State ex rel. Chance v. Sweeney

70 S.W.3d 664, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 700, 2002 WL 467735
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 28, 2002
DocketNo. 24267
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 70 S.W.3d 664 (State ex rel. Chance v. Sweeney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Chance v. Sweeney, 70 S.W.3d 664, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 700, 2002 WL 467735 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinions

JOHN E. PARRISH, Judge.

This is an original proceeding in prohibition directed to a proposed ruling announced by the respondent judge regarding discovery of medical records in an [666]*666action pending in the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri. The circuit court case is Rhianna V. Chance v. Darren K. Vodopich, et al., Greene County Circuit Court No. 199CC0032. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers and Cox Hospitals of the Ozarks, Inc. (collectively referred to in this opinion as “Cox”) are co-defendants with Darren K. Vodopich in the circuit court action.

Relator sought production of records of Cox regarding hospitalization of Darren K. Vodopich. Respondent notified relator and the other parties to the circuit court case that an order denying relator’s request for production of the medical records would be entered unless respondent was “prohibited from doing so by the appellate court.” 1

Relator filed a petition for writ of prohibition in this court. A preliminary order in prohibition was issued. Respondent was prohibited from denying the request for production of medical records pending further order of this court. The preliminary order in prohibition is quashed in part and made absolute in part with directions as hereafter stated.

The Circuit Court Case

The underlying circuit court case was brought in seven counts. Count I is against Mr. Vodopich. The remaining counts are against Cox. The circuit court petition characterizes Count I as an action for “Battery.” Count I alleges that relator was admitted to a psychiatry center operated by Cox on September 11, 1997; that she was discharged from that facility September 26, 1997. It alleges that Mr. Vo-dopich was admitted to that facility on September 20,1997; that on or about September 23, 1997, Mr. Vodopich injured relator while at those premises. It asserts that he, “without consent, sexually molested and raped [relator].” The petition alleges “Vodopich intentionally caused harm through an offensive and non-consensual touching of a sexual kind”; that as a result, relator “was caused bodily harm”; that relator “suffered severe emotional distress and will continue to incur future emotional distress.”

The claims against Cox are denominated as claims for “Negligence” (Count II), “Assault & Battery” (Count III), “False Imprisonment” (Count IV), “Breach of Contract” (Count V), “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress” (Count VI), and “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress” (Count VII). Counts II and VI are based on the circumstances that are alleged in relator’s claim against Mr. Vodopich — the [667]*667facts alleged in Count I of the petition. Counts II and VI assert Cox was negligent in failing to take actions that would have prevented the events alleged in Count I. Counts III, IV and VII are based on claims that Cox forcefully restrained relator by strapping her to a bed and by grabbing her and moving her to an area where she was ultimately restrained. Count V is a claim that Cox materially breached a contract with relator to provide treatment.

The requests for production of documents filed in circuit court include requests that Cox produce, pursuant to Rule 58.01:

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2. Any and all copies of all medical reports, office records, and hospital records regarding the treatment of defendant Darren K. Vodopich while he was a patient at Cox.
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4. Any and all records and contracts regarding the admittance of Defendant Darren K. Vodopich into the care of Cox.
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7. Any and all records of administering medications to defendant Darren K. Vodopich.
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10. Any and all written statements, transcriptions of oral statements or written memoranda from oral statements from Defendant Darren Vodopich regarding the incident mentioned in Plaintiffs Petition.
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Cox objected to requests No. 2, 4 and 7 “for the reason that it is over broad and burdensome, seeks to invade the peer review privilege and for the reason that it seeks to invade the physician-patient privilege.” Cox objected to request No. 10 “for the reason that it seeks information protected by the physician-patient privilege; seeks information which constitutes work product and/or trial preparation information.”

Similar requests for production were directed to Mr. Vodopich. His response to each request for production of medical records was, “Objection; seeks privileged information.” 2

According to copies of the trial court’s docket sheets filed in this court with the petition for writ of prohibition, the respondent judge on December 8, 1999, ordered the medical records of Cox produced “in camera.”3 A May 3, 2001, docket entry notes respondent’s intention to deny relator’s request for production of [668]*668the medical records. The docket entry was made following an in camera review of those records.

Rule 58.01 — Request for Production of Documents

Rule 58.01(a) provides, as applicable here:

Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents ... which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served;....

State ex rel. Dixon v. Darnold, 939 S.W.2d 66 (Mo.App.1997), explains the procedure for review of a claim that a trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in an action in prohibition.

In a prohibition proceeding the burden is on the petitioning party to show that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, and that burden includes overcoming the presumption of right action in favor of the trial court’s ruling. State ex rel. Vanderpool Feed & Supply Co. v. Sloan, 628 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo.App.1982); accord [State ex rel.] Lichtor [v. Clarkl 845 S.W.2d [55] at 59 [(Mo.App.1992)]. The reviewing court is limited to the record made in the court below. State ex rel. Terry v. Holtkamp, 330 Mo. 608, 51 S.W.2d 13, 16 (1932). The record under review in a prohibition proceeding must be sufficiently developed so that a reviewing court may make a proper determination as to the correctness of the ruling of the trial court. See [State ex rel] St. Anthony’s [Medical Center v. Provaznik], 863 S.W.2d [21] at 23 [ (Mo.App.1993) ].

Id. at 69.

State ex rel. Dixon Oaks Health Center, Inc. v. Long, 929 S.W.2d 226 (Mo.App.1996), states with respect to discovery:

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70 S.W.3d 664, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 700, 2002 WL 467735, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-chance-v-sweeney-moctapp-2002.