented to the mayor immediately after its adoption, but shall not be acted upon by him (except it be an emergency measure) within ten days after its adoption. He shall within twenty days after its presentation to him return it with his approval or disapproval endorsed thereon to the board of aldermen, or, if said board shall have finally adjourned, to the register. Failure so to return any bill within said time shall constitute approval [487]*487thereof by the mayor. If the mayor approves the bill, or fails to return it as and when above provided, it shall become an ordinance, subject to the referendum provisions of this charter. If he returns it to the register, with his disapproval endorsed thereon, after said board shall have finally adjourned, but within said twenty days, it shall not become an ordinance. If he returns it to said board, with his disapproval endorsed thereon, within said twenty days and before said board shall have finally adjourned, said board shall reconsider it. If, on such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the members vote to pass the bill, the presiding officer shall certify that fact thereon over his signature and thereupon the bill shall become an ordinance, subject to the referendum provisions of this charter; otherwise it shall not become an ordinance.

Section 21 provides:

Every ordinance shall be immediately sent to the register, and by him numbered, filed and preserved in his office. Every ordinance shall be published within ten days after its approval by the mayor or adoption over his veto in the paper or papers doing the city publishing.

The Register’s duty to number, file, preserve and publish extends only to validly enacted ordinances. Braddy v. Zych, 702 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Mo.App.1985). Accordingly, we first address the issue of whether Board Bill 130 became an ordinance. Under Section 17 of the Charter, a bill passed by the Board “shall become an ordinance” if the Mayor approves the bill, or fails to return it within twenty days. The trial court found the bill was not approved because a copy of the bill endorsed “approved” was not returned to the Board of Aldermen within 20 days.

Relators contend that, once the Mayor signed Board Bill 130 and sent the endorsed copy to the Register indicating his approval, it became a valid ordinance.

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Bluebook (online)
931 S.W.2d 484, 1996 Mo. App. LEXIS 1663, 1996 WL 570738, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-clark-v-gray-moctapp-1996.