State ex rel. City of Columbus v. Boyland
This text of 391 N.E.2d 324 (State ex rel. City of Columbus v. Boyland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The singular issue presented to this court in the instant action is whether that portion of Crim E. 23(B) which deals with the number of jurors in misdemeanor trials violates the Ohio Constitution.1 Eespondent maintains that the Ohio Constitution, as interpreted by this court, requires that a jury must consist of 12 members, while Crim. E. 23(B) requires only eight members in trials involving misdemeanors.
Eespondent acknowledges that the rule states that, in misdemeanor cases, juries shall consist of eight, but cites Work v. State (1853), 2 Ohio St. 296, in which this court stated that the Ohio Constitution requires juries to consist of 12 persons, to be selected impartially, and to [492]*492reach a unanimous conclusion of “guilt.” Respondent further determined that the number of jurors in a criminal matter is a “substantive right,” not a “procedural right,” and cannot, therefore, be changed by the rule-making power of this court. Respondent relied upon this court’s opinion in Krause v. State (1972), 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, wherein it is stated in paragraph five of the syllabus:
“The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court of Ohio is limited under Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution to the formulation of rules governing practice and procedure in all the courts of the state, and by such rules this court may not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”
We disagree with respondent’s conclusion that the number of persons comprising a jury is a substantive right.2 This court has previously stated that, in general terms, substantive law is that which creates duties, rights, and obligations, while procedural law prescribes the methods of the enforcement of those rights. State, ex rel. Holdridge, v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St. 2d 175, 178; Kilbreath v. Rudy (1968), 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 72; Denicola v. Providence Hospital (1979), 57 Ohio St. 2d 115, 117, at fn. 2.
Crim. R. 23(B) in no way attempts to alter a defendant’s substantive constitutional right to a trial by jury.3 It merely prescribes the method by which the substantive [493]*493right is to be exercised. It is properly characterized as procedural in nature. The rule, therefore, was properly promulgated pursuant to this court’s rule-making authority pursuant to Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.4
We find that a clear legal duty exists and, therefore, order that a writ of mandamus issue ordering respondent to impanel a jury in accordance with Crim. E. 23(B).
Writ allowed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
391 N.E.2d 324, 58 Ohio St. 2d 490, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 401, 1979 Ohio LEXIS 463, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-city-of-columbus-v-boyland-ohio-1979.