State Ex Rel. Church of the Nazarene v. Fogo

Ohio Court of Appeals

State Ex Rel. Church of the Nazarene v. Fogo

79 N.E.2d 914, 82 Ohio App. 238, 50 Ohio Law. Abs. 63

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 20, 1947

Docket4024

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 79 N.E.2d 914 (State Ex Rel. Church of the Nazarene v. Fogo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State Ex Rel. Church of the Nazarene v. Fogo, 79 N.E.2d 914, 82 Ohio App. 238, 50 Ohio Law. Abs. 63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947).

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Opinion

OPINION

By THE COURT:

This is an action in mandamus wherein the relator seeka writ directing the respondent, Edward T. Fogo as Registrar of Motor Vehicles to issue to him license plates for an alleged “school bus” without the payment of the annual motor vehicle *64 license tax as provided in §6293-1 GC. The petition alleges-that the “school bus” in question is used to transport children to Sunday School and Bible School and to such school functions connected therewith, and all of which are operated in connection with a church. A general demurrer is filed to the. petition.

The question presented is whether a bus used for such purposes is a “school bus” as that term is used in §6295-1 GC, which section provides in part as follows:

“No school bus as hereinafter defined shall be required to pay the annual license tax provided for in §6291 GC. The term ‘school bus’ as used herein shall tbe construed to mean any vehicle, however owned, used exclusively to transport school children, either to and/or from school, or to and/or from any school function, having a seating capacity of more than five persons exclusive of the driver.”

It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that words used in a statute should be given their usual and ordinary me'aning unless the context requires a different interpretation. Consequently, it is necessary to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the words “school” and “Sunday School.” We think that the term “school” as so used denotes an institution of learning wherein a course of general education and mental training is offered for children similar to that offered in the public schools.

The term “Sunday School” as ordinarily used refers to a school held on Sunday for the study of the Bible and for religious instruction. The terms “school” and “Sunday School” are not synonymous, as ordinarily used, each having a distinct and different meaning. We therefore hold that a “Sunday Softool” does not constitute a “school” as that term is defined, and consequently a bus used in connection therewith would not constitute a “school bus” as that term is used in §6295-1 GC.

The demurrer will be sustained.

WISEMAN, PJ, MILLER and HORNBECK, JJ, concur.

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OPINION

By THE COURT:

This is an action in mandamus wherein the relator seeka writ directing the respondent, Edward T. Fogo as Registrar of Motor Vehicles to issue to him license plates for an alleged “school bus” without the payment of the annual motor vehicle *64 license tax as provided in §6293-1 GC. The petition alleges-that the “school bus” in question is used to transport children to Sunday School and Bible School and to such school functions connected therewith, and all of which are operated in connection with a church. A general demurrer is filed to the. petition.

The question presented is whether a bus used for such purposes is a “school bus” as that term is used in §6295-1 GC, which section provides in part as follows:

“No school bus as hereinafter defined shall be required to pay the annual license tax provided for in §6291 GC. The term ‘school bus’ as used herein shall tbe construed to mean any vehicle, however owned, used exclusively to transport school children, either to and/or from school, or to and/or from any school function, having a seating capacity of more than five persons exclusive of the driver.”

It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that words used in a statute should be given their usual and ordinary me'aning unless the context requires a different interpretation. Consequently, it is necessary to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the words “school” and “Sunday School.” We think that the term “school” as so used denotes an institution of learning wherein a course of general education and mental training is offered for children similar to that offered in the public schools.

The term “Sunday School” as ordinarily used refers to a school held on Sunday for the study of the Bible and for religious instruction. The terms “school” and “Sunday School” are not synonymous, as ordinarily used, each having a distinct and different meaning. We therefore hold that a “Sunday Softool” does not constitute a “school” as that term is defined, and consequently a bus used in connection therewith would not constitute a “school bus” as that term is used in §6295-1 GC.

The demurrer will be sustained.

WISEMAN, PJ, MILLER and HORNBECK, JJ, concur.

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79 N.E.2d 914, 82 Ohio App. 238, 50 Ohio Law. Abs. 63, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-church-of-the-nazarene-v-fogo-ohioctapp-1947.

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